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Abstract 
Economic reforms in the Chinese industrial sector during 1979-88 have followed two 
lines: decentralization of the authority of the central government bureaucracy to the 
provincial and local level and movement within enterprises towards greater reliance on the 
market mechanism and away from government planning. The latter movement has led to 
the development of market mechanisms in Chinese industry, but the bureaucratic 
decentralization has restricted the development of a national market and encouraged local 
fragmentation with a consequent lack of scale economies. 
Local governments continued to have strong incentives to retain the collection of 
revenue from enterprises in their region even after the reforms. Decentralized fiscal and 
financial systems, particularly, the confusion between tax and industrial financing in the 
current taxation system, enabled local governments to do this. Distorted factor and goods 
markets also encouraged protection of local markets. 
The initiatives of enterprises in seeking profit maximization were reflected in 
decreasing production costs. The expansion of enterprises, however, was not decided 
solely or mainly by relative costs, but by the extent of local government control. Many 
(generally smaller) enterprises with high production costs were in a favourable position to 
take advantage of market distortions created by the partial introduction of market 
mechanisms. Market imperfections led to a pattern of iron and steel industry expansion 
which saw enterprises with high production costs expanding more rapidly than those with 
low production costs. This expansion pattern distorted resource allocation so that many 
III 
enterprises operated at less than minimum efficient scales, and potentially more efficient 
large-scale enterprises were disadvantaged. 
Empirical analysis supports the following hypotheses. From the point of view of 
the industry as a whole, overall industrial performance would have been affected by two 
competing driving forces: improved rates of technical progress due to the increasing 
market orientation of profit maximizing enterprises, and decreasing scale efficiency due to 
distortions in mechanism controlling expansion in the iron and steel industry. From the 
point of view of the enterprises, their technical efficiency might have been improved by 
efforts to udlize their production factors more effectively; the allocative efficiency of 
factors over which they have control might have been also improved. The allocadon of 
factors which remain subject to distortions in factor markets, however, has remained 
inefficient. The scale efficiency of enterprises might not have been improved and may 
even have deteriorated as a result of the segmentation of local markets due to local 
authority involvement in industrial investment and protection. 
Further reforms require the establishment of an equitable taxation system, a 
financial market and a labour market. The profitablity of enterprises would then be 
directly linked to their economic efficiency. The two-tier price policy and the policy of 
low nominal interest rates (usually negative while inflation rates were high) has to be 
changed to minimize the distortions in goods and factor markets. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Objectives 
This study focuses on the development of markets and their impact on performance in the 
Chinese industrial sector, particularly in the iron and steel industry, during the reform 
period of 1979 to 1988. 
Impetus was given to market-oriented economic reforms by the pervasive 
inefficiency in the utilization of factor inputs and hence the poor productivity performance 
of the Chinese industrial sector during central planning. Economic resources were not 
allocated according to their marginal productivities. Inefficient allocation of resources 
related to the lack of incentive for firms and individual workers to use factors of 
production effectively; distorted factor and goods markets meant that signals for resource 
allocation were inappropriate and there was a lack of mobility of economic resources 
across industrial sectors, firms and regions. 
Reforms were expected to improve industrial productivity by introducing some 
elements of the market mechanism into the centrally planned economic system. The 
effects of the partial introduction of elements of a market system to overcome inefficient 
resource allocation and hence to improve productivity has, however, not been empirically 
tested. This study undertakes such empirical tests. 
Reforms had the potential to influence productivity in three ways: 
. through the creation of greater incentives for enterprises and individual workers to 
utilize factors of production more effectively and hence improve productivity; 
. through the creation of factor and goods markets which would enable economic 
resources to be more efficiently allocated according to their marginal productivities; 
. through an improvement in the mobility of economic resources across regions, 
industrial sectors and enterprises. 
Economic reforms during 1979-88 were characterized by two types of movement: 
decentralization of decision-making power from the central government to local 
governments; and movement of decision-making from government agencies to enterprises. 
The policies implemented during 1979-88 included changes in the management of 
state-owned assets, the taxation system, industrial financing, wage determination, and the 
price and commodity distribution system. They are examined to determine their impact on 
the development of factor and goods markets, and hence on industrial performance. The 
problems that needed to be overcome by reforms included: 
. Determination of the appropriate fee to be paid to the State for the use of state-
owned capital assets. This problem arises from poorly-defined property rights of 
state-owned assets. While reforms in the taxation system and industrial financing 
have been designed to encourage the profitability of enterprises, miscalculation of a 
enterprise's true profitability because of a failure to account for the cost of using 
state-owned capital assets may significantly weaken the effect of these reforms on 
industrial performance. 
. Unequal marketing opportunities for enterprises under the two-tier price system. 
Enterprises are not given equal rights to sell their products for higher prices in the 
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free market. Hence the profitability of enterprises is frequently not related to 
efficiency but to the proportions of output sold at regulated prices and in the 
market. The iron and steel industry has been the key industry constrained by the 
State's plans. The central government usually controls large-scale enterprises but 
allows local medium- and small-scale enterprises to sell in the market. This 
introduces a bias against large-scale enterprises as they cannot fully exploit their 
market potential and their market share is therefore restricted. 
Locally fragmented financial markets. Even though reforms in the banking system 
have resulted in a change from previously free government grants to enterprises to 
bank loans, these are typically advanced at negative real interest rates. Bank loans 
therefore represent a net benefit to enterprises. Local governments have also 
played a central role in allocating bank loans from local bank branches to local 
enterprises and restricting bank loans across regions. 
The nature of job tenure and the wage system in Chinese industrial enterprises. Job 
tenure has made the creation of a functioning labour market in the Chinese 
industrial sector a difficult task. It eventually distorts the labour market. Before 
essential reforms to change the job tenure system were implemented, enterprises 
were allowed to issue bonuses to workers to reward their working efforts. 
Enterprise managers were supposed to determine bonus levels for workers 
according to marginal productivity. Without a functioning labour market, there 
were no rational constraints on workers' demands for increased bonuses. There 
was also no appropriate market-clearing wage rate that could be followed by 
enterprise managers. Reform initiatives for issuing workers' bonuses were 
essentially annulled by strong pressure from workers for an equal allocation of 
bonuses to all workers. This pressure resulted in wage increases which were 
unrelated to productivity and merely fuelled inflation. The Chinese experience 
seems to suggest that reforms in the wage system are unlikely to have an impact on 
productivity before the industrial relations system is reformed. 
Methodology 
This study aims to develop measures of industrial performance to assess the impact 
of reforms on the three aspects of efficiency improvement discussed above. 
The methodology applied is to disaggregate industrial productivity performance. In 
the time-series analysis, the effects of disembodied technical progress and economies of 
scale on productivity in the iron and steel industry are identified. An attempt is made to 
assess whether the Chinese iron and steel industry has experienced a systematic change in 
disembodied technical progress and economies of scale during the reform period. In the 
cross-sectional analysis, productive efficiency has been disaggregated to technical, 
allocative and scale efficiencies. These distinctive efficiency measures are expected to 
provide detailed and unbiased estimates of the effect of the development of a market 
mechanism on industrial productivity. 
Overview of the arguments 
In industrialized countries, the market structure of industries is highly differentiated due to 
the constraints on economies of scale (Gupta and Fuss 1979, Scherer and Ross 1990:97-
141). For industries exhibiting significant economies of scale, production is typically 
concentrated in a few relatively large-scale enterprises which are able to achieve a 
minimum efficient scale of production. These relatively large-scale enterprises are likely to 
have cost advantages and hence are able to capture a large share of total production. 
Observations from international data (see chapter 3) suggest that the iron and steel industry 
exhibits strong economies of scale. 
As the China moved from central planning to market orientation, it could be 
expected that a shift of factors of production towards more economically efficient regions 
and enterprises would occur. In the iron and steel industry, large-scale enterprises with a 
cost advantage should have been able to expand more rapidly than small-scale enterprises 
which lacked this cost advantage. 
The development of a market in the Chinese industrial sector during the reform 
period was fragmented by local government involvement associated with serious 
distortions in factor and goods markets. Local governments have strong incentives to 
retain the collection of financial revenue from enterprises in their region. Decentralized 
fiscal and financial systems enabled local governments to do this while the distorted factor 
and goods markets encouraged protection for local enterprises. The expansion of 
enterprises was not decided solely or mainly by relative costs, but by the extent of local 
government control. Many (generally smaller) enterprises with cost disadvantages (higher 
average costs than that of large-scale enterprises) were in a strong position to take 
advantage of market distortions created by the partial movement towards the market 
mechanisms. Market imperfections led to a pattern of iron and steel industry expansion 
which has seen enterprises with cost disadvantages expanding more rapidly than those 
with cost advantages. This expansion pattern has distorted resource allocation so that 
many enterprises are operated at less than minimum efficient scales and potentially more 
efficient large-scale producers are disadvantaged. 
It could be expected that all enterprises would have tried to economize factor inputs 
and improve the efficiency of their production scale since the market-oriented reforms 
encouraged profit maximization by enterprises. However, it is hypothesized that while 
there may be an improvement in the efficiency with which individual enterprises utilize 
resources over which they have control (such as internal factor allocation), this has 
coincided with a decline in the efficiency of enterprises due to factors over which they still 
have no control, including the declining scale efficiency of industry overall. 
Overall industrial performance was affected by two competing driving forces: 
improved rates of technical progress due to the increasing market orientation of profit 
maximizing enterprises, and decreasing scale efficiency due to distortions in mechanisms 
controlling expansion in the iron and steel industry. 
From the point of view of the enterprises, technical efficiency might have been 
improved through their efforts to utilize their production facilities more effectively; the 
allocative efficiency of factors, such as producdon fund accumulated from the retained 
profits of the enterprises over which they have control might have been improved. 
However, the allocation of factors, such as bank loans, which remain subject to 
distonions in factor markets may have remained inefficient. In addidon, enterprises' scale 
efficiency might not have been improved and might even have deteriorated as a result of 
the segmentation of local markets due to local authority involvement in industrial 
investment and protection. 
O u t l i n e 
The industrial economic system in the pre-reform period is discussed in chapter 2. This 
discussion indicates the key problems of the pre-reform system and how these problems 
were reflected in the development of the iron and steel industr)'. 
Chapter 3 describes the two main economic reform measures undertaken in the 
Chinese industrial economy: decentralization of the authority of the central government 
bureaucracy to the provincial and local level and movement towards greater reliance on the 
market mechanism and less reliance on government planning at the enterprise level. It is 
argued that the latter movement has led to the development of a market mechanism in the 
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Chinese industrial economy, but the former decentralization has restricted the development 
of an optimal national market structure and encouraged local fragmentation and sub-
optimal scale economies. 
Chapter 4 looks at problems that have arisen in the iron and steel industry with the 
segmentation of local markets. Cost and profit, expansion patterns of profuction and the 
technological characteristics of large, medium and small scale enterprises are investigated. 
Regional development patterns in the iron and steel industry are also compared. 
In chapter 5, the implications of problems related to industrial performance 
indicated in chapter 4 are explored. The detailed hypotheses which will be tested in later 
chapters are formulated. 
The results of econometric tests of these hypotheses using time-series data are 
reported in chapter 6. The estimates provide measures of industrial performance in terms 
of disembodied technical progress and returns to scale. 
In chapter 7, cross-sectional enterprise-level data from the reform period are used to 
test hypotheses regarding productivity performance during the reform period. The 
estimates of enterprise-specific technical, allocative and scale efficiencies over the period 
1980 to 1988 demonstrate how enterprises of different sizes differed in their productive 
efficiency. 
In chapter 8, the major findings are summarized and conclusions are drawn 
regarding the study's implications for economic policy. 
Chapter 2 
The Chinese industrial system in the pre-reform period 
Pre-reform Chinese industry was predominantly governed by a hierarchy comprising two 
administrative systems: central industrial ministries and regional governments (Fong Litian 
et al. 1984:80). This system is shown in Figure 2.1. The central industrial ministries 
prepared output targets for commodities and other economic indicators for the provincial 
and municipal industrial bureaux within broad constraints imposed by the State Planning 
Commission. Provincial and municipal industrial bureaux were immediate State 
supervisors of enterprises in their regions. This vertical administrative line passed down 
plans to the district and county levels in the same fashion. 
Compared with the Eastern European countries, centralized planning in China has 
always been crude and relatively weak, and did not cover large areas of industrial output 
even in the mid-1970s (Hare 1983:185-223, Naughton 1990:743-767). Regional 
governments also made their own plans and resource allocation decisions. Consequently, 
the regional industrial bureaux also received plans from their regional planning bureaux. 
Allocation of materials and products 
Plans at both central and local levels mainly addressed the allocation of materials and 
products. Even before the economic reforms, only a relatively small number of 
commodities were allocated by the central government through the State Bureau of 
Material Allocation. These typically numbered about 200 (and never as many as 600) at 
Figure 2.1 The industrial organization in the Chinese economy during the pre-reform period 
the 5 digit level of Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes. Steel was 
one of the most important industrial outputs controlled by central planners but was not 
completely planned by central planners even before the economic reforms. The proportion 
of finished steel controlled by Chinese central planners was 80 per cent in 1978 (Yu 
Xiaogu 1980:4 and Table 3.2). 
Local governments gained control over the allocation of large blocks of resources 
although it was necessary that allocations by local governments conformed to the general 
priorities of the central government. The central government priorities stressed heavy 
industry, defence preparedness, and self-sufficiency. Local governments had substantial 
authority to formulate and implement their own development strategies and tended to act 
like planners in their own right. 
The commodity distribution system in the pre-reform period was operated through 
three component entities which were organized along administrative lines: 
. The State Bureau of Material Allocation, which planned and allocated basic 
industrial raw materials and capital equipment to enterprises according to Central 
Plans. 
. The State Commercial Ministry, which handled the wholesale and retail distribution 
of industrial goods through its tri-level system of commercial distribution centres^. 
, The rural Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, which bought farm produce and 
supplied industrial goods to the countryside. 
^The first commercial distribution cenu-e was the provincial/municipal centre, the second was the district 
centre and the third one was the county cenU-e. These centres were charged with the distribution of 
industrial and some other products within their regions. Any cross-regional distribution was only possible 
through the first centres according to the Cenu^l Plans. 
10 
Chinese economists (for example, Wan Dianwu 1983) criticized this system as it 
separated producers from consumers rather than helped them meet and interact. This 
system was operated along distribution lines which followed the administrative hierarchy 
rather than economic geography. 
For enterprises run by central industrial ministries, their production plan was set, 
and most of their raw materials were allocated, by the Central Industrial Ministries. 
Profits from these enterprises were then remitted direcdy to the central fiscal authorities. 
The province or municipality within which the enterprises were located not only received a 
copy of the plan, but the planned acdvides of centrally-run enterprises also formed an 
integral part of the provincial or municipal plans. 
Fiscal planning and control 
Central planning was closely linked with the central budget. As soon as the central plans 
were issued, the financial resources would be allocated direcdy from the central budget. 
Compared with the planning system, the fiscal system in the pre-reform period was 
reladvely centralized. Although the fiscal system was subject to adjustments at various 
periods, it was mainly characterized by tongshou tongzhi, which means centralized 
revenue collection and centralized expenditure. Essentially, the State Financial Ministry 
pooled the profits of all State enterprises and other fiscal receipts and distributed them to 
local governments to cover their expenditures. As the distribution of income was 
arbitrarily decided by the State Financial Ministry, the central government played a 
decisive role in the pre-reform fiscal system. 
The banking system in the pre-reform period was monopolized by the People's 
Bank and functioned to provide planners' with cash and credit balances. Borrowing, 
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lending, sales on credit and advance payments by enterprises were not permitted. Every 
enterprise and government authority held its accounts with the People's Bank. Income 
from profits remitted by enterprises was collected in government revenue accounts at the 
People's Bank. State budget allocations of capital to enterprises were made through 
entries in the state expenditure accounts at the Bank. Thus, the Bank was responsible for 
seeing that all revenues and expenditures were made in strict conformity with the State's 
financial plan. Hence, the bank did not perform any role in allocating capital but merely 
audited the implementation of government plans. 
In the case of enterprises run by the central government and/or provincial or 
municipal governments, some ponion of transmitted profits would be retained by the 
provincial or municipal authorities. The output of jointly-run enterprises was distributed 
either by the central government, or by provincial or municipal governments, through 
commercial networks controlled by them. Depending on the importance of the commodity 
within the national economy, some goods were priced by the central government and other 
goods (primarily goods of local significance) were priced by provincial or municipal price 
authorities. Such bureaucratic controls were also applied to those enterprises by lower 
bureaucratic levels. 
Before the economic reforms, irrespective of whether enterprises were controlled 
by lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy or the central ministries, state-owned 
enterprises had almost no autonomy to operate in markets, not even in local markets. Only 
collectively-owned enterprises, which were usually run by counties, could produce 
without the direction of government plans. However, even collectively-owned enterprises 
had to sell their output to the state-controlled commercial centres. This meant they could 
not decide the prices of their outputs and could not choose markets (for example, in other 
regions) for their products. Their products were usually sold in local markets by a local 
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state-controlled commercial centre with the prices set by the provincial or district price 
authority. If a market is defined so that enterprises have the right to make decisions in 
their own self-interest and interact directly with consumers through price signals, there 
was no market for industrial output in China before the economic reforms . 
A striking feature of the system represented in Figure 2.1 is that enterprises were 
subject to controls from two, largely separate, bureaucratic channels. One was the central 
planning channel which exercised control through Central Industrial Ministries, the Central 
Material Allocation Bureau and the People's Bank. The other was the local planning 
channel which exercised control through its respective economic bureaux. Chinese 
economists called this dual planning system tiaokwai fenge, meaning the administrative 
separation between central industrial ministries and regional governments. 
The provincial/municipal planning system was not well coordinated with the central 
industrial planning system. Moreover, conflicts between the two systems occurred 
frequently. These conflicts arose because the more direct control the local governments 
were able to exercise over enterprises located in their regions, the more profits they were 
able to retain from these enterprises and thus the more financial revenue they had available. 
The greater the supply of products controlled by local governments, the more employment 
they were able to create, and finally, and maybe most importantly, the more political 
power they were able to achieve. Therefore, regional governments have always tended to 
impose controls over enterprises located in their regions, and have had a strong incentive 
to set up as many enterprises as they could with little consideration of economic feasibihty 
and comparative advantage. 
There were some industrial goods markets, previously called Ziyou Shichang (free market), in rural areas 
where prices were negotiated between sellers and buyers. However, public-owned plants and state-controlled 
commercial retailers were not allowed to trade in these markets before the economic reforms. 
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Dualistic structure in the Chinese iron and steel industry 
Within the administrative hierarchy (Figure 2.1), enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry were divided into centrally and locally controlled (enterprises under the 
administration of provincial or lower level governments). Subject to different levels of 
administrative control, the two groups of enterprises were highly differentiated in their 
respective production and financial capabilities. Their development in the pre-reform 
period demonstrates the conflict of centralization versus decentralizadon in the Chinese 
industrial system. 
The first five-year-plan period 
The output of the iron and steel industry that the Chinese government inherited in 
1949 was negligible. The highest annual outputs for pig iron, crude steel and finished 
steel were 1.8, 0.9 and 0.7 million tonnes before 1949 (Chen Dongshen 1987:1-7). The 
output for crude steel alone was 60 million tonnes in 1990. 
Immediately after the new government took power in 1949, China began to rebuild 
its iron and steel industry with the help of the former Soviet Union. Major reconstruction 
and new construction projects were scheduled for large-scale enterprises during the first 
five-year plan. These large enterprises formed the basis of the Chinese iron and steel 
industry and represented the large-scale side of the industry's structure. The development 
of the iron and steel industry during this period was dominated by the development of 
these large enterprises. The major nine key integrated steel enterprises produced 87 per 
cent of total national crude steel output (5.35 million tonnes) in 1957. 
The great-leap-forward period (1958-60) 
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The Great Leap Forward campaign aimed to industrialize China in a short period 
and enable it to catch up with, and even surpass, the most developed industrialized 
countries in the world. In order to achieve the iron and steel production capacity of the 
United States and the United Kingdom at that time, small-scale iron and steel enterprises 
called 'backyard furnaces' were built by the hundreds by rural communes, giving rise to 
exaggerated claims of a huge increase in iron and steel production. The production of pig 
iron in 1958 was supposedly 2.3 times greater than that in 1957, and producdon of crude 
steel was reportedly 2.07 dmes greater (Table 2.1). By late 1958, it became apparent that 
these small commune enterprises were using large amounts of valuable raw materials and 
rural labour to produce a near useless product. By the end of 1959, most of these 
enterprises had been closed down and none of them were left after 1960. 
Many medium- and small-scale iron and steel enterprises were set up at this time by 
various levels of local government (particularly provincial and district levels) and reached 
their peak production in the period 1959-60. It is the enterprises remaining from this 
development which form the small-scale side of the dualistic structure of the Chinese iron 
and steel industry. They accounted for as much as one half of China's pig iron and a third 
of its steel producdon during this Great Leap Forward period (Usack and Egan 1974:275-
6). Although the product of these enterprises was much higher in quality than the output 
from the backyard furnaces, it was sdll not good enough for many purposes. The main 
problem was the high content of impurities, especially sulphur, caused mainly by the low 
quality of the coal and ore used (Usack and Egan 1974:274). Addidonal problems were 
related to the high cost of inputs, the shortage of skilled labour and the huge transport 
costs. But, unlike the backyard furnaces, most of these medium- and small-sized 
enterprises were not shut down after 1960. They expanded outside the central plans, 
continuing to have an important impact on the structure of the iron and steel industry 
following the Great-Leap-Forward period. 
15 
The usual explanation for the massive increase in the number of local medium- and 
small-scale enterprises in the Great-Leap-Forward period is that they were simply the 
result of the ambitious plans of the central government (Tsao 1987:21). But the survival 
of these local enterprises, even during the period of forced economic adjustment (1960-62) 
and their further expansion in later periods needs further explanation. 
A likely reason for the survival of these local enterprises was the need for local 
governments to achieve self-sufficiency in iron and steel production. Iron and steel 
products have long been controlled by central planning and the planned prices of iron and 
steel products were held at artificially low levels. The unit value of finished steel at 1980 
constant prices dechned over time, and divergence from world prices increased (see Table 
3.6). But a shortage of iron and steel products in the Chinese economy remained. 
According to a study of the shortages of iron and steel products in the Chinese economy 
(Wang Mongqui and Hong Qiao 1987), Chinese domestic production of steel products 
could only meet 70 per cent of domestic demand for steel products during the 1980s. The 
extent of shortages can be partly seen from Table 2.1 which shows the steady increase in 
imports of iron and steel products as a proportion of total consumption. Under the 
distorted price system, local governments were not keen to sell iron and steel products to 
other provinces or levels of governments but rather tried to retain iron and steel products 
for use in their own regions. 
The second explanation for the continued existence of local medium- and small-
scale enterprises is the failure of the traditional commodity distribution system to allocate 
iron and steel products according to economically rational criteria such as willingness to 
pay. Under the traditional commodity distribution system, goods were not distributed 
according to price signals but according to regional bureaucratic divisions. This meant that 
16 
regions which tried to obtain more iron and steel products than their plan quota allocated 
had to have their own production capacity regardless of its efficiency. 
Table 2.1 Production of pig iron and crude steel (million tonnes) 
Domestic production Imports 
Pig iron Crude steel Rolled steel Rolled steel 
1952-57 22 18 14 5 
1958-60 63 41 27 3 
1961-66 61 60 43 3 
1967-76 185 189 128 30 
1977-79 97 90 63 23 
1980-88 392 408 316 96 
Sources: State Statistics Bureau of China, Chinese Statistic Year-book, 1985-1989; The Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-book of Chinese Iron and 
Steel Industry), 1985-1990. 
The period 1961 to 1966 
The Chinese iron and steel industry experienced a decrease in production in the first 
two years during this period. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians in the mid-1960s had 
a considerable impact. Not only did the technicians leave China with several large-scale 
enterprises unfinished, (including the Wuhan and Paoto Iron and Steel Companies), but 
they also took with them managerial and technical know-how which, while often outdated 
by market economy standards, was in extremely short supply in China. Thereafter, the 
Chinese government began to look toward the west for modem steel technology. Basic 
oxygen furnaces were imported from Austria and air separation enterprises from Japan and 
other western countries. The production of alloy steel was greatly increased by the 
expansion of electric steel capacity — mostly by importing electric furnaces from Japan. 
This contributed to an increase in production in the later years during this period. 
Therefore, production of crude and rolled steel over the entire period was still increased 
compared to the last period. However, only large-scale enterprises and, in some cases, 
the local medium-scale enterprises, could obtain access to this modern technology. Even 
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in the large-scale enterprises, modem technology was used together with the equipment 
produced in the 1940s-1960s. The development of the Chinese iron and steel industry 
during 1961-66 was characterised by a decline in output from medium- and small-scale 
enterprises. Their production of pig iron, which was 4.3 million tonnes in 1961, fell to 
only 1.5 million tonnes in 1965 (The Ministiy of Metallurgical Industry of China 1985). 
The cultural revolution (1967-76) 
This period saw another surge in the growth of local small-scale enterprises. 
During the Cultural Revolution, the development of the iron and steel industry followed 
the strategy of 'walking on two legs', that is, a balanced development between local, 
medium- and small-scale enterprises and the centrally-controlled large enterprises. This 
strategy is best understood as an acknowledgement by the central government of pressure 
from local governments to develop their own iron and steel production capacity to meet 
local demand. With local government support, the small-scale enterprises used local 
labour and raw materials. Since these enterprises were more or less an improved version 
of earlier small-scale enterprises, their technological constraints continued to be serious 
compared with those of the state-controlled large-scale enterprises. Meanwhile, the state 
also established a few large-scale enterprises in the inland, including the Panzhihua Iron 
and Steel Company, the Changcheng Special Steel Company, the Shuicheng Iron and 
Steel Company, the Jiuquan Iron and Steel Company and the Nigxia Shizuishan Iron and 
Steel Works. These were built as pan of the process of zhanbei (preparation for war). 
With the development focus biased in favour of these inefficiently located large-scale 
enterprises, the Chinese iron and steel industr>' could not upgrade technolog>' and improve 
economies of scale in existing large-scale enterprises. 
The post Mao period (1977-78) 
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Immediately following the Cultural Revolution, iron and steel production was 
nominated by the Chinese government as a key factor in the campaign of 'four 
modernizations' (modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and 
defence). The planned target of annual steel production was set at 50 million tonnes 
more than double 1977 production. To achieve this ambitious target, the Chinese 
government decided to build new iron and steel enterprises rather than expand the capacity 
of existing enterprises. The Shanghai Baoshan Iron and Steel Corporation was 
established - the largest iron and steel corporation in terms of capital investment built in 
China to that date. The basic production facilities were imported from Japan and more 
than 10 billion Yuan (US 3 billion dollars at the 1980 foreign exchange rate) was invested 
in this corporation. However, production by local, medium- and small-scale enterprises 
was also expanded partly because of the ambitious campaign of 'four modernization' and 
partly because of increasing local demand for the iron and steel products. 
Two interesting points emerge: why did a centrally planned economy allow this 
dualistic development pattern to persist in such a technology- and capital-intensive 
industry, and how did the rigidity of this dualistic structure influence the implementation 
of the objectives of economic reform in the Chinese iron and steel industry? In chapters 3 
and 4, economic reforms and the characteristics of the development of a market system in 
the Chinese iron and steel industry are examined. The impacts of economic reform and the 
introduction of a market mechanism on the dualistic structure of the iron and steel industry 
are assessed. 
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Chapter 3 
Economic reforms in the industrial sector in the period of 1979-88 
Although there was no comprehensive blueprint for economic reforms in the Chinese 
industrial sector in the 1980s, fundamental changes were introduced in almost every area 
of the economy. Asset ownership, industrial planning, financing, pricing, labour 
allocation and worker income determination and commodity distribution all underwent 
some change. 
The reforms aimed to replace the previously highly centralized planned economy 
with a system containing elements of both plan and market. The primary purpose of 
reforms was to provide incentives to local governments and enterprises to utilize their 
assets more effectively to further their own self-interest and thereby improve national 
economic efficiency. However, the reforms were contradictory in many aspects. 
The principle of self-interest governed the behaviour of workers, enterprises and 
even local governments, a hierarchical control structure by government bureaucrats 
remained. Local governments became more important in a newly adjusted hierarchical 
control structure and tried to protect local industrial development from national 
competition. This change had the serious effect of causing the industrial markets to 
develop in a locally segmented manner. 
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The effons at separating ownership and control rights between state agencies and 
state-owned enterprises did litde to alter the traditional structure of socialist ownership. As 
a result, the economic activities of enterprises continued to be subject to direct intervention 
from government agencies. The mobility of capital and other resources between 
enterprises and regions was even more restricted than previously, as local governments 
introduced restrictions to protect their revenue sources. 
The general framework of economic reforms 
Schurman (1971:175-6) divided decentralization in the pre-reform Chinese economic 
system into two categories: "decentralization I and 11". He used the term "decentralization 
type I" to mean that certain centralized decision-making was delegated down to enterprises 
themselves. In "decentralization type 11" the delegation reached some level of regional 
administration. Schurman's framework can be used to categorize various reforms 
implemented in the reform period in China, especially, if his concept of decentraUzation I 
can be re-defmed to include the market-oriented reform measures. Accordingly, two types 
of decentralization can be identified in the Chinese economic reforms. 
. The central government's power to local governments (decentralization 
type II in Schurman's framework). There were those (see, for example, Li 
Chenrei and Zhang Zuoyuan 1979, Zhou Shulian et al 1979 and Gui Shiyong 
1979) who maintained that bureaucratic power was too concentrated in the hands 
of central state agencies and should be transferred to the local governments. Those 
arguing for this view claimed that because too much power resided in the hands of 
the central state agencies, the local governments had to constantiy consult with the 
central state agencies on every issue and, therefore, there was very Httie freedom 
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freedom for local initiatives. Therefore, the reforms should create possibilities for 
greater local initiative. 
. Decentralization of authority to enterprise management (decentralization 
type I in Schurman's framework). Others (see, for example, Dong Furen 1979, 
Hua Shen et al 1988) stressed the importance of improved micro-management, not 
only in terms of administrative decentralization, but also in terms of the 
relationships between the state agencies and industrial enterprises. Those 
promoting these policies saw these relationships as being more economic than 
administrative in nature. They argued that enterprises had insufficient decision-
making power and little opportunity to use initiative in economic matters. This 
created general passivity and inefficiency. Accordingly, economists supporting 
this approach argued that the most important concern was to conduct 
microeconomic reforms, especially ownership reform, to give enterprises more 
decision-making power. 
Decentralization of the central government's power to local bureaucracies 
An attempt was made in the early 1980s to replace industrial bureaux of local governments 
with companies which were expected to function under market conditions rather than as 
bureaucratic agencies. But these companies still had to obey the plans from either the 
central or local planning channels. It was then clear that this 'reform' lacked substance, 
and was basically nothing more than a renaming of the local industrial bureaux, while their 
previous functions remained intact. 
Although the organizational change within traditional bureaucratic structures was 
trivial, the central government nevertheless transferred considerable economic power to 
local governments through its reforms of the planning and fiscal systems. 
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Reform in the planning system 
The goal of reform in the planning system was that 'the socialist economy should be 
the market economy under the direction of planning' (Central Committee of Chinese 
Communist Party 1984). A Chinese economist described this 'market economy under the 
direction of planning' as the close coordination of plan and market rather than a mix of a 
separately functioning planning system and market, and further defined it as a situation 
where 'planners would control the market, and the market guide the enterprises' (Liu 
Guoguang 1980, 1989). This concept could be further explained as a situation whereby 
enterprises would be allowed to function in the market at the margin, while the government 
disseminated information and used its power to influence market conditions (Naughton 
1990: 763). 
During the early reform period (1980-82), the general principle guiding reform of 
the planning system was division of the economy into sections subject to compulsory 
plans, guidance plans and the market. According to one reform document (State Planning 
Commission of China 1983), the division of the economy between these types of 
regulation was established according to the importance of the products and the enterprises 
under consideration. Products that were 'fundamental to state plans and people's 
livelihood' as well as 'key enterprises that affected the entire economy' were subject to 
compulsory plans. Other tasks that were 'relatively important to the development of the 
economy and society' were subject to guidance plans. Activities that did not affect the 
overall economy would be left to the market. This reform document reflects how poorly 
the government understood the reality of the Chinese economy. To take coal and steel 
production as an example, even though they have been the most important products in the 
state plans, they have always been produced by both large and small enterprises. The 
large enterprises were fully integrated into government plans, while the small enterprises 
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produced a considerable amount outside the control of government plans. Therefore, the 
division of the economy into planning types according to commodity type was neither fully 
meaningful nor achievable. 
During 1984 the government moved to a dual-track strategy of reform. According 
to this strategy, even large state-owned enterprises were allowed to sell their output outside 
the State plan, once their planned targets were achieved. However, for some crucial 
products, such as finished steel, price ceilings were imposed for output above the plan, 
although the price of this output was allowed to differ from the plan prices. In fact, the 
government authorities were only able to 'guide' enterprises to sell theu" above-plan output 
at ceiling prices. However, as enterprises decided to whom they would sell the above-plan 
output, it was almost impossible for government agencies to prevent retailers of this output 
from selUng at market prices determined by under-the-table contracts. This was despite the 
fact that such retailers obtained the above-plan output at the ceiling prices (and sometimes 
for lower prices). Thus, the market mechanism eventually invaded the sphere of basic 
commodities and key enterprises, even though guidance planning was supposed to prevent 
this. 
Guidance planning was the key factor in reforms of the planning system. Like 
compulsory plans, guidance plans also assigned tasks to enterprises by government 
agencies. Unlike compulsory plans, these tasks were not decided by governments but 
formulated by negotiation between government agencies and enterprises. The key aspect 
of an operational guidance plan was that the government agency had to allocate scarce 
inputs to enterprises at prices below the market level. In return, enterprises would fulfil 
the guidance plan; that is, sell their output to the government agency at a correspondingly 
low price. Guidance planning remained quantitative and there was a crucial link between 
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the guidance plan and material allocation. The real changes in the planning system 
following the introduction of guidance plans were twofold. 
. The bargaining power of enterprises with planners over input allocation was 
enhanced. Guidance plans were eventually contracted between government 
planners and enterprises in a bilateral monopoly situation. 
. Local governments played an important role in the formulation of guidance plans. 
The central government provided various incentives for local governments to carry 
out guidance plans. For example, according to the Seventh Five-Year Plan for 
1986-90 (State Council of China, 1985:53, 64), local governments which invested 
in new capacity for electricity generation were given control over the electricity 
generated, in proponion to investment shares, for 20 years. Similarly, local 
investment in raw materials was rewarded by control over output. To a certain 
extent, guidance planning in practice was simply the transfer of some previously 
centrally-controlled activities to local governments. Local governments then 
exercised a set of ad hoc interventions into new market arenas by using the 
traditional instruments of planned material supply. 
Reform in the fiscal system 
In 1980, a new version of the national budget control mechanism, characterized as 
shouzhi fenlei minquei gejicaizhen zeiren (classification of income and expenditure 
combined with multi-tier financial responsibility) was estabUshed to replace the previous 
system. The basic aspect of this refonm was a five-year contract between central and local 
governments which established a fixed amount of income owed to the central government 
by local governments and set the expenditure levels of the local governments. The local 
governments then had autonomy over any residual revenue, that is, the balance of actual 
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over contracted revenue. However, the central government found that it was impossible to 
keep central budget expenditure to a pre-determined level, even for two years. Over the 
period 1980-84, increased central budget expenditure led to a high central government 
fiscal deficit and the central government had to borrow from local governments to relieve 
its fiscal difficulties. 
Further reform introduced in 1985 enabled the central government to share any 
residual revenue earned by the local governments. This reform policy was named 
sheishou fenglei, shouzhi chongding, doji caizhen zeiren (division of tax powers, re-
defining income and expenditure, multi-tier financial responsibility). The main aspects of 
the reform were: 
. Budget revenue was classified in three ways: fixed central income, fixed local 
income or income accessible to both central and local governments. Budget 
expenditure allocations continued to be based on ownership responsibilities. 
Centrally-run enterprises and organizations were funded by the central government 
and locally-run enterprises and organizations by local authorities. 
. Local governments were required to remit to the central government the portion of 
their fixed income which was greater than the local expenditures actually incurred. 
If the local fixed income was smaller than their actual expenditure, local 
governments were granted a percentage of the 'income accessible to both central 
and local governments'. If the local governments still had problems financing their 
expenditure, they could obtain a fixed amount of subsidy from the central 
government. 
Once set, the income sharing percentages and amounts for remitting, or for 
subsidization, remained constant for five years. 
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Local governments were thus given responsibility for maintaining their financial 
balances within a system which implied 'more income, more spending; less income, less 
spending'. 
In China, local governments were responsible for the collection of virtually all 
major taxes. Although tax policy and statutory tax rates were nominally set at the national 
level, local governments were responsible for the negotiation of management contracts 
with the enterprises they owned. Thus, local governments had the power to set effective 
tax rates through the establishment of quota profits and taxation of above-quota profits. 
Therefore, the revenue-sharing contracts between central and local governments had little 
effect in strengthening the authority of the central government in determining fiscal policy. 
Instead, increasing amounts of fiscal resources were transferred to the local governments 
(Ferdinand 1987, Oksenberg and Tong 1987, Shi Xiaomin and Liu Jirui 1989 and Blejer 
and Szapary 1990). 
The new fiscal system affected China's industrial structure in the following ways. 
First, local governments and enterprises became more influential in financing local 
industries. The iron and steel industry was mainly financed by the central government 
before 1980. The proportion of investment from both local governments and enterprises 
in total fixed capital investment steadily increased, however, from 1984 (Table 3.1). Bank 
loans were also controlled largely by local governments (Zhang Shaojie et al 1987). 
Second, local governments became dominant in controlling the production of enterprises in 
their regions. Control over finished steel products by local authorities increased 
dramatically after 1985 (Table 3.2). Third, the local govemmems tried to increase 
production of industrialmaterials that were in shon supply. The annual growth rates of 
finished steel output for 28 provinces, centrally-controlled municiples and autonomous 
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regions in the period of 1979-84, 1985-88 and 1979-88 show that every region achieved 
high growth and appeared to have developed its own source of steel products (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.1. The financial sources of fixed capital investment in the iron and 
steel industry, 1980-88 (per cent) 
State budget Non-budget funding Bank loans 
(central government) (local enterprises and governments) 
1980 77.2 17.6 5.2 
1984 47.2 41.4 11.4 
1985 33.1 47.9 14.8 
1986 28.7 54.6 16.7 
1987 23.6 56.3 20.1 
1988 16.1 60.0 23.9 
Sources: State Statistic Bureau of China: Year-book of Chinese Statistics, various years; The Ministry 
of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (Year-book of the Chinese Iron 
and Steel Industry), various years. 
Table 3.2. Finished steel controlled by the central government and local 
governments, 1978-89 (per cent) 
Centrally controlled Locally controlled 
1978 80.0 20.0 
1980 58 .0 42 .0 
1981 49 .3 50.7 
1982 50 .2 49 .8 
1983 49 .0 51 .0 
1984 48 .9 51.1 
1985 44 .3 55.7 
1986 43 .0 57.0 
1987 41 .2 58.8 
1988 39.8 60.2 
1989 32.6 67.4 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (Year-book of the 
Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), various years; 1978: Yu Xiaogu, 1980, Shixing jihua tiaojie he shichang 
tiaojie xiang jiehe, ba wuzi liutong gaohuo, (Promoting the combination of planning and market and vitalizing 
the system of material distribution),p.4; 1980: Li Kaixiu,1987, Zhongguo de wuzi guanli (Management of 
industrial materials in China), China's Financial and Economic Press, Beijing: 124. 
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Table 3.3. Average annual growth rates of the volume of finished steel 
output by provinces/central-controlled municipalities/autonomous regions, 
1979-84, 1985-88, 1979-88(%) 
1979-84 1985-88 1979-88 
Beij ing 24 19 22 
Tianj ing 8 12 10 
Hebei 20 14 17 
Shanxi 12 8 10 
Neimongu 51 18 35 
Liaoning 13 13 13 
J i l in 21 17 19 
Heilongjiang 10 11 10 
Jiangsu 21 83 52 
Shanghai 6 46 26 
Zhejiang 8 8 8 
Anhui 31 10 21 
Fujien 15 31 23 
Jiangxi 49 26 38 
Shandong 15 20 18 
Henan 27 23 25 
Hubei 22 13 17 
Hunan 6 8 7 
Guangdong 23 20 21 
Guangxi 12 20 16 
Sichuan 10 10 10 
Guizhou 53 4 4 48 
Yunnan 39 12 26 
Shaanxi 32 10 21 
Gansu 65 34 50 
Qianghai 23 17 20 
Nigxia 21 17 19 
Xingjiang 53 15 34 
Sources: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (Year-book of 
the Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), various years; State Statistic Bureau of China: Year-book of Chinese 
Statistics, 1981. 
The expansion in production by each province may also have been due to revenue 
optimizing activity by local governments. The local governments sometimes set up 
enterprises even though, from a national point of view, such enterprises represented a 
misallocation of resources. Inefficient enterprises received strong local protection from 
nationwide competition (Chen Dongshen 1987:1-7, Chen Kang 1990). This trend of 
localization restricted the movement of goods and pre-empted the use of inputs from a 
national perspective. 
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In brief, the decentralization of administrative power did very little to orient the 
Chinese economy towards a free market environment. The new markets tended to be 
segmented across administratively separate regions. 
Movement towards greater reliance on the market mechanism at enterprise level 
Ownership reforms 
Privatization of state-owned assets in China has been a poHtically sensitive topic to date. 
Debate on this subject has not been officially permitted. Reforms in state ownership have 
been restricted to adjustment of the relationships between state agencies and enterprises. 
Dong Furen (1979) identified two major weaknesses in state ownership. The first 
was that bureaucratic controls and regulations dominated activities of state-owned 
enterprises to such an extent that there was almost no room left for enterprises to develop 
their own initiatives. Second, since there was no direct link between a enterprise's 
performance and its controllable surplus, enterprises had no incentive to improve their 
productivity. 
Nagaoka (1989) made similar observations. He pointed out that the government 
agencies supervising state-owned enterprises were not economic institutions allowed to 
appropriate profits, but rather public bureaucracies which had little economic incentive to 
behave as an efficient investor. As the government agencies had very tight control over the 
management of a enterprise's production, no institution (neither the enterprise nor its 
supervising agencies) has a clear right to appropriate returns from productive assets. ^ 
Hence, there were very weak incentives for efficient asset management and accumulation 
by enterprises. High taxation and income regulations restricted the ability of enterprises to 
1 Chinese economists called this phenomenon 'Caichan xuzhi (ambiguous ownership of assets) indicating 
that no one gains from the utilization of state assets (Cao 1986, Hua Shen et al 1988). 
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appropriate profits, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, their accountability for 
losses was limited by explicit and implicit subsidies from the State.2 Additional net value 
created by better management of productive assets or by increased investment in 
enterprises was diffused across the economy, or socialized. Lx)sses were also diffused 
across the economy. Komai (1980) points out that the weak incentives for efficient 
investment in asset accumulation by state-owned enterprises were not in conflict with the 
tendency of enterprises towards excessive demand for government investment, the salient 
characteristic of state-owned enterprises in centrally planned economies. The strong 
propensity to invest was an artificial phenomenon which arose from the combination of 
soft budget constraints and the availability of cheap funds tied to investment. 
Consequently, although investment in state-owned enterprises was considerable, it was 
not necessarily efficient 
These weaknesses of state-ownership in centrally planned economies were largely 
due to the fact that the government bureaucracies exercised both regulatory and ownership 
functions with regard to state-owned enterprises. The government acted as the agent for 
the ultimate owners, the people as a whole, with supervising ministries or agencies 
monitoring the performance of enterprises and taking corrective measures as they saw 
adequate. But the government also acted as the regulator of enterprises' activities, often 
using measures such as taxation and subsidies, and pricing and investment regulations to 
achieve economic and social objectives. The supervising agencies played a key role in 
implementing these regulations. 
Reforms weakened the regulatory and ownership functions of government 
agencies, increasing control of enterprises over the assets they used and accumulated and 
allowing them to keep some of the benefits. Experiments in ownership reforms were 
2 This was named by Komai (1980) the 'soft budget constraint'. 
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begun in early 1979 in Sichuan province. The system whereby enterprises retained some 
of their profits established the first link between the economic benefits generated by 
enterprises and their performance. Later in 1979, the State Council issued five decrees 
encompassing expansion of the autonomy of enterprises, profit retention, removal of a tax 
on investment from accumulated funds from enterprises, raising depreciation funds that 
enterprises could use to upgrade production facilities, and access to credit. By 1980, the 
Sichuan experiment had spread throughout China to affect some 6600 industrial 
enterprises accounting for 60 per cent of the gross value of industrial output and 70 per 
cent of industrial profits G i^u Suinian and Wu Qungang 1986:442). Another decisive step 
towards nation-wide reform with regard to the separation of ownership and control was 
taken in 1984 when the State Council issued provisional regulations on expanding the 
autonomy of enterprises. The regulations authorised enterprises to make decisions on 
pricing, production and sales, investment planning, internal organization, personnel 
management and disposition of wages and loans. In 1988, these regulations were 
consolidated in China's Enterprises Law. 
In the iron and steel industr)', separation of ownership and control for state-owned 
enterprises was originally tried in the Capital Iron and Steel Corporation in 1981. This 
experiment was called the Contract Responsibility System. It was then copied by most 
other state-owned iron and steel enterprises (Capital Iron and Steel Corporation 1989, 
Yang Pexing 1989). The first element of this contract was that the enterprise was obliged 
to transfer an agreed amount of profit to the state. The enterprise's performance, mainly 
the profit level in the previous two or three years, was used to decide the basic amount of 
the transferred profit. A fixed annual growth rate for the amount of profit to be transferred 
was also decided between enterprises and government agencies. It was agreed between 
the Corporation and the relevant government authorities that the Corporation would be able 
to control its retained profit so long as it transferred the agreed level of profit. 
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The second element of the contract required enterprises to employ most of the 
retained profit they controlled in productive investment or technical innovation. The total 
volume of wages was linked to certain performance criteria, such as profit and asset 
accumulation. 
Third, enterprises still continued to receive planned production targets which they 
were obliged to fulfil. However, enterprises could now market part of their output. In 
return, government agencies guaranteed to control certain aspects of the market 
environment, including provision of production support through tax exemptions, 
subsidized or controlled interest rates and the allocation of raw materials and components. 
The fourth characteristic of the contract was that it usually covered a period of three 
to four years. 
Finally, enterprises were required to adopt an accounting system that separated the 
net assets of the enterprise into a 'enterprise fund' and a 'state fund'. If a loan was repaid 
with the profits retained by enterprises, the fixed capital financed by that loan was included 
under the enterprise fund. The rest of the fixed capital of the enterprise was included in the 
state fund. If a loan was repaid with the profits that should be divided between 
government and enterprise, the fixed capital was divided into the two funds according to 
the established profit retention rate. Depreciation was apportioned between the enterprise 
fund and the state fund according to the ratio of the depreciated fixed capital that was 
included under each fund. Although the enterprise fund continued nominally to belong to 
the enterprise, it was theoretically owned by the people as a whole, just as the state fund 
was. Hence, it may have been unclear to enterprises what the benefits of accumulating 
assets in the enterprise fund were because ownership was unclear. 
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Although the Contract Responsibility System enhanced enterprises' autonomy in 
management (Lee 1990), it didn't achieved the goal of clearly delineating the ownership 
and control rights of the government and the enterprise. Government agencies continued 
to exercise exclusive or dominant influence over the appointment of senior managers. Any 
investment exceeding 10 million yuan had to be planned by the government and all 
investment with regard to production had to be approved by government agencies. 
Allocation of credit, raw materials and labour were still largely under the control of 
government agencies as was the determination of output p r i c e s P r o f i t s retained by 
enterprises were also controlled. Enterprises were required to divide retained profits 
between production, innovation and welfare funds in fixed proportions. The bonuses of 
workers were required to be less than three months of workers' wages; bonuses beyond 
this level were subject to high taxes (State Finance Ministry of China 1988:184-6). 
The changes the Contract Responsibility System achieved can be described as an 
adjustment of behavioural regulation rather than a fundamental change in structural 
regulation in relation to the separation of ownership and control rights. A policy of 
behavioural regulation entails the government exercising direct control over the activities of 
the enterprise. A policy of structural regulation, on the other hand, involves the 
government in controlling only the policy environment of the enterprise (Perry 1984, Kay 
and Vickers 1990). Since a government agency cannot really know whether or not a 
enterprise is operating efficiendy, the creation of market signals to encourage efficiency 
would be vastly superior to the present system. Examples are market interest rates, 
exchange rates and wages. 
3 For example, the pricing of plants' above-plan output in the iron and steel industry was subject to the 
ceiling price set by the relevant government agency. 
34 
The lack of clear property rights for public assets is another constraint. Ownership 
reform was severely limited by the socialist doctrine that assets in key sectors of the 
economy must be predominantly owned by the people. To allow enterprises to accumulate 
and control their own assets was contradictory to this doctrine. Avoidance of State 
intervention in investment at the enterprise level was, however, an objective of the 
economic reforms. Therefore, the Chinese government decided that, although the 
enterprise had discretion over the utilization of the 'enterprise fund', the assets in the 
'enterprise fund' ultimately belong to the people as a whole. The contract system hence 
failed to give enterprises clear property rights over their retained profits. Enterprises faced 
the risk of state expropriation of their accumulated funds because there is no legal ground 
on which they can protect their assets. This lack of clarity regarding the property rights of 
'enterprise funds' discouraged enterprises from increasing their funds and hence their 
retained profits, thus providing the basis for government agencies to intervene directiy in 
the economic activities of individual enterprises. 
Distortions in factor markets and the price system increased the difficulties involved 
in devolving responsibility to enterprises. Distonions in the prices of factor and goods 
meant that government agencies couldn't effectively evaluate the real value of a enterprise's 
assets or judge its efficiency. Ownership reform in China hence involved continual 
bargaining and negotiations between enterprises and government agencies. Until price 
reform, there could be no uniform national regulations with regard to taxation, profit 
retention, subsidized or controlled interest rates and the allocation of industrial materials. 
The contract signed between government and enterprise was usually subject to change 
during the contract period. Government agencies continued to exercise direct control over 
enterprises' behaviour in profit retention, pricing, material supply and so on. 
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The fundamental goal of ownership reform, as expected by reformers, was to 
replace the previous administrative system of bureaucratic hierarchy with market 
mechanisms. Although the role of markets increased during the reform process, the role 
of the bureaucracy remained pervasive. Komai (1990:139) noted that the "vacuum left by 
the elimination of administrative controls, and thus by the elimination of direct bureaucratic 
coordination, was filled not by the market, but by other, indirect tools of bureaucratic 
coordination." He called this phenomenon "the persistence of bureaucracy" and "the 
systemic tendency of self-reproduction of the bureaucracy". 
Reform of industrial financing 
Komai (1980:306-9) argues that the existence of a enterprise in the traditional centrally 
planned economies was not contingent on its ability to cover all its costs out of its sales 
proceeds because grants, subsidies and tax favours could be negotiated to fill the gap. If it 
is agreed that the behaviour of enterprises in relation to the 'soft budget constraint' is the 
distinguishing characteristic of state-owned enterprises, reforms in industrial financing 
should have a major impact. 
A striking feature of reform in China's industrial financing is the confusion of 
industrial financing with the taxation system. More specifically, a proportion of a 
enterprise's profits in fact represented unpaid interest on state-owned capital assets. Taxes 
on these profits were then mixed with cost of capital. This has been the fundamental 
problem in the reform process. 
Reforms in the banking system. The first major thrust of reforms in 
industrial financing was to implement a market-oriented discipline, known as, 'bo gai dai\ 
moving away from the previous practice of supplying to enterprises all fixed, and much of 
the working capital, as interest-free budget allocations. Under the new system, the bulk of 
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capital advances was to be in the form of bank loans, to be repaid at interest rates. This 
reform was expected to give banking institutions considerable power to mobilize capital. It 
was expected that banks would use their capacity to channel credit funds to promote 
industrial expansion and preferentially to direct loans to enterprises in sectors suffering 
bottle-necks. In addition, reformers anticipated that through their ability to provide or 
withhold loans, to use differential terms and interest rates and enforce credit contracts 
through an expanding framework of loans, banks could act as a stimulus to a enterprise's 
efficiency. 
The ability of banks to direct credit towards efficient enterprises was however 
limited by local government pressure to extend credit only for regional needs. Local 
governments always attempted to prevent local banks from remitting excess reserves to the 
next level up in the bureaucratic hierarchy and from lending their excess reserves to banks 
in other regions. Although reform in the banking system gave banks the autonomy to 
issue credit to enterprises, the central government considerably weakened the impact of the 
reform by keeping nominal interest rates low (Table 3.1). With a high inflation rate, the 
real interest rate was very low and even negative. Accordingly, the more credit enterprises 
could obtain, the more subsidies they could obtain from the government. Moreover, the 
more credit local governments could force local banks to issue to local enterprises, the 
more benefit the local economy gained from the next tier of government, and the greater 
the fiscal revenue local government could expect to collect from local enterprises. As local 
lenders received low returns, transfer of their savings out of the region represented a 
welfare loss to the local region. In addition, since the real interest rate was low and even 
negative in some years, there was very little incentive for bank branches to choose efficient 
enterprises as credit recipients. It was preferable for them to follow local government 
priorities because local governments effectively controlled the careers of bank directors and 
their families. 
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Table 3.4. Annual interest rates on deposits and loans (weighted averages) 
and the rate of growth of bank loans to enterprises, 1978-89 (per cent) 
Deposit rate Loan rate^ Inflation Real loan rate Growth rate of loan 
1978 2.1 5.0 0.7 4.3 5.1 
1979 2.4 4.9 2.0 2.9 3.3 
1980 2.8 4.8 6.0 -1.2 17.7 
1981 2.9 4.9 2.4 2.5 11.7 
1982 3.2 6.9 1.9 5.0 7.3 
1983 3.3 6.8 1.5 5.3 11.3 
1984 3.5 6.7 2.8 3.9 38.3 
1985 4.0 7.3 8.8 -1.5 24.9 
1986 4.3 7.6 6.0 1.6 43.9 
1987 4.4 7.6 7.3 0.3 20.4 
1988 4.8 7.8 18.5 -10.7 22.2 
1989 8.0 10.9 17.8 -6.9 
Note: Includes the rates for budgetary loans. 
Source: Slate Statistical Bureau of China, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (Statistical Year-book of China), 
Beijing, China, 1980-90. World Bank, China - Financial Sector Review: Financial Policies and 
Institutional Development, Washingdon, D.C. 1991. 
The effectiveness of reform in the banking system was also adversely affected by 
'reform' in the taxation system. Enterprises were allowed to deduct the interest paid on 
bank loans from taxable profit. This also greatly reduced the effective interest rate. Thus, 
the tax system in its distoned form provided incentives to enterprises to substitute bank 
loans for their own financing of investment. 
Reforms of the taxation system. Reform in industrial financing provided 
financial power to enterprises enabling them to implement capital investment from their 
own resources. This reform went through two stages. 
During the first stage (1979-83), enterprises were able to retain control over part of 
their profits. This policy aimed to give enterprises an incentive to increase profits by 
improving their efficiency of capital utilization. However, it also encouraged managers to 
conceal the true level of profits as a strategy for strengthening their bargaining power with 
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state agencies to ensure a higher level of profit retention. Malpractice made the collection 
of government revenue from enterprises more difficult. Concern over this situation 
prompted the second stage of reform, known as li gai sui where enterprises paid taxes to 
the government instead of submitting profits. 
Reformers argued that taxes, once set in institutional law, would not be subject to 
any arbitrary bargaining between government agencies and enterprises. Moreover, the 
relationship between enterprises and government agencies should then be no more than 
that between tax payers and collectors. It was expected that so long as enterprises paid 
their taxes, government agencies would not direcdy intervene in a enterprise's economic 
decision making giving enterprises greater autonomy. It was planned to implement this 
reform in two steps. The first step was simply to change the profits previously submitted 
by enterprises into various taxes. According to the regulations, enterprises were to first 
pay a production tax and a tax on the state-owned fixed capital from profits. The 
remaining profit was then subject to income tax set at 55 per cent for the state-owned large 
and medium-sized enterprises. Income tax paid by small enterprises was determined by 
local government authorides and was usually much lower than 55 per cent. Finally, any 
profit was shared between enterprises and government. 
During the inidal stage of reform implementation, the government took taxes as well 
as a proportion of profits from enterprises. The distribution of post-tax profit was still 
subject to negotiation between government authorities and enterprises. Government 
authorities could arbitrarily interfere with the distribudon of profits of enterprises, but 
enterprises could also bargain for retendon of a greater share of their profits. 
Consequently, uniform tax regulations were not applied. Actual profit retendon was 
decided not only by the performance of enterprises but also by its connections with the 
local government. 
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Defects in the first set of taxation reforms stemmed mainly from the difficulty in 
determining uniform tax rates on state-owned fixed capital. In the highly distorted Chinese 
economy, it was impossible for the government to formulate a uniform tax rate covering 
state-owned assets in all industries. The iron and steel industry, for example, received 
considerable investment, but the prices of iron and steel products were kept at very low 
levels by state planning authorities. If a uniform tax rate on state-owned assets had been 
applied nationally, the iron and steel industry would not have been able to afford to pay 
such a tax from profits, unless the prices of its products were raised. Even if the iron and 
steel industry had been able to afford this payment, some enterprises, for example, the 
Changchen Iron and Steel Cooperation, which was located in a remote area for the purpose 
of 'preparation for war', would strongly argue for special treatment on the basis that its 
economic effectiveness was largely determined by its location, which was out of the 
enterprise's control. 
Consequently, the tax rate on state-owned fixed capital was replaced by an arbitrary 
fee which was decided as a small portion of the previously submitted profits of the 
enterprises. This fee was enterprise-specific and not related to the amount of state-owned 
fixed capital that enterprises used in their production. It was sometimes set well below the 
opportunity cost of state-owned capital. Enterprises which used more state-owned capital 
were therefore favoured relatively to collective or private enterprises. Hence, local 
governments were given power to negotiate the distribution of post-tax profits to 
appropriate some of the profits of enterprises arising from their advantageous allocation of 
state-owned capital assets. 
If a uniform tax on state-owned fixed capital could not be determined by the state, 
neither could the profit sharing arrangement arbitrarily determined by local governments 
reflect the real opportunity cost of state-owned fixed capital. Inefficient enterprises with 
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low profits, or enterprises able to conceal their true profits, paid less proportionally for 
their use of state-owned capital assets than efficient or honest enterprises. Thus, the first 
step of reforms in the taxation system failed to deliver an effective redistribution system 
which encouraged efficient enterprises and punished inefficient enterprises. 
The key to the failure of the first set of reforms was the confusion between charges 
for a enterprise's use of state-owned capital assets and enterprises' net profits. If a capital 
asset was owned by the state, the state should have charged enterprises interest on its use. 
The financial charge on the borrowed capital asset should have been determined ex ante 
according to the amount of capital used and the economic discount rate. However, under 
the distorted Chinese taxation system, the requirement of a enterprise to pay financial costs 
for its state-owned capital assets was determined ex post by its profits. Obviously, if a 
enterprise happened to be inefficient and earned zero profits, it was simply exempted from 
the payment on state-owned capital assets. 
The distortion in the taxation system resulted in some enterprises handing out funds 
in the form of bonuses for workers that should have been allocated to pay for the use of 
capital and provide for its depreciation. The required poHcy is clear, interest rates or taxes 
imposed on enterprises for their use of state-owned capital assets should be treated as the 
payment for capital by enterprises. 
The second stage of reforms to the taxation system was supposed to involve the 
levying of a uniform tax on resources (including state-owned fixed capital assets) in place 
of the previous tax on state-owned fixed capital and the government share of enterprises 
post-tax profits (He Zhengyi 1984 and Hua Shen et al 1988). It was hoped that after 
enterprises paid these taxes, they would be able to fully control post-tax profits and 
interventions from government in the distribution of the profits of enterprises would be 
41 
eliminated. More importantly, profit would become an effective indicator of a enterprise's 
performance. 
The tax regulations finally chosen were different from these principles. The key 
taxes on Chinese industrial enterprises were: 
. Product taxes. For different products, different tax rates were determined by the 
central government. 
. Value-added tax. The value of tax collected was determined by value-added tax 
rate applied to net output. Again, different types of products were subject to different 
value-added tax rates as determined by the central government. 
. Income tax. Income tax was calculated by income tax rates which apply to the 
gross profit subject to various tax exemptions allowed by the central and local 
governments. Gross profit was calculated as: gross income from product sales and 
other sources - product tax - value added tax - costs of the production of the sold 
products - marketing costs - technology purchase costs. Tax exemptions were 
usually given by local government authorities for enterprises which earned very low 
profits. The company income tax rate for large- and medium-scale enterprises was 
55 per cent. For small-scale enterprises, there were eight progressive tax steps up to 
55 per cent. 
. Adjustment tax. Three steps were needed to calculate enterprises' adjustment tax. 
First, profit in the base period had to be determined. This was determined as profit 
and industrial and commercial tax in 1983 minus product tax and value added tax. 
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The adjustment tax rate could then be decided as a proportion of profit in the base 
period minus income tax and profit retention in 1983 to profit in the base period. If 
this rate was zero or negative for a enterprise, no adjustment tax would have been 
applied in 1984. However, if the profits of enterprises later increased, whether and 
how the adjustment tax was applied was decided in the contract between the 
enterprise and relevant government authorities. The adjustment tax in any year was 
determined as: 
[the base-year profit x adjustment tax rate + (current year profit - profit in base year) x 
0.3 X adjustment tax rate] 
The increase of profit in the year under consideration over base year profit was, 
however, determined a priori in the contract between enterprises and government 
authorities at a fixed rate for seven years. 
Ironically, a tax on resources (including fixed capital and other natural resources 
owned by the State) which was originally expected to be the most important tax introduced 
in the second stage, was not implemented at all. There was no tax associated with state-
owned fixed capital in the new taxation system. Nevertheless, an adjustment tax was 
introduced as a substitute for the government's share of post-tax profits of enterprises. 
While the adjustment tax was again subject to negotiations to determine the distribution of 
enterprises' post-tax profit between local governments and enterprises, its function was no 
different from post-tax profit sharing arrangement previously employed. None of the 
problems with the first stage of reforms were solved by the second stage. 
The Chinese government was reluctant to give up its ability to control of the 
activities of enterprises, especially in relation to the distribution of the profits of 
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enterprises. This is one of the reasons that the Chinese government chose not to 
implement a uniform tax on state-owned resources and introduced the adjustment tax 
designed to give government the ability to expropriate post-tax profit of enterprises at a rate 
that could be decided arbitrarily by government authorities. Enterprises were also able to 
ignore the liabilities related to their pre-reform stock of state-owned capital assets. The 
lack of liability accepted by enterprises for state-owned assets continued a system in which 
inefficient enterprises could not be punished and forced to reduce or withdraw from 
production. This had the effect of preventing the movement of these assets towards more 
efficient enterprises and regions. The development of a functioning capital market has not 
eventuated. Since the incorrecdy calculated profits of state-owned enterprises were, 
moreover, used as a key factor in formulating other reform policies, such as contracts 
between enterprises and governments and adjustment of product prices across industries, 
the effect of the latter reform measures on resource allocation was greatly constrained. 
Reforms in the fiscal system had allocated many sources of investment funds to 
local bureaucratic control. Allocations of capital by local governments continued to be 
made on political and administrative grounds. Though institutional reforms in the banking 
system reduced monopolistic characteristics to some extent, the new system is still 
oligopolistic or locally monopoHstic in the sense that local governments can exercise their 
authority to force local bank branches to issue loans in favour of projects with high local 
priority. The movement of capital between local governments is hence limited. Cross-
regional investment through the use of 'extra-budgetary funds'^ which was largely 
controlled by local governments, was rare. Even though reforms in industrial financing 
provided individual enterprises with incentives to move their own accumulated capital 
Extra-budgetary funds include funds from any diversified financial source (local government-controlled, 
plant-controlled, local bank-controlled and even industrial ministry-controlled sources) except state budget 
funds. They have grown as a source of national finance since the reforms began. Extra-budgetary funds were 
41 per cent of State budget expenditure in 1979, 70 per cent in 1983 and 79 per cent in 1988. 
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between local territories, their efforts have been restricted by the locally fragmented 
financial markets and the interests of local governments. 
Reform in labour allocation 
Compared with the reforms in industrial financing, labour reform, especially within state-
owned enterprises, has been negligible. The issue of 'labour market' reform was 
politically sensitive in China because, according to Marxist theory, a labour market is a 
defining characteristic of capitalism. According to this doctrine, most national assets must 
be owned by the people as a whole. This means everyone is joint-owner of state-owned 
assets and has the right to work with these assets. This is the theoretical basis on which 
the Chinese State Labour Bureau exercised monopolistic power over the allocation of 
labour in urban areas, tongyi jouye tongyi fenpei (nation-wide planned employment and 
assignment of workers to work place). 
The administrative allocation of labour greatly restricted the motivation of workers 
and labour productivity. Workers can rarely move from their assigned work place to other 
enterprises. This means that most workers in state-owned enterprises had life-time tenure 
in the enterprise to which they were originally assigned, no matter whether they wished to 
stay or not. Managers had almost no right to dismiss inefficient workers. 
Reform was mainly restricted to the experimental labour contract system initiated in 
some industries in 1982. The labour contract system was only applied to newly employed 
workers. Workers were employed on contracts of varying length, agreed between 
themselves and the management of respective enterprises. At the end of the contract, the 
performance of the contracted workers would be reviewed by management and a decision 
would be made on whether or not the contract should be renewed. The contract did not 
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have to be renewed if the enterprise's manager found the labour requirements of the 
enterprise had changed. 
The share of contracted workers never exceeded 14 per cent of the labour force 
(Table 3.5) because little effort was made to extend the contract system to the established 
labour force. It was inevitable with urban unemployment low rewards for non-state 
Table 3.5. The structure of the labour force of the iron and steel industry for 
selected years, 1980-89 (thousand people) 
Years Total labour Contracted Contracted workers 
force workers in total labour force 
(1) (2) (2)/(l) (%) 
1980 228.6 0.0 0.0 
1985 268.8 10.0 3.7 
1986 274.9 15.0 5.4 
1987 282.6 22.7 8.0 
1988 304.4 38.0 12.5 
1989 309.1 42.5 13.8 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (Year-
book of the Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), various years. 
employment that the workers already employed by state enterprises would vigorously 
resist the contract system (White 1983:184, 1988:16). Labour contracts were almost 
always renewed so that contracted workers soon also obtained life-time tenure. 
Another reform allowed managers to appoint senior staff assistants. Managers 
could also promote staff and dismiss workers who repeatedly violated employment 
regulations. However, due to the lack of unemployment benefits, such dismissals were 
rare. Stricdy speaking, these measures couldn't be qualified as reforms in the labour 
allocation system, but rather as changes in personnel policy. They had hardly any impact 
on the mobility of labour between different enterprises and areas. At the margin, the 
flexibility of managers was increased and producdvity may have been improved to some 
extent. 
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Reform in the wage system was thought by Chinese policy makers and economists 
to be one of the key reforms. They believed that workers would have a strong incentive to 
improve labour productivity if they could retain a proportion of what they contributed to 
production. This belief was derived from the Marxist doctrine of income distribution in 
the socialism regime that "the distribution of worker's income is proportional to the 
amount of labour performed" (Marx 1876:16). It explains why the initial reform policy 
was to allow enterprises to retain part of their profits to issue as bonuses to workers. 
Without effective reform of labour allocation and the failure to develop a labour 
market, wage reform was, however, also limited. There was no equilibrium price for 
labour, that is to say, returns to workers were not decided by competition in a labour 
market. Labour was not yet considered a production factor that managers could choose to 
employ on the basis of its price relative to the cost of other factors. Without the constraints 
inherent in a competitive labour market influencing the behaviour of workers, existing 
bonuses became just another part of workers income. Managers found that the effect of 
bonuses on productivity was neutral or negative when the level of bonuses was not 
decided according to a enterprise's performance. 
The profits of enterprises might not truly reflect their performance but were 
influenced by the advantages that they received in distorted product markets due to plan-
determined resource endowments, or even the bargaining power of managers in obtaining 
material supplies from government agencies. It was easy for workers to claim that the 
bulk of the enterprise's performance was a result of their contribution and so demand more 
pay. There were great pressures on managers to allocate more and more funds for 
workers bonuses or other welfare expenditures, and less for investment. This was also a 
typical feature of Yugoslav labour-managed enterprises (Bonin 1985, Mitchell 1989). 
Reform in commodity distribution 
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The reform of commodity distribution aimed to encourage development of independent 
cooperative and private trading concerns. This was to be achieved by allowing enterprises 
to market a portion of their output directly, by-passing the bureaucratic network of the 
previous State-run commercial centres. 
Table 3.6 presents the allocation of rolled steel by different sources and gives an 
indication of the impact of reforms. These reforms included: 
. allowing enterprises to market a portion of their output. Market sales of rolled steel 
by enterprises in the iron and steel industry became a substantial part of total sales 
following the economic reforms; 
. increased role of local government in the allocation of products; 
. allowing enterprises to produce directly for consumers who could provide the 
required materials. This is reflected by the item of production for client from 
clients materials in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Allocation of rolled steel production by different methods for 
selected years 1980 and 1989 (per cent) 
enterprises 
Year 
Total supply 
Shipment by state contract 
Shipment by local governments 
Sale by enterprises 
Production for chent 
from client's materials 
Other 
Large-scale enterprises Medium and small-scale 
1980 1989 1980 1989 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
95.0 49.0 75.6 15.3 
2.3 12.3 15.1 35.1 
0.7 20.6 2.5 31.9 
1.6 11.5 4.7 13.9 
0.4 6.6 2.9 4.8 
Sources: Data for 1989 is from The Minisu^' of Metallurgical Industr}' of China, Zhongguo Gangtie 
Gongye Nianjian (Year-book of the Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), various years; Data for 1980 is 
calculated from Nadon-wide Industrial Investigation Office, State Economic Committee, 1987, Quanguo 
Gongyie Pucia Zhiliao, (Documents of Nation-wide Industrial Census), Neibu Zhiliao (internal sources). 
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It should be noted that local governments and enterprises distributed most of the 
products produced by medium- and small-scale enterprises. However, the State Bureau of 
Material Allocation still dominated the distribution of the products produced by the large-
scale enterprises. It appeared that medium- and small-scale enterprises were freer from the 
control of State Bureau of Material Allocation than large-scale enterprises. 
The dominance of administrative allocation was difficult to reverse in spite of these 
reforms. The State Bureau of Material Allocation was still an important force in 
distributing industrial materials and finished products, but even decentralized allocation 
operated on the basis of local administrative mechanisms rather than market-oriented 
systems. Bureaucratic allocation continued to dominate in the distribution of rolled steel 
despite the joint power of the State Bureau of Material Allocation and the local 
governments in the distribution of rolled steel (Table 3.6). 
Reform in the price system 
The traditional price system was closely linked to the commodity distribution system. 
While commodity distribution was dominated by the administrative allocation system, 
prices had to be established for products supplied under plans. Planned prices for these 
goods did not reflect supply and demand but the requirements of the administrative plans. 
The reformers (Lou Jiwei and Zhou Xiaochuan 1984:3-11) argue that the failure of the 
price system to reflect demand and supply led to the irrationally planned prices. In the 
sphere of production, the relationship between the price and production costs of a 
commodity was vague and prices failed to register differences in efficiency between 
enterprises. In transactions between state-owned enterprises, prices played a 'passive' 
accounting role and reflected 'planned' relationships between physical goods. In the case 
of consumer goods, prices were inflexible and too often reflected non-economic 
considerations. 
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The central goals of reforms in the price system advocated by the Chinese reformers 
were two fold: 
. adjustment of irrationally planned prices so that they related more closely to actual 
costs of production; and 
. deregulation of prices of most producer and consumer goods through 
decentralization of the price administration from central to local agencies, reduction 
in the range of goods subject to State price controls and diversification of the 
pricing system encompassing a range of fixed, negotiated, floating and free market 
systems. 
Iron and steel are basic industrial inputs for most industrial sectors. Thus, a nation-
wide adjustment of iron and steel product prices, which were kept artificially low under 
planning, would have had great impact on the cost of production throughout the economy, 
the price level of most of consumer goods and even the nation-wide pattern of income 
distribution. In 1984, the average prices of iron and steel products were increased by 
about 15 per cent (The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, 1985). The higher 
price level, however, was still too low to overcome excess demand. In 1986, the Chinese 
government planned to implement a comprehensive adjustment of the nation-wide price 
system. Its central concern was to raise the price of iron and steel products to a level that 
reflected the real cost of their production and cleared excess demand. As the effects of 
adjustments to prices for iron and steel products couldn't be predicted, only some 
consumer goods, such as wine and cigarettes, were chosen for the price reform 
implemented in 1987.5 
5 The social response to this limited price adjustment was also beyond the expectation of reformers. 
People interpreted this limited price adjustment as a signal of following nation-wide upward adjustments in 
price levels of many more goods and began hoarding almost every sort of consumer good, such as, bath 
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Reform of iron and steel prices then focused on a second area. Local authorities 
and enterprises were permitted to sell products under their control at prices up to an upper 
limit set by the State Price Bureau. This price level was, however, only 25 per cent higher 
than the planned price level (Tao Ying 1988) and still not high enough to remove excess 
demand in the market. Non-state retailers could earn profit margins as high as 300 per 
cent from the re-sale of such products. ^ The trend of the average price level of finished 
steel products is somewhat surprising: at 1980 constant prices, the unit prices of finished 
steel products during the reform period were generally lower than the pre-reform period 
values (Table 3.7). This implies that although the prices of products controlled by local 
authorities and enterprises could be set higher than planned prices, they were not set high 
enough to offset the rate of inflation over the period 1970 to 1988. This explains the 
increasing gap between prices of iron and steel products in China and on the world market. 
The average prices for China's iron and steel products were 46.6 per cent lower than 
world prices for similar products in 1984, and 54.1 per cent lower in 1988 (Tao Ying 
1988). In 1988, the planned price of ordinary finished steel was 70.7 per cent below the 
world price and, the upper limit price was 55.9 per cent lower than the price prevailing in 
the Japanese and US markets. 
towels and toilet paper. People then started to complain about the effect of price reform. Afterwards, no 
national-wide price adjustment was made. 
^ The prevailing market price of finished steel was 5500 yuan per tonne in 1988 (Du et al. 1990). 
Table 3.7 indicates that the unit value, the combination of planned price, floating price under the upper 
limited price level and market price, of the finished steel products was 1846 yuan per ton at current prices. 
This indicates that the market price was at least three times the plan price. 
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Table 3.7. The average price of finished steel products sold by the iron and 
steel industry 1970-89 (yuan/tonne)^ 
Year 1980 constant prices Current prices 
1970 1298.8 1162.7 
1972 1323.1 
1974 1402.2 
1976 1437.2 1226.5 
1978 1264.9 1171.2 
1979 1310.2 1134.6 
1980 1247.7 1176.7 
1981 1160.8 1129.2 
1982 1210.5 1185.7 
1983 1236.8 1221.4 
1984 1188.0 1220.6 
1985 1110.4 1391.9 
1986 1098.0 1517.5 
1987 1137.1 1650.9 
1988 1139.6 1846.0 
1989 1077.0 2064.2 
o 
Note: Average price of finished steel products was calculated by dividing the revenue from sales of 
products by the amount of finished steel. This method assumes that only finished steel was sold by the 
iron and steel industry. Even though finished steel has been always the dominant products sold by the iron 
and steel industry, some other products, such as coke and iron products, are also sold. Therefore, these 
calculated average prices for finished steel may be over-estimated. It should be pointed out that only the 
trend of these prices is relevant in judging the price level of finished steel. 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (Year-
book of the Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), various years. 
The upper price limit level set by the State Price Bureau for products controlled by 
local governments and enterprises greatly distorted the distribution of iron and steel 
products. While the upper price limit level was still far below the market equilibrium 
price, a enterprise's production was unlikely to respond to market demand. Corrupt 
relationships developed between local governments, enterprises and retailers, with illegal 
negotiations involving the distribution of super-normal profits between suppliers and 
retailers. This corruption is known in China as guan dao, meaning the corrupt activities of 
those bureaucrats who sold their controlled products to their guanxi hu (close friends or 
relatives) at planned or lower than market prices, so that these products could then be sold 
in the market at much higher prices. The resultant benefits were then shared between these 
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bureaucrats and retailers. These practices also occurred in some enterprises, which 
received benefits in the form of cash or goods from retailers who bought products from the 
enterprises at lower than market prices. The reported revenue from the sale of products 
could be concealed through the under-reporting of revenues and over-reporting of costs. 
In addition, commodity distribution was less likely to follow normal market channels 
because barter trade was encouraged by black-market activity. 
An increasing proportion of the production of enterprises was supplied to clients 
who provided raw materials (Table 3.6). Steel and raw materials, such as coal, iron ore 
and electricity, were in short supply. To avoid government price regulations, local 
governments and enterprises which controlled production or distribution of these products 
increasingly bartered with each other rather than produced for markets. 
The iron and steel industry had a two-tier price system. While the state controlled a 
significant proportion of iron and steel production and distributed it at planned prices, a 
growing proportion of output was sold by enterprises at non-planned prices, either at 
floating or market prices. Hence, enterprises were able to increase benefits to themselves 
either by selling more of their output at the floating price or by selling more of their 
controlled output at market prices. 
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Chapter 4 
Transition in the Chinese iron and steel industry 
In industrial organization analysis, the market structure of a particular industry can be 
defined according to "the number and size distribution of sellers and buyers, the degree of 
physical or subjective differentiation distinguishing competing sellers' products, the 
presence or absence of barriers to the entry of new enterprises, the shapes of cost curves, 
the degree to which enterprises are vertically integrated from raw material production to 
retail distribution, and the extent of enterprises' product line diversification 
(conglomerateness)" (Scherer and Ross 1990:4). In describing the development of market 
structure in the Chinese iron and steel industry, the following analysis focuses on the 
number and size distribution of enterprises and on the patterns of cost and profit of the 
different sized enterprises. 
Enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry have been classified as either key 
enterprises, or medium- and small-scale enterprises by the Chinese Metallurgical Industrial 
MinistT}'. The key enterprises were administered and controlled solely by the Central 
Metallurgical Industrial Ministry or jointly by the Central Ministry and provincial or 
municipal governments. Medium- and small-scale enterprises were administered by local 
governments. In 1980, each of the key enterprises produced at least 0.2 million tonnes of 
pig iron and 0.2 million tonnes of crude steel; enterprises producing under these levels 
were medium- and small-scale enterprises. The key enterprises will hence simply be called 
large-scale enterprises for convenience. During the pre-reform period, the two types of 
enterprises were differentiated by their production and financial capabihties. Large-scale 
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enterprises were always favoured by the central government in supplies of investment and 
production resources, while medium- and small-scale enterprises received little support 
under the central plan and their development was largely determined by the financial ability 
of local governments. Economic reforms by decentralizing economic powers from the 
central government to provincial and local governments would be expected to bring 
changes to the existing development pattern. 
International bench-marks 
The production of iron and steel involves stages: the preparation of raw materials and iron 
production, steel production and the rolling or casting of products. Molten pig iron is 
produced from a blast furnace using inputs of iron ore, coke and limestone. The 
production of steel is undertaken in two ways. To ensure maximum heat economies, 
molten pig iron is purified further in open hearth furnaces, the old technology, or more 
commonly, basic oxygen enriched steel furnaces, where various minerals are added to give 
steel the desired physical and other properties that determine tensile and other 
characteristics. Oxygen steel requires lower energy inputs and the time required for each 
heat is shorter, but the process is more sophisticated requiring higher investment and 
greater skills for a tonne of steel produced than open hearth technology. The hot steel is 
then rolled (basic rolling) into various bars and flats or sheet steel. The next stage of iron 
and steel manufacturing consists of steel products which include further rolled products 
such as coated sheet steels, wire and feed for nails, screws etc and cast foundry products. 
The variety of iron and steel products is very large indeed and, though some are produced 
in integrated steel enterprises, they are regarded as a separate industry. 
A further method of producing steel is in electric arc furnaces operating on scrap 
steel. Both general scrap and relatively uniform industrial scrap (derived from the 
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manufacture of steel products) is used. The range of steels and rolled products that can be 
produced from an electric arc furnace is limited, so that there are not the economies of scale 
that can be gained in an integrated iron and steel enterprise. Enterprises based on electric 
arc furnaces are generally regarded as 'small' by international iron and steel industry 
standards although they might be large scale by the Chinese definition. Costs depend on 
the costs of scrap and scale of production. Hence, most medium- and small-scale 
enterprises use electric arc furnaces and have a limited output range. A small integrated 
enterprise would be a contradiction of terms. Arc technology has higher average and 
marginal costs (Hilly 1989, Findlay 1990). The scale of investment is higher in integrated 
enterprises, but unit costs are lower. 
Direct reduction furnaces use iron ore and natural gas, coal or other energy forms, 
but despite constant claims that this form of production is on the verge of a 'breakthrough' 
their unit costs are higher than steel production costs in conventional integrated enterprises 
or electric arc furnaces. 
Location is a very important issue for the economies of iron and steel production. 
Integrated iron and steel enterprises were originally located on coal fields because coal (to 
make the coke used in blast furnaces) was the most important input by weight. With fuel 
economy, integrated enterprises moved to iron ore fields or to deep water sites where coke, 
iron ore and limestone could be assembled most economically. The recent trend has been 
to locate near deep water sites and markets to minimize distribution costs. This is where 
the highly efficient Japanese industry is located (often on very expensive, reclaimed land as 
in Osaka harbour) to minimize inventories and total transport costs. As of 1978, more than 
80 per cent of Japanese production capacity was produced in the five largest Japanese 
producers. Most of this output was produced by seventeen integrated enterprises. The 
average annual output of these enterprises was more than 8 million tonnes (Crandall 
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1981:11-13, 144). Iron and steel industries in industrial countries are highly concentrated 
because economies of scale are substantial. 
Economies of scale are a key determinant of efficiency in the iron and steel industry. 
Apart from the link with heat economies, there is a consideration of capital costs and capital 
utilization, but the most important factor is the product composition of integrated and 
electric arc steel enterprises. The range of 'optimal' economies of scale is very 
considerable. A modem, fully integrated iron and steel enterprise producing both bars and 
flats would require an annual output of some 6 million tonnes a year to fully utilize and 
amortise capital for heat economies and to be able fully to utilize rolling mills without 
excessive roll changes (Kawata Publicity, Inc, 1990:40-44). An integrated iron and steel 
enterprise, only rolling a hmited range of flats, say for a motor vehicle enterprise, might be 
efficient at 2 million tonnes a year. A more general flat rolling enterprise might have to go 
up to 2 to 3 million tonnes a year to be efficient (Scherer 1974:26, Scherer et al. 
1975:80,Gupta and Fuss 1979). A group of electric arc furnaces with a limited output of 
structural shapes and other simple bar producers could reach minimal economies of scale at 
1 million tonnes a year. For such non-integrated enterprises with a very limited output 
range, minimum efficient scale of production could range from 0.5 million tonnes to one 
million tonnes of crude steel per year (Cockerill and Silberson 1974: 79-85, Crandall 
1981:11, International Labour Organization 1986:6). Accordingly, output ranges of 2 to 
more than 8 million tonnes of crude steel per year for integrated enterprises and 0.5 to 
more than 1 million tonnes for non-integrated enterprises might be efficient in terms of 
international competitive costs. 
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Change in the Chinese iron and steel industry during 1979-88 
The data to apply conventional measures of economic efficiency and economies of scale, 
such as investment dates for different technologies and product ranges by different types of 
enterprises, are not available from the published statistics of the Chinese iron and steel 
industry. 'Stylized' facts are hence used to a considerable extent to make quantitative 
analysis of any sort possible. In the published Chinese statistics, about 1500 enterprises 
are included in the iron and steel industry. Most of these enterprises are actually foundries 
and product enterprises that heat some sort of iron and steel. Such enterprises are not 
necessarily iron and steel enterprises. These enterprises and their products are hence 
excluded in the following analysis. 
Change of enterprise size 
Table 4.1 presents the average sizes of large-, medium- and small-scale enterprises in 
terms of their crude steel output, labour force and capital stock. Enterprises are grouped 
according to whether they are integrated or non-integrated. In the integrated group, large-
scale enterprises are those producing more than one million tonnes of crude steel in 1980 
and medium- and small-scale enterprises are those producing under one million tonnes. In 
the non-integrated group, large-scale enterprises are those producing more than 0.1 million 
tonnes of crude steel in 1980 and medium- and small-scale enterprises are those producing 
less than 0.1 million tonnes. The situation in 1980 is taken as the base against which later 
development is evaluated. 
Output of crude steel In the integrated group, the average production from 
the eleven large-scale enterprises increased from about 2 million tonnes in 1980 to 3 
million tonnes in 1988. Only six of the eleven large-scale enterprises actually produced 
more than 2 million tonnes in 1988 (The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, 
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1985-89). Average production from medium- and small-scale enterprises also increased 
from 0.12 million tonnes in 1980 to 0.28 million tonnes in 1988. Nevertheless, in 1988, 
the average production level of the medium- and small-scale enterprises was still far below 
that of the large-scale enterprises. 
Among the non-integrated enterprises, average output from both large-scale and 
medium- and small-scale enterprises also increased. Average production from large-scale 
enterprises increased from 0.25 million tonnes in 1980 to 0.31 million tonnes in 1988 and 
in medium- scale and small-scale enterprises from 0.031 to 0.043 million tonnes. 
However, the scale difference between enterprises in the two sub-groups was still 
substantial. 
Table 4.1 The average scale of large- and medium- and small-scale 
enterprises by integrated and non-integrated establishments, 1980-88 
Number Output of Labour Capital Output/ Output/ 
of enterprises crude steel (Q) force (L) stock (K) labour capital 
(million lonnes) (10,000 people) (100 million yuan) ( Q / L ) (0/K) 
Integrated steel enterprises 
I arge-scale enterprises 
1980 11 2.09 9.29 24.29 0.22 0.09 
1985 11 2.63 9.29 27.14 0.28 0.10 
1988 11 3.03 10.10 35.06 0.30 0.09 
Medium- and small-scale enterprises 
1980 35 0.12 1.51 1.98 0.08 0.06 
1985 42 0.21 1.45 2.66 0.14 0.08 
1988 42 0.28 1.71 3.96 0.16 0.07 
Non-integrated steel enterprises 
t;irge-scale enterprises 
1980 16 0.28 1.17 1.86 0.24 0.15 
1985 16 0.30 1.25 2.63 0.24 0.11 
1988 16 0.31 1.41 3.39 0.22 0.09 
Medium- scale and small-scale enterprises 
1980 37 0.032 0.31 0.42 0.10 0.08 
1985 30 0.037 0.34 0.55 0.10 0.07 
1988 30 0.043 0.37 0.62 0.12 0.07 
Source: The Ministx>' of Metallurgy Industry' of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-
book of Iron and Steel Industry), 1985-1989; Nation-Wide Industrial Investigation Office, State Economic 
Commission of China, 1987, Quanguo Gongyie Pucia Ziliao (The Document of National Industrial 
Investigation), Neibu Zhiliao (Internal resources). 
59 
Labour force and capital stock Table 4.1 also shows the average labour 
force and capital stock of enterprises in each scale group. An interesting point is that 
differences between factors of production in different sized enterprises were not as marked 
as differences in output. In 1980, the difference in output between large-scale enterprises 
and medium- and small-scale enterprises was a factor of 17 for integrated enterprises, but 
the difference in labour force size was only a factor of 6 and in capital stock, a factor of 12. 
For non-integrated enterprises, the difference in output was about a factor of 9, the labour 
force and capital stock differed by factors of 4 and 4.4 respectively. This situation had not 
changed much by 1988. For integrated enterprises, output differed between enterprises of 
different scale by a factor of 11, the labour force by a factor of 6 and capital stock by a 
factor of 9. For non-integrated enterprises, output from large-scale enterprises was 7.2 
times that of medium- and small-scale enterprises, but the difference between the labour 
force and capital stock was 4 and 5 times respectively. The conclusion from these 
comparisons is that the difference in output between large-scale enterprises and medium-
and small-scale enterprises was not wholly due to the differences in inputs of factors of 
production. The large-scale enterprises had the advantages of economies of scale which 
enabled them to achieve higher output levels and hence higher output per labour and capital 
unit employed. 
The cost and profit pattern of different sized enterprises 
Marginal costs and profits of different sized enterprises in 1981, 1985 and 1988 are 
considered (Table 4.2) to analyse economies of scale. In the three years considered, the 
larger the scale of the enterprises, the lower the costs of capital (fixed and working) and 
labour and, hence, costs per unit of output (Table 4.2). Economies of scale were clearly 
important. Cost comparison should be based on individual product quantities and costs. 
Although the quantities of different products produced were reported by the Chinese 
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Ministry of Metallurgical Industry (1985-90) , the corresponding costs of the individual 
products were not. Instead, the aggregated costs of all these products were reported. 
Consequendy, the data do not allow a cost comparison based on the costs of individual 
products. Gross output data had to be used instead. Gross output thus comprises the 
values of a number of different products. For integrated enterprises, these products were 
principally pig iron, steel and rolled steel. Non-integrated enterprises only produced steel 
and rolled steel. Some of these enterprises also produced pig iron. Jefferson (1990) 
pointed out that, even at the end of the 1990s, iron ore, pig iron and steel were mainly sold 
within the iron and steel industry and a substantial proportion was still subject to planned 
pricing. A substantial proportion of steel products on the other hand were sold at market 
prices outside the industry. Integrated enterprises that sell iron and steel and possibly even 
coke probably sell proportionately less of their output at market prices than non-integrated 
enterprises. Accordingly, compared with non-integrated enterprises, the gross output of 
some integrated enterprises might be under-valued. This implies that the economies of 
scale of integrated enterprises may have been under-valued. 
In a market economy, the rental cost of capital should consist of the sum of real rate 
of interest plus the depreciation rate, adjusted for taxes. In the Chinese economy, 
particularly in the state-owned sector, most enterprises have not paid interest directly for 
the use of state-owned assets. Instead, enterprises have submitted part of their profits that 
was contracted between enterprises and government. Since the submitted profits include 
payment for the use of state-owned asset as well as government taxes, it is impossible to 
identify the nominal interest cost of capital from the submitted profits. Accordingly, it is 
very hard to verify the real interest cost of capital (the nominal interest cost adjusted for 
inflation). To measure rental cost of capital for the state-owned enterprises, the following 
assumption has to be made. A 12 per cent discount rate is used as the rental cost. The 
purpose of the calculation in Table 4.2 is to reveal the relative cost difference between 
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enterprises. A 12 per cent rate uniformly applied to each enterprise as the rental cost for 
capital should be satisfactory for this purpose. However, even if the World Bank has also 
used such a rate in evaluating its Chinese projects (World Bank, 1988a), this rate is clearly 
an arbitrary rate and may not reflect the real cost of capital in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry. The results in Table 4.2 should, therefore, be interpreted in a relative term for 
inter-enterprise comparison rather than in an absolute term for the cost of each enterprise 
group. 
Due to the lack of data for material costs, working capital is used as a proxy. In the 
Chinese accounting system, working capital is mainly used to purchase materials used for 
production and should largely reflect the pattern of material cost in production. Fixed 
capital used in the calculation is the net capital that is adjusted for depreciation. It should 
be pointed out that fixed capital in the Chinese industry statistics includes both production 
capital and non-production (for the production of in-kind services). Effort has been made 
by Chen et al (1988b) to deduct non-production fixed capital from total fixed capital to 
obtain production capital for aggregated Chinese industrial sector (see Appendix 6A for 
details). However, as far as enterprise-level calculations are concerned, detailed data on 
this information for each enterprise are simply not available. The deflator used by Chen et 
al (1988b) for the Chinese industry sector has to be used equally for each enterprise (the 
same method is applied in the rest of chapters while enterprise-specific capital is used). 
While this treatment may improve the data quality in representing the real production 
capital, it will surely involve some errors for each individual enterprise. The limitation of 
this method should then be noticed. 
In the calculation, marginal cost is defined as the increased cost of factors 
corresponding to the increased gross output. Specifically, increases of gross output, fixed 
capital, working capital and wage between 1980 and 1981, 19884 and 1985 and 1987 and 
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1988 are used as marginal changes of these variables in 1981, 1985 and 1988. It should 
be noted that the change of factor share and its implication for changes of factor 
productivity will demonstrate different patterns depending on whether constant or varying 
level of output and factor are considered. While there are no changes in output and factors, 
the change of factor share would lead to a change of factor productivity. For instance, a 
substitution of capital for labour, i.e. the rise in capital-labour ratio will definitely cause 
labour productivity to rise and capital productivity to fall. However, as far as varying 
levels of output and factors are concerned, the situation will be different. For example, a 
production of 1000 units of products uses 101 units of capital and 10 units of labour in 
year one. In year two, 20 more units of products are produced by increasing 20 more 
units of capital and 1 more unit of labour. In year three, again 20 more units of products 
are produced but 19 more units of capital and 2 more units of labour are added. It can be 
easily revealed that capital-labour ratio increased over time from 10.1 to 11 and to 11.2. 
But, in terms of marginal cost defined above, the unit cost of capital decreased from 0.2 to 
0.19 and the unit cost of labour increased from 0.01 to 0.015. This simple example may 
explain why the capital-labour ratio in the Chinese iron and steel industry increased (Table 
4.3) and unit cost of capital decreased but unit cost of labour increased (Table 4.2) during 
the reform period. 
In Table 4.2, total unit cost is the aggregate of unit costs of fixed capital, working 
capital and wage. This methodology was also applied by Prendergast (1990) in his study 
to identify scale of production and choice of technique in the engineering industries in 
developing countries. 
It appears that all groups of enterprises were able to reduce their unit cost over time. 
Unit costs were further broken down into the cost of fixed capital and working capital and 
the cost of labour. The decrease in unit costs for all groups was due to the decreases in 
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Table 4.2. Marginal costs and profits of different sized enterprises in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry, 1981, 1985 and 1988 
Integrated enterprises Non-integrated enterprises 
Small Medium Large Small Medium 
o Ntimber of enterprises 11 16 25 16 14 19 
1981 
For the increment of 1,000 >aian of gross output (at 1980 constant price): 
Unit costs 521 430 329 496 410 323 
In which 
Capital cost 249 201 177 222 190 153 
Working capital 151 126 71 157 128 86 
Labour cost 121 103 81 117 92 74 
Unit profit 164 251 346 197 263 331 
1985 
For the increment of 1,000 yuan of gross output (at 1980 constant price): 
Unit costs 505 406 313 476 390 321 
In which 
Capital cost 217 188 160 201 172 144 
Working capital 140 101 57 136 105 79 
Labour cost 148 116 96 142 113 98 
Unit profit 267 336 372 261 334 385 
1988 
For the increment of 1,000 yuan of gross output (at 1980 constant price): 
Unit costs 492 382 299 455 374 303 
In which 
Capital cost 191 175 130 162 231 117 
Working capital 110 50 44 105 84 62 
Labour cost 206 157 125 188 159 124 
Unit profit 371 436 427 388 414 391 
Notes: ^ The number of enterprises used in the sample. Following Table 4.1, in the integrated enterprise 
group, large-scale, medium-scale and small-scale enterprises produced 1, 0.5 to 1 and less than 0.5 million 
tonnes steel products respectively; in the non-integrated enterprise group, large-scale, medium-scale and 
small-scale enterprises produced 0.1, 0.05 to 0.1 and less than 0.05 million tonnes steel products per year 
respectively. 
^ Due to the lack of data for material costs, working capital is instead used as a proxy. The increased wage 
per worker in each sub-group and a discount rate of 12 per cent per annum for fixed and working capital 
were used to approximate the cost of labour and capital respectively. 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-
book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industr)-), 1985-1989; Nation-Wide Industrial Investigation Office, State 
Economic Commission of China, 1987, Quanguo Gongyie Pucia Ziliao (The Document of National 
Indusuial Investigation), Neibu Zhiliao (Internal resources). 
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capital costs (Table 4.2). Labour costs for all groups increased over time. These relative 
changes derive from developments in the capital and labour markets. The capital market 
was relatively more developed than the labour market. Following 1980, enterprises could 
apply for credit to banks and accumulate funds for capital investment but they did not have 
the right to determine the size of their labour force. When enterprises had to consider 
capital costs, it was to be expected that they would increase capital utilization. The increase 
in labour cost may represent an increase in labour's ability to be compensated in accord 
with its marginal product. However, due to the lack of reform in the employment and 
wage systems, workers have had great pressure to increase their income regardless of the 
productivity of their enterprises. This has been a great concern during the reform period. 
The increase in labour cost may, therefore, also reflect an over-valuation of labour in 
production. In the chapter 7, this concern will be empirically tested. 
An increase in profit per unit of output can also be observed for all enterprise 
groups. While the decrease in costs per unit of output partly contributed to this, the impact 
of distonions in factor and goods markets also warrants consideration. Enterprises did not 
pay market value for their capital. This contributed to high profit margins. As part of the 
reform process, some previously regulated steel products were sold in the market at high 
market prices and high profit margins were also realized. The more a enterprise was able 
to sell at market prices, the higher the profit margin it could obtain. The two-tier price 
system created serious problems. If enterprises were subject to plan constraints, 
disciplined by following price regulations, or honest in reporting their output, they had to 
sell a considerable proportion of their products at planned prices and earned lower profits 
than if they sold a substantial share of output at market prices. The former seems to have 
been the case for large-scale enterprises. Referring back to Table 3.5, large-scale 
enterprises had a high portion of their products controlled by State plans. Most large-scale 
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enterprises had previously been centrally controlled and were subject to more government 
regulations than enterprises in other groups. Hence, even though large-scale enterprises 
had the lowest costs per unit of output, their profit margins were not necessarily the 
highest. The product mix is also one of the key determinants of profitability. Analysis in 
this regard cannot, however, be done due to the lack of enterprise-level data on product 
mix. 
Expansion patterns by size of enterprises 
Distortions in the price system affected the patterns of expansion in the iron and steel 
industry. Enterprises with the lowest unit costs could not achieve highest unit profits, and 
were not able to exploit their production possibilities because their comparative cost 
advantage was offset by disadvantages in input acquisition and output distribution in 
distorted goods and factor markets. ^  The expansion patterns which occurred are indicated 
by changes in the distribution of output, labour and capital stock between different sized 
enterprises (Table 4.3). It can be seen that the output share of large-scale enterprises in 
output of crude steel, capital stock and labour force decreased while the medium- and 
small-scale enterprises' shares increased. 
The capital-labour ratio of enterprises in each sub-group, that is, the average capital 
intensity of all enterprises, rose. In addition, the difference in capital intensity between 
large-scale enterprises and medium- and small-scale enterprises became somewhat smaller. 
The difference for integrated enteiprises was a factor of 2 in 1980 but fell to 1.5 in 1988. 
For non-integrated enterprises, the difference fell from a factor of 1.4 to 1.1. This 
suggests that the local medium- and small-scale enterprises undertook proportionately 
^ While this analysis is based on the average performance of large-scale plants, this average performance 
should not be applied to any individual large-scale plant. It is possible, in real life, that a badly managed 
large-scale plant would produce unwanted products, have poor heat economies etc and hence high unit cost 
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somewhat more capital investment during the reform period. The expansion in output 
from the local medium- and small-scale enterprises probably relied quite heavily on 
additional investment. 
Table 4.3. Output and factor shares of different sized enterprises, 1980, 1985 and 1988 
Number Output of Labour Capital 
of enterprises crude steel force stock Capital-labour ratio 
Per cent of Per cent of Per cent of 10,000 yuan/person 
national total national total national total 
Integrated steel enterprises 
Large-scale enterprises 
1980 11 68 42 60 2.6 
1985 11 62 38 52 2.9 
1988 11 59 37 50 3.5 
Medium- and small-scale enterprises 
1980 35 11 22 16 1.3 
1985 42 19 23 20 1.8 
1988 42 21 24 22 2.3 
Non-integrated steel enterprises 
I ^rge-scale enterprises 
1980 16 12 8 7 1.7 
1985 16 10 8 7 2.1 
1988 16 9 7 6 2.4 
Medium- scale and small-scale enterprises 
1980 37 6 23 15 1.2 
1985 30 8 26 17 1.6 
1988 30 9 29 19 2.1 
Notes: Enterprises producing more than one million tonnes of crude steel per year. 
^ Enterprises producing less than one million tonnes of crude steel per year. 
Enterprises producing more than 0.1 million tonnes of crude steel per year. 
^ Enterprises producing less than 0.1 milhon lonnes of crude steel per year. 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-
book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry) 1985-1990; National-Wide Industrial Investigation Office, State 
Economic Commission of China, 1987, Quanguo Gongyie Pucia Ziliao (The Document of National 
Industrial Investigation), Neibu Zhiliao (Internal resources). 
The increasing shares of steel output and factors of the medium- and small-scale 
enterprises compared to that of the large-scale enterprises indicates that resource allocation 
in the iron and steel industry was biased towards medium- and small-scale enterprises 
during the reform period. Considering scale as well as cost differences between large-
scale enterprises and medium- and small-scale enterprises, this appears to represent a sub-
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optimal expansion pattern for the iron and steel industry. The enterprises whose output 
and factor shares increased were the enterprises with production scales far below the 
minimum efficient scales. 
Technology choices of different sized enterprises 
It is of interest to consider the extent to which technological change facilitated the above 
pattern of expansion. 
Trends in the use of the three technologies - open hearth, basic oxygen and electric 
arc furnaces - in China and selected industrial countries are compared (Table 4.4). There 
was no substantial difference between China and other countries in 1960 in technologies 
employed. Industrial countries were then only starting to use basic oxygen furnace 
technology. Japan led in the appUcation of basic oxygen furnaces in 1960, 12 per cent of 
its output was already produced by this method. Japan also led in the development of the 
technology, using furnace 'lids', improved oxygen lances and other innovations to raise 
productivity. 
The widespread adoption of basic oxygen furnaces and abandonment of open 
hearths took place in the 1960s and 1970s in the industrial countries. This led to 
productivity differences between steel industries in China and the industrial countries. The 
industrial countries only produced 3 per cent of their steel output in open hearth furnaces 
and 68 per cent in basic oxygen furnaces in 1982. China at that stage still produced 32 per 
cent of its output in open hearth furnaces and only 45 per cent using basic oxygen 
furnaces. 
The industrial countries produced 28 per cent of steel in electric arc furnaces; China 
only used this method for 19 per cent of its production. The differences between China 
and the industrial countries were almost the same in 1988. This suggests that 1980s 
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investment was insufficient to reduce the technology gap between China and industrial 
countries. 
Table 4.4. Trends in technology use in steelmaking processes in selected 
countries, 1960, 1982, 1988 (percentage of total production of crude steel) 
1960 1982 1988 
Open Basic Electric Other Open Basic Electric Other Open Basic Electric Other 
hearth oxveen arc hearth oxygen arc hearth oxvgen are 
Western Europe 49 3 11 37 2 69 29 1 69 30 -
EEC 38 2 10 50 1 73 26 - 71 29 -
Other 72 6 13 9 12 52 36 7 59 34 -
North America'^ 87 3 9 1 9 61 30 4 60 36 -
United States 87 3 8 2 8 61 30 5 58 37 -
Japan 68 12 20 - - 74 26 - 70 30 -
Subtotal 68 4 11 - 3 68 29 2 67 31 -
China 83 - 11 6 32 45 19 4 22 56 20 2 
World Total'^ 72 4 11 13 23 54 22 1 16 57 27 -
Notes: Excluding Switzerland. 
Canada and United States only. 
Including only industrialized countries and Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, India, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Eastern European countries. Figures may not be added up to 100 per cent because of 
rounding. 
Sources: For 1960 data: United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Structural Changes in the 
Iron and Steel Industry (1979)- for 1982 and 1988 data: International Iron and Steel Institute, 1983-1989, 
Steel Statistical Year-book. For China's data: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo 
Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industr>'), 1985-1990. 
The industrial countries produced 28 per cent of steel in electric arc furnaces; China 
only used this method for 19 per cent of its producdon. The differences between China 
and the industrial countries were almost the same in 1988. This suggests that 1980s 
investment was insufficient to reduce the technology gap between China and industrial 
countries. 
The size of enterprise influenced technology choices. In Table 4.5, the technology 
employed by different sized enterprises is oudined Two indicators are presented for each 
type of technology, the number of furnaces owned by enterprises of different scale and the 
proportion of tonnage produced. 
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Table 4.5. Production of crude steel by size of enterprise using different 
Open hearth Basic oxygen Electric arc 
Furnaces Tonnage^ Furnaces Tonnage Furnaces Tonnage 
Number Per cent of Number Per cent of Number Percent of 
national total national total national total 
1975 
Total production 49 25 26 
Of which 
T ^rge-scale enterprises 70 46 39 22 221 8 
Medium- and small-scale enterprises26 3 53 4 1316 18 
1980 
Total production 32 19 41 
Of which 
I ;irge-scale enterprises 67 30 17 32 207 6 
Medium- and small-scale 27 2 106 9 1438 13 
1985 
Total production 26 49 22 
Of which 
T ;irge-scale enterprises 63 19 54 39 199 6 
Medium- and small-scale enterprises26 8 72 10 1394 16 
1988 
Total production 22 56 20 
Of which 
T ^rge-scale enterprises 54 21 59 42 207 6 
Medium- and small-scale enterprisesl6 1 101 15 1166 15 
Notes: The proportion of production tonnage of respective technology in total production. 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry' of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-
book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), 1985-1990. 
Large-scale enterprises dominated in the use of open hearth furnace technology. 
But medium- and small-scale enterprises also employed a considerable amount of open 
hearth furnace technology. The production capacity of medium- and small-scale 
enterprises from open hearth furnaces was, however, very low compared with that of the 
large-scale enterprises. 
The electric arc furnace technology allowed medium- and small-scale enterprises 
rapidly to expand their production capacity. However, there was no nationwide 
competition to restrict the expansion of the local medium- and small-scale enterprises to a 
level which national resources, particularly scrap steel and electricity, could support. 
Hence, although local medium- and small-scale enterprises were able to use electric arc 
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furnace technology, their unit costs were high, because capital equipment wasn't fully 
utihzed because of shortages of scrap steel and electricity. 
The out-of-date technology that continued to be used reflects the lack of funding, 
and particularly a shortage of foreign exchange for purchasing new capital equipment. 
Traditional depreciation accounting did not permit enterprises to accumulate the funds 
necessary to cany out technological upgrading. The depreciation rate was set at artificially 
low levels because central planners always tried to collect as much net revenue as possible 
from enterprises. According to a recent report (Qi Janguo 1990:11-14), depreciation funds 
in the Chinese industrial sector only provided one-fourth to one-third of funds required by 
enterprises for replacement of out-dated equipment. Artificially low prices for energy and 
raw materials resulted in an under-estimation of the benefits from investments that saved 
on these inputs. Upgrading and innovation had a long-run effect on productivity 
improvement, but also had the potential to reduce a enterprise's performance in the short 
run. Both the traditional reward system in centrally planned economies and the contract 
responsibility system during the reform period focused on short-term performance. 
Managers were forced to ignore the long-term benefits of upgrading and innovation (Nuti 
1988:373-4). 
Under the prevailing distorted price system, moreover, demand for iron and steel 
products was very high. Unduly low prices meant that iron and steel products were in 
very short supply during the reform period. An economic analysis of the iron and steel 
industry (Wang Mongqui and Hong Qiao 1987:73-5) estimated that iron and steel 
production capacity could meet only two-thirds of the demand for iron and steel products. 
Another report (Li Boxi et al. 1988) stated that the growth rate of the metallurgical industry 
in the period 1981 to 1987 had been only 8.2 per cent per annum while total industry 
growth had been 11.0 per cent. The lag in the growth of iron and steel output created a 
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severe shortage of iron and steel products. The central government, therefore, could not 
give up its control over iron and steel production and local governments also tried to ensure 
that they had their own production capacity to obtain sufficient supplies of iron and steel 
products. Each region and even each enterprise tried to expand its production to earn high 
profits on this additional output. Old production capacity was not discarded because it was 
needed to produce the output required by government plans. 
Spatial distribution of the Chinese iron and steel industry 
Fifty per cent of identified iron ore reserves are concentrated in three provinces, Liaoning, 
Sichuan and Hebei and a further 30 per cent are distributed across six other provinces and 
autonomous regions, Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Neimenggu, Shandong and Yunnan (Chen 
Dongshen 1987:1-7). The remaining 19 provinces and autonomous regions have to import 
iron ore from other provinces or overseas to produce iron and steel (Lu Dadao 1989:1-9). 
Eight southeastern provinces had only 1 per cent of total Chinese reserves of iron ore but 
all had steel industries (Sun Jingzhi 1988:148). More importandy, the rich ore that can be 
used for iron production without beneficiation makes up less than 5 per cent of identified 
iron ore reserves. Iron ore supply problems thus prevail even in the provinces and 
autonomous regions which have relatively ample iron ore reserves (Lu Dadao 1989:1-9). 
Consequently, of 28 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalides, 16 were partially 
or wholly dependent on ore inflow from other provinces or countries (Hu Zhaoliang 
1981:3(X)-15). Every province had its own iron and steel enterprises but more than 50 per 
cent of these enterprises consistently suffered from iron ore shortages (Chen Dongshen 
1987, Lyons 1988:126, Lu Dadao 1989). 
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Shortage of coking coal was another problem. In all provinces and autonomous 
regions except Shanxi, Liaoning, Anhui and Sichuan provinces, iron and steel production 
suffered from persistent coking coal shortages (Usack and Egan 1977:270). 
In provinces which were poorly endowed with resources, iron and steel production 
was still feasible if enterprises were proximate to ports, particularly if ports were close to 
fmal product markets. Shanghai in Jianshu province and Wuhan in Hubei province are 
hence excellent locations for iron and steel production. Although they do not have 
resources of iron ore and coking coal, they have good access to ports or railways and are 
bases of industrial production. 
Before the economic reforms, the central government tried to concentrate iron and 
steel production in eight provinces and autonomous regions, namely, Hebei, Shanxi, 
Neimenggu, Liaoning, Jiansu, Anhui, Hubei and Sichuan, which were relatively resource 
rich or were close to transportation facilities and markets. However, the other provinces 
and regions wanted self-sufficiency in iron and steel. 
Each province, autonomous region and municipality, without exception, increased 
its output of finished steel during the reform period (see Table 3.3). The Herfmdahl and 
Hirschman index (HHI) is used to describe the change in market concentration in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry during the reform period. The HHI index is the sum of 
squares of the market shares of each province in the industry. Giving N provinces and s-
is the market share of province i, HHI index is 
HHI = S,^ + S^^ + . . .+ S ^ 1 2 n 
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A higher HHI indicates a higher degree of concentration. The method of squaring market 
shares captures the degree of production concentration (Martin 1988a: 100-4). 
The decreasing HHI index in Table 4.6 confirms the increasing trend toward 
localization or spatial segmentation in iron and steel production. This may have had 
serious implications for inefficient resource allocation in the industry. As infrastructure 
such as transportation and energy generation and iron ore reserves varied substantially 
among regions, the production costs for enterprises in different regions varied 
considerably. Iron and steel equipment was not mobile. Once enterprises were 
established, it was almost impossible to close or merge them no matter how inefficient they 
were. They were kept operating in an attempt to recover the cost of investment (the 'sunk 
cost' problem. Caves 1988). Such enterprises often did not reach even a minimally 
efficient producdon scale because they had to compete with other enterprises for scarce 
inputs and investment funds. 
Table 4.6. Geographic concentration ratio of the Chinese iron and steel 
industry: Herfindahl and Hirschman index, 1979-88 
1979 1981 1985 1988 
HHI 10.7 10.5 9.8 8.3 
Sources: Data for 1979 and 1981 are taken from (i) State Staiisiic Bureau of China, 1981. Zhongguo 
jingji nianjian (Year-book of Chinese Statistics) 1981. (ii) Lyons, T.P., 1987. Economic Integration and 
planning in Maoist China. Data for other years are taken from The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of 
China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), 1985-
1990. 
In his well-known paper 'Economies as an antitrust defense: the welfare tradeoffs', 
Williamson (1968) argued that industry's concentration ratio may vary from industry to 
For example, consider an industry comprised of three plants. In the situation of equal-sized plants, each 
plant has 1/3 market share and HHI = (1/3)^ + (1/3)^ + (1/3)^ = 1/3. If plants are not of equal size, say one 2 2 2 
p lan thasamarke t sha reo f 1/2 and another two have a 1/4 share each, HHI = (1/2) (1/4) -h(1/4) = 
3/8. Comparing the two cases, the higher HHI is in accord with the higher concentration of production in 
one plant in the case of unequal-sized plants. 
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industry. An industry with economies of scale could have much higher concentration ratio 
than an industry without economies of scale. A declining concentration ratio in the 
industry with economies of scale may not mean increasing competition as well as 
improvement in economic welfare. Hence, government's regulation of the scale of firms 
within an industry with economies of scale may stop firms from achieving their full 
economies of scale. Competition may then be restricted rather than promoted in the 
industry even if its industry's concentration may thus decline. Numerous studies have 
been done along the line of Wilhamson's study. In a paper reviewing industry's 
concentration ratio, Curry and George (1982) showed that the concentration ratio in most 
industries of developed countries has been dramatically increased during the post-war 
period. Notably, Perry (1984) formalized Williamson's argument to show that industry 
policy concerning on industry's concentration should be industry-specific. This is because 
different industries with different degrees of economies of scale would require different 
optimal scale for their firms. It could be wrong to have a policy to restrict the scale of 
firms in the industry with economies of scale simply because the concentration ratio in this 
industry is high. 
The iron and steel industry is widely recognized as having substantial economies of 
scale. As pointed out before, the minimum efficient scale of iron and steel enterprises in 
market economies has been much larger than the average scale of enterprises in the Chinese 
iron and steel industry. If the iron and steel industry in the market economies presents a 
less distorted market structure, one would predict that an increasing average scale of 
enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry and hence its industry's concentration 
ratio could lead to declining distortion of market and improvement of resource allocation. 
The increasing segmentation of the Chinese iron and steel industry may, therefore, imply 
growing resource misallocation as enterprises which were relatively more productive were 
unable to procure adequate quantities of raw materials. 
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Nevertheless, one may argue that the localization of iron and steel enterprises may 
be efficient when measured in terms of input and output distribution or transportation 
costs. However, it has been pointed out that only several provinces have sufficient 
resources to support the development of iron and steel industry. This means that most 
provinces have to bear substantial cost in the transportadon of raw materials from either 
resource provinces or overseas. Since the transportation of finished iron and steel 
products would usually cost less than the transportation of raw materials, cost efficiency 
can be achieved to concentrate iron and steel producdon in resource provinces or regions 
with better transportation facilides. Due to lack of data in the cost of transportation of 
finished iron and steel products and raw materials, this cost comparison can not be 
detailed. Further research is needed to jusnfy the above assertion as soon as data are 
available. Resource allocation and productivity differences across regions (Table 4.7) can, 
nevertheless, shed some light on the cost of efficiency due to industrial segmentation. 
Indicators of the proportional change in the labour force and fixed and working capital for 
28 provinces and autonomous regions between 1984 and 1989 are reported. To assess the 
productivity change in each region, Tomqvist indexes are presented. A Tomqvist index is 
derived from the comparative difference between indicators of output and input across the 
two years. It is defined as: 
n 
T(x, t) = In y^ - In - I 1/2 (V. (In x.^-ln (4.1) 
i=l 
where, y is output at time t, V.^  is the cost share of input i at time t and x.^  is input i at time 
t. Inputs of labour and fixed and working capital and net output defined as output are used 
in calculations of the Tomqvist indexes. The cost share of labour is derived by dividing 
the total wage bill by net output and the cost share of fixed and working capital is the 
difference between the cost share of labour and unity. The Tomqvist index defined in 
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equation 4.1 enables observable data to be used in the calculation of the rate of productivity 
change, that is, the change in the relationship between quantities of inputs and outputs (see 
Appendix 4A for details). 
However, under the two-tier price system, a higher level of net output from a 
enterprise may merely reflect the advantages that enterprise had with regard to the 
proportion of its output sold at high market prices and the proportion of inputs purchased 
at planned prices. Hence, if net output value rather than output quantity is used in 
calculations of the Tomqvist index, regions which were better able to take advantage of the 
two-tier price system are likely to record misleading productivity growtii figures. Two 
Tomqvist indexes of productivity are therefore provided. One uses the quantities of 
finished steel and the other uses net output values. The comparative productivity analysis 
is based on the index using quantities of finished steel output because there is less price 
distortion in this index. The index using net output value is retained as an indicator of the 
impact of price advantages enjoyed by some regions on the estimation of regional 
productivity changes. 
The social cost of capital in iron and steel production and the actual cost of capital to 
enterprises should also be distinguished in the derivation of Tomqvist indexes. Almost all 
enterprises in the iron and steel industry did not pay for funds allocated to them under 
government plans. Although the financial economic reforms required enterprises to pay 
interest on the capital assets of enterprises which were financed by bank loans, most of the 
enterprises' existing capital assets were allocated under previous govemment plans under 
the title of govemment ownership (people's ownership). The actual cost of capital to 
enterprises, which was reflected in the interest paid by enterprises to banks, was well 
below 10 per cent of enterprises net output (Table 4.7). If the actual cost of capital is used 
to derive Tomqvist indexes, the resultant indexes will under-value the social cost of capital 
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Table 4.7. Interest paid on capital by enterprises to banks (100 million 
yuan)^ the resulting capital cost shares (per cent) in net output and the 
capital cost share derived from 12 per cent interest rate on capital in net 
output (per cent)^ by regions 
Interest paid Capital cost Capital cost 
on capital share in terms share in terms 
by enterprises of interest of 12 per cent interest 
to banks paid by enterprises rate on capital 
Regions 1984 1989 1984 1989 1984 1989 
Beijing 0.09 0.53 0.009 0.022 0.874 0.884 
Tianjing 0.12 0.70 0.026 0.097 0.851 0.850 
Hebei 0.16 1.13 0.022 0.075 0.788 0.823 
Shanxi 0.16 0.98 0.033 0.084 0.739 0.844 
Neimenggu 0.15 0.70 0.047 0.102 0.719 0.836 
Liaoning 0.56 2.83 0.018 0.044 0.855 0.891 
Jilin 0.08 0.60 0.028 0.092 0.775 0.861 
Heilongjiang 0.09 0.51 0.052 0.107 0.732 0.829 
Shanghai 0.23 2.01 0.012 0.061 0.917 0.920 
Jiangsu 0.11 1.12 0.029 0.147 0.757 0.823 
Zhejiang 0.03 0.29 0.016 0.095 0.800 0.813 
Anhui 0.03 0.48 0.007 0.066 0.800 0.794 
Fujian 0.03 0.27 0.030 0.084 0.713 0.867 
Jiangxi 0.06 0.77 0.024 0.148 0.726 0.819 
Shandong 0.05 0.62 0.014 0.059 0.687 0.848 
Henan 0.06 0.67 0.021 0.084 0.736 0.859 
Hubei 0.25 1.51 0.018 0.059 0.987 0.884 
Hunan 0.09 0.55 0.029 0.062 0.733 0.857 
Guandong 0.06 0.39 0.018 0.097 0.729 0.732 
Guangxi 0.03 0.21 0.024 0.058 0.690 0.838 
Sichuan 0.73 2.21 0.060 0.076 0.841 0.868 
Guizhou 0.07 0.46 0.042 0.115 0.715 0.829 
Yunnan 0.01 0.17 0.005 0.053 0.769 0.773 
Shaanxi 0.03 0.29 0.029 0.094 0.677 0.834 
Gansu 0.02 0.27 0.017 0.069 0.433 0.791 
Qinghai 0.01 0.14 0.016 0.081 0.738 0.871 ^ o 
Ningxia 0.01 0.02 0.014 0.023 0.695 0.874 
Xinjiang 0.01 0.12 0.017 0.059 0.447 0.777 
National total^ 3.32 12.07 
0.818 National averaee 0.023 0.064 0.844 
Note: ^ 12 per cent interest rate is chosen as a stylized rate to compare the very low interest paid on 
capital from enterprises. Considering the high inflation rate in China, 12 per cent interest rate is still low 
and may not represent the social interest rate on capital. 
^ The sum of regional values may not equal the national total because of rounding. 
Source: Ministr>' of Metallurgical Industry of China: 1984-1990, The Yearbook of Chinese Iron and Steel 
Industry. 
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used in the iron and steel production. Therefore, two additional types of Tomqvist indexes 
are distinguished. One uses the social cost of capital , and the other, the actual cost of 
capital incurred by enterprises. The analysis of productivity changes across regions is 
based on the Tomqvist indexes defined using tiie social cost of capital. The indexes 
derived using the actual capital costs is used as an indicator of how the asset ownership 
system distorted the evaluation of productivity changes across regions. 
Table 4.8 indicates that the size of the labour force and fixed and working capital 
stock increased in iron and steel production from 1984 to 1989 in every province, 
autonomous region and municipality. Of 28 provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities, 25 increased their labour force by more than 10 per cent, 20 increased their 
fixed capital by more than 30 per cent, and 25 increased their working capital by more than 
100 per cent. 
The Tomqvist indexes of output quantity for each region show that 15 of the 28 
regions experienced a decline in productivity from 1984 to 1989. As all 15 regions 
increased their use of labour and capital inputs, it may be concluded that the resources used 
in the iron and steel industry were not optimally allocated across regions. Strikingly, these 
15 regions, on average, recorded a much higher rate of increase in fixed and working 
capital than the other regions. This suggests that, to produce more iron and steel, the 15 
regions used proportionately more capital, which was in short supply. 
It might be questioned why the market-oriented economic reforms did not lead to 
adjustment involving concentration of economic resources in more efficient regions. The 
Tomqvist indexes of output values shed light on this issue. As can be seen, only two 
regions recorded a decline in productivity according to the estimates of the Tomqvist index 
In the derivation of this Tomqvist index, the social capital cost share in net output was calculated by 
subtracting the wage share in net output from unity. 
79 
Table 4.8. The proportional changes^ in the labour force and fixed and 
working capital stock and Tornqvist indexes^ by province, autonomous region and municipality between 1984 and 1989 
Changes in Changes Changes Tornqvist Tornqvist Tornqvist index 
the size of in in index of index of by output value 
the labour fixed working output output and interest 
fcHce capital stock capital stock quantity value paid to capital 
Beijing 0.62 0.41 1.43 1.02 1.17 1.33 
Tianjing 0.12 0.41 1.00 0.91 1.03 1.17 
Hebei 0.38 0.57 1.45 0.97 1.10 1.28 
Shanxi 0.26 0.30 1.40 0.96 1.23 1.35 
Neimenggu 0.20 0.23 1.06 1.21 1.22 1.30 
Liaoning 0.06 0.41 1.29 0.99 1.16 1.31 
Jilin 0.21 0.47 2.04 0.97 1.15 1.34 
Heilongjiang 0.31 0.27 1.69 0.98 1.27 1.40 
Shanghai 0.22 1.96 2.69 0.57 0.79 1.22 
Jiangsu 0.19 0.51 1.63 0.98 1.11 1.27 
Zhejiang 0.13 0.52 1.23 0.95 1.02 1.19 
Anhui 0.21 0.37 1.02 1.66 1.06 1.18 
Fujian 0.19 0.36 1.26 1.13 1.36 1.49 
Jiangxi 0.32 0.48 1.99 1.07 1.10 1.26 
Shandong 0.12 0.52 1.70 1.05 1.28 1.44 
Henan 0.19 0.49 2.08 1.03 1.23 1.41 
Hubei 0.06 0.16 0.59 1.08 1.17 1.25 
Hunan 0.12 0.35 1.14 0.99 1.30 1.43 
Guandong 0.04 0.50 0.86 1.13 0.95 1.08 
Guangxi 0.17 0.22 1.07 1.13 1.34 1.43 
Sichuan 0.72 0.36 1.40 0.86 1.19. 1.33 
Guizhou 0.23 0.23 1.82 0.94 1.24 1.35 
Yunnan 0.09 0.32 1.05 0.99 1.06 1.17 
Shaanxi 0.40 0.36 1.32 0.98 1.29 1.42 
Gansu 0.22 0.40 0.99 1.26 1.38 1.48 
Qinghai 0.07 0.15 1.09 1.14 1.33 1.42 
Ningxia 0.83 0.32 2.47 0.93 1.40 1.56 
Xinjiang 0.31 0.42 1.15 1.11 1.38 1.49 
Notes: ^ All economic indicators (in value terms) used in the calculations are in 1980 constant prices. 
Fixed capital stock in a particular year is decomposed into different vintage stocks and then different annual 
price deflators are used for different vintages of capital stock. 
^ A value below unity for a Tornqvist index indicates a decrease in productivity. The Tornqvist indexes of 
output quantities were derived using output quantities and the social cost of capital; the Tornqvist indexes 
of output values were derived using net output and the social cost of capital and the Tornqvist indexes by 
output values and interest paid to capital were derived using net output and the actual cost of capital 
incurred by enterprises. 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-
book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), 1985-1990. 
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of output values. The majority of the 15 regions which were unable to maintain their 
productivity levels in output quantity terms were able to increase them in output value 
terms. As indicated above, this may have been due to price distortions. Although some 
regions could not compete in iron and steel production, they were encouraged to expand 
their production when the distorted price system would enable them to earn positive 
returns. 
The Tomqvist indexes of productivity growth estimated using output values and 
actual costs of enterprises indicate that enterprises in all regions improved their productivity 
performance. When enterprises did not pay the social cost of capital, they appeared to 
have had high productivity rates. The difference between these Tomqvist indexes indicate 
the distortions due to public ownership of assets in the iron and steel industry and 
inadequate payments by enterprises for capital assets. Furthermore, since inefficient 
regions achieved positive productivity growth rates, and probably increased returns to 
capital owners (local governments), they were able to expand production capacity despite 
high cost. 
The increase in working capital stock was far more rapid than increases in other 
factors in every region. As working capital was mostly used to purchase industrial 
materials, this is an indication that each region spent proportionately more of its capital 
resources on accumulation of industrial materials, such as coal and iron ore. Since every 
region tried to increase its iron and steel output, the industry as a whole faced a 
4 deteriorating material supply simation. 
'^There is a typical story which illustrates this situation. At one point in 1988, the Anshan Iron 
and Steel Cooperation, the largest cooperation in the Chinese iron and steel industry, had coal stores 
sufficient for only one day of production and an electricity supply which could support only 60 per cent of 
its production capacity because the resource supply regions could not keep up with its requirements (Qi 
Janguo 1990). 
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Conclus ion 
The pattern of production expansion was increasingly biased towards medium- and small-
scale enterprises during the reform period. Specifically, the production share of 
enterprises with higher production costs increased and enterprises with lower production 
costs fell. Medium- and small-scale enterprises were able to use electric arc furnace 
technology to expand production capacity. But as the electric arc technology used scrap 
steel and electricity, both of which were under-priced and in short supply, the increasing 
use of this technology was of serious concern. Iron and steel production was increasingly 
segmented across regions. Relatively less efficient regions experienced a more rapid 
increase in capital formation, it is likely that the scale efficiency of the iron and steel 
industry was adversely affected. 
The distorted prices in factor and goods markets and local government protection 
were the driving forces behind the development pattern of the iron and steel industry. The 
two-tier price system was the key source for distortions in goods market (chapter 3:51-3, 
chapter 4:65-66, 77-81). The prevailing market price of finished steel products was 5500 
yuan per tonne in 1988, which was more than three times of the planned price. Provinces 
selling steel products at planned prices would mean that they gave up their revenues. This 
price distortion encouraged local protections and promoted each region to have its own 
production. The negative real interest rate paid by the enterprises for the use of bank loans 
and state-owned capital enabled them to expand production even if their expansion might 
not be nationally optimal (chapter 3:36-8, chapter 4:65-6, 76-81). Despite this, compared 
to the pre-reform period, enterprises of different scale were, on average, able to reduce 
their costs and improve their economic efficiency during the reform period, although 
considerable cost differences between the relatively large-scale enterprises and medium-
and small-scale enterprises remained. 
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Appendix 4A 
The derivation of the Tornqvist index 
Given a production function: 
y = f ( x , t ) (4A.1) 
where y is output, x is input and t represents time. Total differentiation of equation (4A.1) 
with respect to time yields: 
dy/dt = Zj a / / dx. . dXj / dt + d f / at (4A.2) 
where j indicates input j. Dividing equation (4A.2) through by y gives: 
diny/dt = X. e. dlnx^ / dt + T(x,t) (4A.3) 
where e^  is the output elasticity of input j and T(x,t) is the productivity change over time. 
Equation (4A.3) has n+1 observable terms (dIny/dt and dlnxj/dt, j=l,2,...,n) and n+1 
unobservable terms [T(x,t) and then e^]. To make T(x,t) observable, a way must be found 
to make the e^  observable. Under profit maximization, the output elasticities equal input 
shares in total revenue. Hence, when profits are maximized, the expression yields: 
dIny/dt = I j w-x. / py . dlnx^ / dt + T(x,t) 
or 
T(x,t) = dInY/dt - Z. w.x. / py . dlnxVdt (4A.4) J J J J 
where, w is the input price and p is the output price. For discrete observations, which 
economic data usually are, equation.(4A.4) can only be approximated by 
T(x,t) = Iny^ - 1/2 [V^^  + [Inx.^ - (4A.5) 
Equation (4A.5) is equivalent to equation (4.1) in the text. 
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Chapter 5 
Market structural changes: implications for industrial performance 
The analysis of the effects of the changes in market structure during the reform 
period on the iron and steel industry's performance is based on the data of the previous 
chapter. Initial analysis is undertaken on the assumption that all enterprises charged the 
same price for the same product. This is followed by analysis based on the price regime 
which prevailed under the two-tier price system where different groups of enterprises 
charged different prices for the same product. The analysis focuses on the effect market 
imperfections had on industrial performance. 
During the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented 
economic system, enterprises moved toward profit-maximizing behaviour. No matter 
how poor the relative efficiency of a particular enterprise under the reformed economic 
system, its economic performance could have been expected to improve when it began to 
maximize profit. The final section of analysis focuses on identifying what effects this 
change in the behaviour of enterprises had on industrial performance. 
The analysis draws a distinction between two separate effects which influenced 
industrial performance, the continuation of (or even increase in) market imperfections and 
anticipated changes in the behaviour of enterprises. 
Market imperfections and industrial scale efficiency under the assumption 
of uniform market prices 
Three basic facts have been observed so far: 
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. Enterprises were distinguished on the basis of their different average cost structure: 
the large-scale enterprises on average had lower unit costs than did the medium-
and small-scale enterprises. 
. Although the medium- and small-scale enterprises had a cost disadvantage, they 
achieved higher rates of growth for output and factor inputs and captured an 
increasing production share. That is, dS^ < 0 and dS^ > 0, where d indicates 
change and Sj and S^ ^ represent the production shares of large-scale enterprises and 
medium- and small-scale enterprises respectively. 
. Iron and steel production was more segmented during the reform period. This was 
indicated by the decreasing Herfmdahl and Hirschman index (HHI) for the 
industry, namely, ^iHHI < 0. According to the definition of Hffl stated in the 
previous chapter, HHI = S S. , where i = 1,... n. If production of the iron and 
steel industry is disaggregated into the two groups of enterprises considered to 
2 2 date, then, HHI = Sj + Sj^  . The production share of the large-scale enterprises 
was bigger than that of the medium- and small-scale enterprises before the 
economic reforms, SJQ > S^Q, where 0 indicates the pre-reform period. However, 
as already discussed the production share of the medium- and small-scale 
enterprises increased during the reform period although S ^ was still larger than 
2 2 
Sj^p where 1 indicates the reform period. Therefore, HHI^ = S ^ + < 
HHIq = SjQ^ Sj^ Q ,^ that is ^/HHI < 0 . ^  
^This relationship can be seen from a hypothetical example. Assuming that S.^  = 2/3 and S^ ^ = 
1/3 and S.J = 3/5 and S.^  = 2/5, then, HHI^  = S.^^ + S.^^ = (2/3)^ + (1/3)^ = 0.56 and HHIj = S.^^ + 
= (3/5)^ + (2/5)^ = 0.52. Therefore, HHI^  < HHI^ . 
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The impact of the behaviour of the two groups of enterprises on industrial 
performance can be explored within the framework of market imperfection theory. A 
monopolist's degree of market power can be represented by: 
P - M C 1 
P Eqp (5.1) 
where, P is output price, MC is marginal cost, and E g p is the price elasticity of demand 
(see Appendix 5.A for the derivation of this reladonship). Equation (5.1) can be re-written 
as 
MC 1 
= 1 
P E q p (5.2) 
For a profit-maximizing monopolist, price is proportional to marginal cost. Price is 
a markup over marginal cost, with the size of the markup depending on the price elasticity 
of demand. It follows that if one compares two enterprises, one with a lower marginal 
cost than the other, the enterprise with the lower marginal cost will charge a lower price 
(Bork 1978: 307). 
For oligopolists with cost differences, the same point holds (Martin 1984 and 
1988b). In the general case of N enterprises with unequal costs, the individual 
oligopolist's degree of market power becomes: 
P - M C s. 
^QP 
or. 
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M C s. 
= 1 -
P V ( 5 . 3 ) 
where, M C is marginal cost of enterprise i and s- is the market share of enterprise i. As a 
enterprise with lower marginal cost will charge a lower price, it follows that a enterprise 
with higher marginal cost in an oligopolistic market would have to give at least part of its 
production share to the enterprise with lower marginal cost. The enterprise with lower 
marginal cost will thus produce more and have a higher market share, s., than the 
enterprise with higher marginal cost (see Appendix 5. A for the derivation of this relation). 
In an oligopolistic industrial market, market shares will be allocated so that all enterprises 
will have the same marginal cost. This is the so-called 'equal marginal cost principle of 
efficiency' (Call and Holahan 1983:235-6, Martin 1988a: 137). It should be noted that the 
above analysis assumes that enterprises sell their product at the same market price. 
This argument was presented graphically by Martin (1988a: 137) in a duopolist 
model (Figure 5.1). Because marginal cost rises more rapidly as output increases for the 
high-cost enterprise than the low-cost enterprise, overall industrial profit maximization 
requires the high-cost enterprise to accept a lower output, and therefore a lower market 
share, than the low-cost enterprise. That is to say, enterprises with a cost advantage will 
take a lower profit per unit sold by increasing output and then capture a higher market 
share, because increases in output reduce its average cost and increase its total profit. 
Economists in the Neo-Austrian school (Haines and Shackleton 1990: 179) are therefore highly 
sceptical of active government intervention to break up private sector concentrations of market power to 
prevent mergers. Instead they lay great emphasis on reducing the state's role in the economy, promoting 
privatisation and deregulation as the key to competition. Where some regulation is nevertheless called for, 
there should be no attempt to control prices and behaviour in detail. Rather governments should set rules 
which allow regulated firms to innovate and seek maximum profits. 
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of production share between different cost enterprises 
Pnce Pnce Price 
MC + MC H 
Q 
a. High cost enterprise b. Low cost enterprise c. Market 
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Two considerations validate the use of the imperfect competition model to analyse 
the Chinese iron and steel industry. First, the iron and steel industry has long been 
constrained by raw materials shortage (such as iron ore). The expansion of this industry 
as a whole has been constrained from the supply side. Second, as discussed previously, 
demand for iron and steel products in China has always exceeded supply. Consequently, 
iron and steel enterprises have enjoyed monoplistic power wherever they were able to seU 
products on the free market. More importantiy, the performance of the industry relied on 
how the production share was distributed among groups of enterprises with different 
costs. 
The decreasing production share, Sp of large-scale enterprises (the increasing 
share, Sj^, of medium- and small-scale enterprises and increased HHI indicating higher 
market segmentation) indicates sub-optimal conduct by large-scale enterprises. It would 
appear that they were willing to accept a higher return per unit of output and produce less, 
rather than take a lower return and produce more. As the large-scale enterprises failed to 
exploit their cost advantage and maintained higher price-cost margins, their production 
share declined. On the other hand, the medium- and small-scale enterprises with cost 
disadvantages were able to expand their production share even though they often had 
lower price-cost margins. As a result, the equal marginal cost principle of efficiency when 
there are marginal cost differences among enterprises was violated due to market 
imperfections. 
While the two t\'pes of enterprises are compared, the overall efficiency of the whole 
industry is acuially considered. However, since enterprises belong to specific segmented 
markets, their individual performance may be well associated to the conditions in the 
segmented markets. It is quite possible that enterprises with cost disadvantages may face a 
local market where output price is high, but enterprises with cost advantages may face a 
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local market where output price is low. The segmented markets then have the function to 
protect the enterprises with cost disadvantages from the competition of enterprises with 
cost advantages. To be able to investigate the overall efficiency of the whole industry, it is 
thus not proper to evaluate enterprises' performance separately according to the conditions 
in their individual local markets. Rather, enterprises should be compared within the 
framework in which the overall efficiency of the whole industry can be assessed. By 
doing so, the cost of overall efficiency of the whole industry due to the market 
segmentation can be addressed. 
Attention should be paid to the limitation of this type of partial equlibrium analysis 
(only a single industry is analysed). When the ouput of any individual industry grows 
rapidly in the short run, output is not optimally distributed in the context of inter-industry 
comparison. This is because the rapid growth in an individual industry may well be 
constrained in its supply ability. This would give rise to short-run inefficiency. 
Therefore, even if relative efficiency may be gained within the Chinese iron and steel 
industry while the cost-advantage large-scale enterprises could expand more rapidly than 
the cost-disadvantage small-scale enterprises, the rapid expansion of this industry may still 
cause economic inefficiency by comparing to other industries. Since this dissertation is 
restricted to a partial equilibrium analysis, i.e. the Chinese iron and steel industry only, the 
general equilibrium analysis involving inter-industry analysis will not be addressed. 
The above hypothesis can be verified by examining the distribution of market 
shares in relation to cost differences among enterprises. For simplicity of analysis, a 
given total output quantity Q is assumed, so that a change in the quantity produced by any 
group of enterprises will correspond to a change in the production share of that group. In 
figure 5.2, the production share of the high cost medium- and small-scale enterprises 
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increases from Q^^ Q ^^ Q h l ' ^^^ production share of the low cost large-scale 
enterprises decreases from QJQ to Q ^ . Formally, 
S h i = Q h i / Q > S h o = Qho/Q (5.4) 
S i i = Q I I / Q < S J Q = QJ(/Q (5.5) 
It is assumed that the equal marginal cost principle of efficiency held in period 0, and both 
groups of enterprises were operating at MCQ, MC^Q = M C J ^ Q . However, this principle is 
violated as the marginal costs of the two groups of enterprises h and 1 will diverge to 
M C ^ j and MCj^ respectively. The effect of this market imperfection on the industry is 
captured by the two rectangles in figure 5.2, ^j^bj^Qj^ ^Q^^Q and ^^^^Q^QQ^. The 
production quantity loss from the enterprises with a cost advantage is the production 
quantity gain for the enterprises with a cost disadvantage, i.e. the distance QJ^J-QJ^Q is 
equal to the distance Q j o ' ^ i r following breakdown of the cost of the market 
imperfection can be made. The extra cost incurred by the enterprises with a cost 
disadvantage from producing more is Cj^dj^Qj^^Qj^O and the cost savings for the enterprises 
with a cost advantage by producing less is Cjd^QjQQj^: 
The benefit (economic profit as well as producer surplus) gained by enterprises with a cost 
disadvantage from producing more is aj^bj^d^c^^, and the benefit loss for the enterprises 
with a cost advantage from producing less is a^ b^d^Cj.-
% W h < ^l^l^l'l 
As the extra cost is larger than the cost savings and the extra benefit is less than the benefit 
loss, the whole industry is worse off compared with the situation in period 0. 
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Figure 5.2 The disforlcd distribution of production share between different cost enterprises 
in a uniform price system 
Price Price Price 
MC u ' - M C ^ n y L 
Derm and 
\ ' \ 1 
^ / i ^ M R 
Q 
a. High cost enterprise b. Low cost enterprise c. Market 
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Market imperfections and industrial performance under a two-tier price 
s y s t e m 
With a two-tier price system, planned output was sold at planned prices and enterprise or 
local government controlled output at floating prices. Although enterprises could decide to 
whom they sold their controlled output, the floating price did not simply equate with 
market price because an upper limit to the floating price was set by the central government. 
Nevertheless, whether enterprises were really subject to this regulated upper price limit 
depended on how the market activities of enterprises were audited by the government 
3 
authorities, especially, the central government agency. 
The large-scale enterprises were in a weak position in exploiting the two-tier price 
system during the reform period. First, the large-scale enterprises were subject to 
planning control over a higher proportion of output and hence could only sell a smaller 
4 
proponion of their output at the floating price. Second, the large-scale enterprises were 
more easily and often audited by the central government price agency and, therefore, it 
was more difficult for them to sell their controlled output at the market price rather than at 
the floating price. ^ 
Given this differentiation in the pricing constraints applied to large- and medium-
and small-scale enterprises, the assumption of a uniform price level, P, is relaxed. The 
3 
Some local authorides may well have contrived to hide the illegal pricing activities of firms in 
their own regions from the central audit. By doing so, they could collect more revenue from these firms. 
'^A Chinese report (Li Xiaowei 1990) found that the large-scale firms were subject to much higher 
planned output targets from the central government. For example, the Shanghai No.5 iron and steel firm 
had 1.25 million tonnes crude steel from its total production of 1.30 million tonnes subject to central 
government plan in 1989. But the central planned production of crude steel in 1989 was only 32.6 per 
cent of the national total (see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3). This suggests that medium- and small-scale firms 
were subject to much lower centrally planned output targets. 
^To take Wuhan Iron and Steel Cooperation, one of the top four cooperations in the Chinese iron 
and steel industry as an example. It was reported (Wu Guohe 1990) that the central price agency kept 
checking the prices of Wuhan Iron and Steel Cooperauon's controlled output so that the price per tonne of 
finished steel charged by this cooperation was usually several hundred yuan lower than that charged by 
other firms. 
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price confronting large-scale enterprises was likely to be a lower regulated price and for 
medium- and small-scale enterprises a higher price prevailed in the free market. 
Based on the framework of Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 presents a naive model of the 
behaviour of enterprises with different cost structures under the two-tier price system. 
The market price is denoted by P ^ and the government regulated price by Pp, with P ^ > 
Pp. When output from medium- and small-scale enterprises (Qj^) increases, P ^ is 
charged; when Q^ (output from large-scale enterprise) decreases, Pp is charged. 
Everything else is the same as the case examined in Figure 5.2. 
The price-cost margin of the medium- and small-scale group of enterprises would 
increase when enterprises charge the market price, P ^ . The economic inefficiency 
generated under the uniform price system was demonstrated above. Under the two-tier 
price system, the profit margin of the medium- and small-scale enterprises P^-MCj^ may 
have been higher than that of the large-scale enterprise group Pp-MCj, because P ^ > Pp. 
Under the two-tier price system, the benefit to enterprises with a cost disadvantage is 
^h^h^h^h ^ ^ ^l^A^'l ^^  ^^^ ^^ enterprises with a cost advantage. Therefore, the real 
cost of the market imperfections in terms of industrial performance should not be judged 
from the profitability of different-scale enterprises with different cost structures. 
The comparative profitability of different groups of enterprises is therefore 
meaningless for the evaluation of industrial efficiency.^ As the contract responsibility 
system was implemented on the basis of the profitability of enterprises, its effect on the 
performance of enterprises was ver>' limited. But this distorted pattern of enterprise 
^The well-known equal marginal cost principle of industrial efficiency in a duopolist model, 
MC.=MC.=MR.=MR. and (P-MC.)=(P-MC.), can not hold in this circumstance. Under a discriminating 
price regime, such as applied in the Chinese iron and steel indusu-y case, it is possible that (P^-
MC )=(P -MC ) but MC, and MC, , MR and MR are not equal because of P is not equal to P I m h l h l n p m 
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Figure 5.3 The dis t r ibut ion of product ion share between di f ferent cost en terpr i ses 
in a two-tier price system 
Price Pnce Pnce 
Demaind 
MC + M C , 
\ 1 
i \ MR 
/ 1 V 
Q 
a. High cost enterprise b. Low cost enterprise c. Market 
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profitability is a key to understanding the expansion pattern of the iron and steel industry 
during the reform period. Considering that the profit margin of the medium- and small-
scale group of enterprises was potentially rather large when they fully exploited the 
partially free market by charging market prices, there must have been strong motivation for 
these enterprises to expand their production. The strong local government support would 
have enabled the medium- and small-scale enterprises to compete with the large-scale 
enterprises, even if their marginal cost was much higher than that of the large-scale 
enterprises. 
With limited financial and natural resources constraining the development of the 
Chinese iron and steel industry, the fast expansion of the medium- and small-scale 
enterprises limited the growth of large-scale enterprises which are more efficient in scale. 
The higher the profit margin of the medium- and small-scale enterprises, the stronger their 
motivation to expand and capture a higher market share albeit at higher costs of 
production. This industrial expansion pattern is rather inefficient because increases in 
production were largely contributed from the enterprises below minimum efficient scale. 
A continuous trend of market segmentation in the iron and steel industry, as a result of the 
stronger expansion of the less efficient medium- and small-scale enterprises, led to a loss 
of economies of scale for the industry as a whole. 
The effect of the micro-econoinic reforms on enterrises 
The central goal of the economic reforms was to increase profit-maximization behaviour 
(Tidrick and Chen 1987:1-11, Wilson and Gordon 1989, Kosta 1989, Komai 1990). The 
sequencing of this change in the behaviour of enterprises was very critical for the 
economic reforms. If enterprises had exhibited profit-maximizing behaviour and actively 
responded to the market-based reform poUcies, an efficiency gain in the Chinese economy 
would have been expected. This would have occurred because enterprises were 
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considering the costs and benefits associated with their investment and production 
decisions. If an empirical study is to be used to justify the feasibility or desirability of the 
market-oriented economic reforms, it is necessary to determine if an efficiency gain was 
achieved. 
It has been widely argued among Chinese economists that enterprises did not show 
normal market-based behaviour in their responses to the reform policies but primarily 
sought rents in the reform process itself (Zhang Shaojie et al. 1987, Den Yengtao and Lo 
Xiaopeng 1987, Dai Yuanchen and Li Hanmin 1988, Du Haiyan etal 1990). The partial 
introduction of a market mechanism resulted in seriously distorted output and input 
markets and a seriously distorted redistribution of income, leading to concern that any 
further reform would engender enormous economic and social uncertainties. The current 
debate about the economic reforms in China and about other centrally planned economies, 
is focused on whether they can be reformed at all (Kosta 1989, Petr 1990). Nordhaus 
(1990) even proposed a Murphy's law for economic reforms in centrally planned 
economies: partial reformation of an internally consistent planned economy makes things 
worse before they get better. 
The above concerns seem to confuse the effects of the micro-level reforms on the 
behaviour of enterprises with the effects of market imperfections on industrial 
performance. The focus of the empirical study of micro reforms is on whether there was 
any systematic difference in industrial performance during the reform period as enterprises 
7 started to seek profit rather than quantity maximization. In relation to market 
n 
Komai (1980) argued that typical firms in a centrally-planned economies were not normally 
restrained by fears of loss or failure of production because their production was externally decided by a 
central plan. The central decision makers took all responsibility for ensuring input supply to support the 
production and commercial distribution of the final products. Therefore, the survival of firms in centrally 
planned economy was hardly contingent on their ability to cover all their costs out of their sales proceeds 
since grants, subsidies and tax favours could be negotiated to fill the gap. The basic motivating force for 
firms was a strong quantity drive, that is, an incentive to increase output as far as possible given available 
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imperfections, empirical study focuses on how enterprises could achieve profit 
maximization within the prevailing market system. 
Enterprises of all sizes were able to improve their cost efficiency, that is, reduce 
their unit costs, during the reform period although there were still wide cost differences 
among enterprises of different sizes and from different regions. Market-oriented 
behaviour by enterprises might have improved industrial performance, but market 
imperfections may have resulted in a deterioration. If this is the case, the evaluation of the 
effect of economic reforms on industrial performance may be confused by attempting to 
o 
measure two distinctive effects simultaneously. 
If enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry were now facing a perfectly 
competitive market, the hypotheses of the effect of micro-economic reforms on the 
behaviour of enterprises could be easily predicted. For example, Jefferson and Xu (1991) 
predicted the following changes in the patterns of enterprise behaviour: 
1. Where enterprises face downward-sloping demand curves, they should be setting prices to 
maximize profits. Specifically, profit-maximizing enterprises should never operate on the 
inelastic part of their market demand curves. 
2. Where competitive factor markets exist, profit-making enterprises should allocate revenues in 
accord with each factor's technical conLribution to production. Specifically, across enterprises, 
labour's compensation should be related to its marginal revenue product. 
3. When managers are granted autonomy to manage internally, they should use this greater 
authority to reduce costs and expand profits. 
resources. In relation to investment, there was an incentive to initiate and undertake investment projects to 
expand the scale of operation by seeking more favourable offers from a cenu-al economic plan, without ant 
concern for whether this expansion produced net economic benefits for the country. 
^Some studies (Chen Kuan et al 1988a, Dollar 1990, Li Xiaowei 1990, Lau and Brada 1990) 
indicate that the total factor productivity of the Chinese industrial sector improved during the reform 
period. However, some studies (Lardy 1987, Du Haiyan et al 1990) found that the productivity gains due 
to the reforms were rather poor and that they even deteriorated in some years. Different methodologies used 
for these studies may be the cause of this divergence. But it might also be that all these estimates are 
more or less biased in favour of one of the two effects discussed in the text. The optimists estimates were 
biased toward the effects on the transition in the behaviour of firms; the pessimists, towards the effect of 
imperfections related to the Chinese market mechanism. 
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4. Enterprises should seek to economize on factor inputs that become relatively expensive or 
whose opportunity cost rises. 
Hence, it could be expected that: 
1. During the reform period, across enterprises, factor returns including returns to capital, labour, 
and intermediate inputs have become more equal; and 
2. Over longer periods, the allocation of investment has enabled the more profitable enterprises to 
expand capacity most rapidly. (Jefferson and Xu 1991:49) 
Most of these predictions are invalid in the case of the iron and steel industry simply 
because the market was imperfect. It has been indicated that the enterprises with cost 
disadvantages might well have been profitable (due to price discrimination) and might also 
have expanded more rapidly than the enterprises with cost advantages. These 
observations run counter to those anticipated in the case of perfect competition. But the 
iron and steel industry changed from a centrally controlled industry into an industry 
operating in an imperfect market In an imperfect market, competition between enterprises 
is limited. Individual enterprises did try to maximize their profits, but even when they 
succeeded, this did not necessarily imply the most efficient outcome for the industry or the 
country. In addition, enterprises may have been able to utilize their internal resources 
effectively, but inter-enterprise resource mobility may be limited. 
A more detailed interpretation of enterprises' behaviour with regard to factor 
allocation can be made in terms of capital and labour. 
C a p i t a l 
Accounts for Chinese enterprises divide capital into fixed and working capital. 
Fixed capital consists of capital stocks from centrally allocated investment in the pre-
reform period, investment undertaken following the first introduction of reforms from 
accumulated fund of enterprises, investment financed by bank loans and investment from 
local governments and, in some instances, from the central government in the reform 
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period. Working capital consists of that portion determined by central plans before 
economic reforms and provided from banks to enterprises, bank loans and the 
accumulated fund of enterprises. Among these sources of capital, the only truly 
endogenous variable for enterprises was their own accumulation of funds. Enterprises 
had full control over their own accumulation, and more importantly, these funds involved 
an opportunity cost. Enterprises also incurred costs using bank loans. But whether bank 
loans were efficiendy allocated among enterprises or if enterprises paid the true economic 
cost of these funds, depended on whether interest rates were at equilibrium levels and 
whether enterprises were actually required to repay the loans. The behaviour of 
enterprises regarding capital formation and utilization can be examined in relation to the 
different sources of capital funds: 
. In attempting to minimize production costs or maximize profits, enterprises should 
have effectively utilized capital stock allocated to them regardless of its source. 
Accordingly, an improvement of technical efficiency should have resulted. 
Provided enterprises and workers could retain part of the benefits from utilizing 
production capacity more efficiently, a more efficient utilization of the capacity 
should have occurred as a result of the enterprises' and workers' response to 
economic incentives introduced by the reforms. 
. In attempting to minimize production costs or maximize profits, enterprises should 
have sought to economize on capital purchased from their accumulated funds so 
that the marginal productivities of these capital inputs equalled their marginal costs. 
An improvement in the allocative efficiency of enterprises in the use of capital 
investment under their control should have occurred. Enterprises were also able to 
use the capital investment under their control to correct existing misallocations of 
resources. For example, enterprises could implement investment from their own 
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funds to improve the compatibility of different types of production equipment. 
The effort of enterprises in this regard would contribute to improved technical 
efficiency. 
The change from granting enterprises funds freely from banks during the pre-reform 
period to charging enterprises interest rates during the reform period would have 
put some constraints on enterprises in obtaining funds from banks. However, the 
behaviour of enterprises towards bank loans was mainly determined by the interest 
rate policy implemented during the reform period. If nominal bank lending rates 
were lower than the inflation rate, the real cost of borrowing was negative. Hence, 
enterprises sought as many bank loans as they could with little consideration of 
efficient utilization. Consequendy, scarce capital resources were thinly spread 
across numerous enterprises by the decentralized banking system, and were 
insufficient to meet demand. Non-price rationing occurred and, therefore, 
allocative efficiency in relation to bank loans is expected to have been poor. 
Capital inputs not under the control of enterprises (the remaining planned 
investment) was allocated among enterprises in relation to their bargaining power 
with relevant government authorities. Therefore, the behaviour of enterprises with 
respect to these capital inputs remained as it had been in the pre-reform period. 
As no basic ownership reforms were initiated, capital was still immobile between 
regions and enterprises. Hence, the ability of enterprises to adjust their production 
scale to suit market conditions was largely restricted by their own accumulation of 
funds. Moreover, every enterprise, no matter whether it should have expanded its 
production capacity or not, had to implement more capital investment annually 
from its own accumulation according to the contract between enterprises and 
government authorities. As a result, industrial investment was spread more thinly 
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among enterprises and a deterioration of scale efficiency happened in a 
considerable number of enterprises. 
Labour 
The labour market was the least developed market in China's industrial sector. 
There was no real market wage rate to allocate labour: workers had de facto job tenure. 
The ability of a enterprise's manager to use labour effectively was very limited. To 
minimize costs in relation to labour inputs, managers should have been able to relate the 
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enterprises. 
However, after a few years, the implementation of this bonus-incentive policy 
merely resulted in a 'competitive bonus spiral' across enterprises. The bonus levels of 
workers in individual enterprises were not differentiated according to achieved 
productivity gains but rather converged (Chinese Institute of Economic System Reform 
1987, Dai Yuanchen et al 1988). The 'competitive bonus spiral' within enterprises was 
mainly due to the factor that managers were not given the power to change or adjust the 
basic wage levels of workers. These continued to be regulated by central planning. Even 
in the area of the bonus levels of workers, the authority of managers was strictly limited 
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among enterprises and a deterioration of scale efficiency happened in a 
considerable number of enterprises. 
Labour 
The labour market was the least developed market in China's industrial sector. 
There was no real market wage rate to allocate labour: workers had de facto job tenure. 
The ability of a enterprise's manager to use labour effectively was very limited. To 
minimize costs in relation to labour inputs, managers should have been able to relate the 
compensation of labour to its marginal revenue product. But their efforts were limited by 
their inability to retrench unnecessary workers and the strong pressure from workers for 
increases in their income in excess of their marginal productivity. 
The 'bonus incentive' policy was one of the most important policies implemented in 
an attempt to reform the labour and wage system. The Chinese government and 
economists were optimistically expecting that, if enterprises were allowed to issue bonuses 
to workers from retained profits, this would provide a greater incentive for workers to 
increase their work effort and improve their productivity, i.e. the technical efficiency of 
enterprises. 
However, after a few years, the implementation of this bonus-incentive policy 
merely resulted in a 'competitive bonus spiral' across enterprises. The bonus levels of 
workers in individual enterprises were not differentiated according to achieved 
productivity gains but rather converged (Chinese Institute of Economic System Reform 
1987, Dai Yuanchen et al 1988). The 'competitive bonus spiral' within enterprises was 
mainly due to the factor that managers were not given the power to change or adjust the 
basic wage levels of workers. These continued to be regulated by central planning. Even 
in the area of the bonus levels of workers, the authority of managers was strictly limited 
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by government regulations. These were introduced mainly because of the 'soft' nature of 
the financial constraints on enterprises and the undue pressure workers placed on 
enterprise managers to increase bonuses. Due to these factors, the effect of the 'bonus 
incentive' policy on the effort of workers may have been diminished. The income of 
workers hence continued to lie outside the control of managers in the sense that they could 
not determine the incomes of workers according to their marginal contributions to revenue. 
The 'competitive bonus spiral' which developed among enterprises resulted mainly 
from the pressure of workers to increase remuneration. In so far as managers had 
autonomy to issue bonuses, it was inevitable that workers pressured management to 
increase total wages not only to the highest level, but also to the highest level relative to 
other enterprises. Moreover, inadequate accounting and taxation systems that failed to 
audit the financial spending of enterprises enabled managers to match their workers bonus 
9 level to that of other enterprises, regardless of productivity. 
Although the bonus policy for workers could have had a positive impact on the 
effort of workers and, hence on the technical efficiency of enterprises, the consequent 
'competitive bonus spiral' led to an increase in the cost of labour. Factor allocation was 
thus distorted in the sense that labour, the most abundant resource in China, became 
relatively more expensive while the cost of capital was held at an artificially low level. 
^Numerous studies have been conducted on the worker's role in determining firm's investment patterns in 
Yugoslav labour-managed firms (Bonin, 1985, Mitchell, 1989). The main finding was that workers in 
labour-managed firms cannot recover the principal remaining on self-financed investment upon leaving the 
firm; therefore, all benefits from self-financed investment must accrue through increased salaries during the 
workers' tenure with the firm. This requirement gives rise to a horizon problem, which refers to the 
relative unwillingness of workers who are nearing the end of their association with the firm to retain 
earnings for self-financed investment. The effect of behaviour of Chinese workers on firm's investment is 
very similar to that of the labour-managed firms' workers in the sense that Chinese workers only take the 
income increase in the contracted period as their own benefit, but treat the firm's long-run profitability as 
something beyond their control and even as a contrary factor to the increase in their income. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis of this chapter has suggested several hypotheses for empirical analysis. 
. Market imperfections due to government policy reduced economies of scale and 
overall economic efficiency in the iron and steel industry as enterprises with cost 
disadvantages were able to expand much faster than enterprises with cost 
advantages. 
. Scale inefficiencies were also enforced by capital market distortions which led to the 
spread of capital resources thinly across regions and enterprises. 
. The change in the behaviour of enterprises due to the enterprise level reforms led to 
the improvement in technical and allocative efficiency at the enterprise-level 
reforms in regard to factors under the control of enterprises. 
. The 'bonus-incentive' policy might have had limited impact on improvement of 
technical efficiency due to the increase in the effort of workers. 
. The allocative inefficiency of capital resources would have been observed in relation 
to funds provided by banks at sub-optimal prices. 
. Allocative inefficiency would also have been observed as a result of distortions in 
the labour market, i.e. the over-valued labour costs due to the 'competitive bonus 
spiral'. 
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Appendix 5A 
Profit maximization of a monopolist 
For a monopoly, marginal revenue (MR) is the change in total revenue per unit change in 
the quantity demanded: 
MR = P + Q(dP/dQ) (5A.1) 
However, this relation can be rewritten as: 
MR = P (1 + Q/P dP/dQ) = P (1 - 1 / E Q P ) (5A.2) 
where, E^p = - (dQ/Q)/{dP/P) = - P/Q dQ/dP which is the price elasticity of demand 
A monopolist maximizes profit by producing the output at which marginal cost (MC) 
equals marginal revenue (MR), therefore: 
MR = P ( 1 - 1/Eqp) = MC (5A.3) 
It then follows that: 
MC/P = 1 - 1/Eqp 
which is equation (5.2) in chapter 5. 
Appendix 5B 
Profit maximization of oligopolists 
Consider j= l , 2, ..., J oligopolists producing a homogeneous product, Q=[Qp Q2, 
Qj], with price P. For a standard Nash-type conjectures in output, that is, each oligopolist 
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determines its output level on the assumption that the prevailing output level of its rivals 
will remain constant Each enterprise's stationarity point occurs with 
dp./dQ. = P(Q) + Q. (dP/dQ dQ/dQ.) - M C (5B. 1) 
where, p is profit and P(Q) is the inverse market demand function and Q=ZjQj. The 
conjecture can be restated as: 
dQ/dQj = dQ^dQj + dCZ^^. = 1 + aj (5B.2) 
On the right-hand side aj is defmed as enterprise J's conjecture concerning the output of all 
other enterprises. Substituting this into (5B.1) and rearranging gives: 
P(Q) - M C = Qj dP/dQ (1+a.) 
Dividing both sides by P, simply treating P(Q) as P, and rearranging gives: 
(P - MCj)/P = QyQ (Q/P dQ/dP) (1+ aj) (5B.3) 
where, Qj/Q = Sj, the production share of enterprise j and (Q/P dQ/dP) is the elasticity of 
demand E^p. Thus (5B.3) becomes: 
(P - M C ) / P = [Sj (1 + aj)]/EQp (5B.4) 
Using the Coumat conjecture that a^  = 0, (5B.4) can be restated as: 
M C / P = 1 - Sj/Eqp 
which is equation (5.3) in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 6 
Technical progress and scale economies: industrial-level analysis 
Empirical evaluation of the impact of economic reforms on the iron and steel industry is 
undertaken by an analysis of technical progress at the industry level. Time-series data for 
the period 1952 to 1988 are used to investigate whether structural change occurred over 
the reform period (1979-88). More specifically, this analysis tests the hypothesis that the 
industrial economic reforms may have led to a trade-off between technical progress, 
arising from the change in the behaviour of enterprises, and the loss of scale economies 
resulting from market segmentation in the iron and steel industry. 
The theory of technical progress 
Technical progress is a widely-used concept in theoretical and empirical economic research 
but its economic implications have never been standardized. Hence, different authors have 
used it to imply with different meanings. 
The neoclassical model, extended to include technical progress (Solow 1957), 
postulates that output for enterprise i can be expressed as a generalized function, 
Y = A . F ( K p L p , of capital, K., and labour, L., employed by the enterprise. The 
technology index. A, which reflects the efficiency of the production, can be utilized by any 
enterprise simultanously. Thus, the neoclassical formulation emphasizes the distinctive 
feature of technology, that, as an input, it is a public good because there is no rivahy or 
excludability in its utilization. Nevertheless, technical progress can not be treated as some 
sort of manna from heaven (Dutt 1990:88). What then determines technical progress? 
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For those who treat technology strictly as some kind of measurable input, such as 
research and development (R&D) activities at both the government and enterprise levels, 
debate focuses on whether technical progress is intentionally or unintentionally pursued by 
enterprises. Technical progress is assumed to be privately provided as externalities of 
some other activity. Arrow (1962) assumed that technical progress was an externality of 
investment in capital; Lucas (1988) assumed that technical progress arose as an externality 
of education; but Griliches (1979) and Romer (1986) argued that the leaming-by-doing 
formulation cannot explain why R&D activities are undertaken intentionally by private 
enterprises. They developed a production function for enterprise i, Y. = A.G(a-,K.,L.), 
where a- represents research results which are specific to enterprise i . This formulation 
allows for incomplete excludability by assuming that the externality term. A, which 
represents advances every enterprise can take advantage of, is a function of the 
investments by all enterprises in a .^ If constant returns to scale are assumed, function 
G(a.,K.,L.) requires the assumption of homogeneity of degree 1 in a, K and L. This runs 
counter to the essential non-rival feature of technical progress because it implies that, for 
any fixed stock of A and a., enterprise i should be able to double its output by doubling 
only its private good inputs, K and L. If a is doubled as well, output should more than 
double (Romer 1990:341). This issue led Romer to revise his model by considering 
technical progress as a partially excludable good, i.e. there may be knowledge or 
technology spillovers, but technical progress is not a pure public good and innovators can 
exclusively capture at least part of the benefits of an improvement in technology that they 
develop (Romer 1990). Considering that patent rights ensure that technical progress is 
less than a pure public good for some years, this revised Romer model seems more 
realistic. 
Those who treat technical progress broadly, as deriving from both physical 
investment sources and nonphysical organizational improvement, classify technical 
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progress as disembodied and embodied technical progress. Disembodied technical 
progress represents the effects of improvement in nonphysical factors, such as 
improvements in management and the effort of workers, on productivity. Embodied 
technical progress includes the effect of improvements in input quality on productivity. 
In the pioneering work of Solow (1957), disembodied technical progress was 
associated with the time derivative of the production function or some associated function 
such as the cost or profit function. Disembodied technical progress is then merely the 
residual between output and input growth (Domar 1962). Griliches and Jorgenson (1967) 
argued that this residual growth, or the observed growth in total factor productivity (TFP), 
will be negHgible if product output and physical factor inputs are accurately accounted for. 
Their methodology used capital and labour services rather than capital stock and labour 
force in calculating TFP. By doing so, they tried to correct for errors in the statistics of 
input data and price indexes. Hence, their argument was that this residual or TFP was 
mainly due to the poorly reported statistics of output and inputs rather than any 
improvement in nonphysical factors. 
Numerous studies have been devoted to analyzing the economic implications of 
growth of the residual. The comparative studies of productivity change between western 
industrial countries (market economies) and eastern European countries, the centrally 
planned economies (Bergson 1978, Cameron 1981, Desai 1985, Brada 1989) indicate that 
there has been a systematic difference in the residual growth exhibited by these two types 
of economies. As the most obvious difference between centrally-planned economies and 
market economies lies in their distinctive forms of economic organization, it is reasonable 
to measure the differences between these economic systems in terms of systematic 
differences in the levels of residual growth. 
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Moreover, if embodied technical progress is considered along with the estimation of 
disembodied technical progress, the effects of quality changes associated with specific 
vintages of inputs and workers with different work experiences on productivity change 
would be separated from the residual growth. Hence, inputs should be more accurately 
assessed, given the concerns raised by Griliches and Jorgenson. If residual growth is still 
observed, disembodied technical progress might exist and could then be explained only by 
nonphysical factor or organizational improvements. 
The analysis in this chapter will employ the broad concept of technical progress 
defined above. Thus, the causes of industrial output growth over time can be 
disaggregated into changes in availability of factor inputs, embodied technical progress 
and disembodied technical progress. Technical progress will be modelled in two ways. 
First, disembodied technical progress will be modelled to identify the change in the 
relationship between inputs and output, assuming no change in the qualitative nature of 
inputs. Second, embodied technical progress will be considered using a vintage model to 
revise the original data on the capital stock and labour force. Using the revised data, the 
estimates of disembodied technical progress can be used to distinguish more precisely the 
effects of economic reform on productivity. 
Revised data on capital stock have been employed in the analysis in this chapter to 
deflate the value of the capital stock (Chen et al. 1988b) and take account of different 
vintages of capital goods, in respective years. ^  Labour force data have also been revalued 
taking education and work experience into consideration. The merits of these revised data 
lead to the expectation that data measurement errors should be negUgible, according to the 
^Following Chen et al (1988a), capital stock in each year is decomposed into surviving values of previous 
years and then inflation rates in these years are applied to the decomposed surviving values of different 
years. 
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Griliches and Jorgenson's concerns. More precise conclusions can be drawn from the 
estimates. 
Disembodied technical progress: a primary analysis in a Cobb-Douglas production function framework 
Solow's strategy of estimating disembodied technical progress is applied to detect whether 
a structural change in disembodied technical progress occurred following the introduction 
of economic reforms in 1979 (Solow 1957). This simple method only provides a general 
indication of the overall impact of nonphysical input factors on output growth over time. 
The more detailed economic determinants of this impact cannot be drawn simply from the 
estimates of disembodied technical progress. These can only be obtained by adding more 
arguments to the specification of the estimation model. Nevertheless, estimates of 
disembodied technical progress for the Chinese iron and steel industry are the first step in 
empirical analysis. They give an initial insight into the effects of economic reform and 
further study can take direction from these basic findings. 
To test whether the change in the behaviour of enterprises, from seeking 
maximization of output under the traditional centrally-planned economic system to seeking 
profit maximization, led to improvement in the performance of the iron and steel industry, 
the effect of the change in enterprises' behaviour has to be distinguished from other 
sources of economic growth. If more effective incentives were offered to enterprises and 
physical resources were used more efficiently, disembodied technical progress should 
show an improvement. 
To be able to detect whether the economic reforms led to a distinguishable effect on 
disembodied technical progress for the reform period (1979-88), separate time trends are 
applied to the pre-reform period (1952-78) and the reform period (1979-88). It is 
expected that the coefficients of the two time trends should exhibit different characteristics 
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if there were structural change in disembodied technical progress between the two periods. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the time trend for the reform period should capture the effect 
of any change in the behaviour of enterprises on disembodied technical progress. 
A Cobb-Douglas production function constrained by constant returns to scale and 
Hicks-neutral technical progress can be specified as, 
Y^ = A KjP exp( y t -h 5 Dt e^) (6.1) 
where 
Yj = net output in year t; 
A = constant; 
L^ = labour force in year t; 
K^ = fixed capital stock in year t; 
t = time trend, indexed from one to thirty-seven for the pre-reform period 1952 to 
1978 and 0 for all other years; 
D = Dummy variable, 0 for the period 1952 to 1978 and one for the reform period 
1979 to 1988; 
e^ = normally distributed random variables. 
Explanation is needed to the use of net output as the dependent variable in the time-
series analysis since gross output is used instead in cross section analysis in chapter 7. 
Net output equals to gross output minus cost of materials. Hence, cost of materials should 
be omitted as an explanatory variable when net output is used in the production analysis. 
Because usually there are limited observations in time-series data, the advantage of using 
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net output as a dependent variable in time series analysis is that it requires less explanatory 
variables and thus increase the degree of freedom for the regression. For the time-series 
analysis of the Chinese iron and steel industry, there are only 37 observations. To use net 
output as dependent variable and accordingly omit material cost as an explanatory variable, 
one more degree of freedom can be increased for the estimation of Cobb-Douglas 
production function and two more degrees of freedom can be increased for the estimation 
of CES production function. In cross section analysis (chapter 7), the data of 99 
enterprises in three years are used. Therefore, there are 297 observations in the cross 
section analysis while the data are pooled. Since the limitation of observations is not a 
concern, gross output is used as a dependent variable in cross section analysis and material 
cost is added into the estimation as an explanatory variable. 
Taking logarithms and re-arranging yields 
ln(Y/L)^ = InA + p ln(K/L)^ + y t + 6 Dt e^  (6.2) 
In the estimation of equation (6.2), another dummy variable, D5861, is also 
included to capture abnormal growth behaviour in the period 1958 to 1961. This period 
covers the years of the Great Leap Forward and the following year. Casual empiricism 
suggests that the size of gross output and the labour force in these years was abnormally 
higher than for previous and subsequent years. The dummy variable D5861 picks up this 
abnormal effect. 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation was first used for equation (6.2). The 
problem of serial correlation is indicated by the low DW statistics 0.86 and high CHI-SQ 
value, 12.35, from the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of serial correlation. Since the data 
under study comprise a time series (1952 to 1988) of iron and steel production, a natural 
early concern for the source of serial correlation is the mis-specification of dynamics in the 
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model. But the issue of dynamic specification cannot be considered separately from many 
other aspects of model evaluation. Mis-specification of the model, or the omission of 
relevant variables, can produce many of the same symptoms as those of true omitted 
dynamic phenomena. However, the lower CHI-SQ value, 7.73, from Ramsey's RESET 
test for functional form indicates that the other problems of mis-specification, such as 
omitted relevant variables, are less likely than the problem of dynamic mis-specification. 
The next re-estimation focused on the correction of dynamic mis-specification. The 
auto-regression (AR) method was chosen for this purpose. Compared with some other 
AR methods, the exact maximum likelihood method with second-order auto-regression 
2 
(AR(2)) produced the most efficient result. A higher value of adjusted R and more 
significant F-Statistic were obtained, and most of the resultant coefficients were 
statistically significant. Moreover, the parameter estimates of the AR-error were 
statistically significant, and the log-likehhood ratio statistics for the test of AR(1) against 
the non-autocorrelated error hypothesis, and for the test of the AR(2)-error specification 
against the AR(l)-error specification were large enough to pass the critical values at the 2 2.5 per cent level. All these indicate preference for the chosen method of estimation. 
After correcting for serial correlation in ordinary least square (OLS) estimation (see 
Appendix 6A for data description), the estimation results are as follows: 
ln(Y/L)^= -0.88-h 0.14 ln(K/L)^ -0.005 t -h0.05Dt- 0.83 D5861 
(-6.53) (1.45) (-0.63) (1.58) (-2.50) 
Adj. R^ = 0.81 F-statistic (4, 32)= 34.51 
DW statistic = 1.86 (6.2.1) 
In the following estimations, the same methodology as explained above is adopted, because almost all 
subsequent estimations suffered the same estimation problems. This could be expected, as the revised data 
used for these estimations may have changed the behaviour of estimated parameters, but not the basic 
statistical behaviour of the original data set. 
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where, figures in brackets are t ratios corresponding to the estimated coefficients. 
The overall performance of this estimation is basically satisfactoiy as the F-statistic 
is high enough to surpass any critical values under 32 degrees of freedom, the adjusted R 
is also reasonably high and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic does not suggest the 
problem of autocorrelation. The coefficient for the key independent variable ln(K/L)^, is 
not however, statistically significant as its low t-ratio indicates. This is an indication that 
this estimation could be improved by considering other specifications. 
The central concern arising from this estimation is the coefficient of Dt which 
indicates disembodied technical progress during the reform period. The coefficient of Dt 
is statistically significant at about the 10 per cent level and its positive value supports the 
expectation that disembodied technical progress improved during the reform period. On 
the other hand, the pre-reform disembodied technical progress, which is shown by the 
coefficient of t, is not statistically different from zero. However, the negative sign of the 
coefficient of t suggests that disembodied technical progress in the pre-reform period had 
an opposite trend from that in the reform period. Hence, structural change over the 
economic reform period becomes a concern. 
A Chow test for structural change is conducted by only including data from 1952 to 
1978 in the regression. The resultant Chow F-test has a value of 3.45 which is larger than 
the critical value at the 5 per cent level and indicates the likelihood that structural change 
occurred over the period of economic reform. 
Accordingly, the method of piecewise linear regression is used to identify the 
structural characters in the two sub-periods (Ramanathan 1989:258-60). In the piecewise 
^For 37 degrees of freedom, the critical values of t ratios at the 10, 5 and 2.5 per cent levels are 
respectively 1.30, 1.68 and 2.20 under the one tail test. 
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linear regression, the coefficient that is expected to be subject to structural change over 
different periods is specified as a function of the original coefficient and a dummy 
variable. The piecewise linear regression enables the modelling of a nonlinear relationship 
by approximating it with several linear relationships. While the estimates of the original 
coefficients capture the long-term effects, the estimates of the coefficients of the dummy 
variables capture the structural change effect in a (usually short) specified period. 
Equation (6.2) can be re-specified as: 
Ln(Y/L)^ = InA + (p + bD) In(K/L)^ + 71 + 8 Dt + a D5861 + e^  
= InA + p In(K/L)^ + b DIn(K/L)j + y t + 5 Dt + a D5861 + e^ (6.2.2) 
where D equals unity in the period 1979 to 1988 and is otherwise zero. The null 
hypothesis of no structural change during the reform period is expressed by HO: d=b=0. 
This can be tested using the traditional F-test associated with testing that coefficients in a 
linear regression model are simultaneously zero. These empirical results are as follows 
(see Appendix 6A for estimation methodology): 
In(Y/L)^ = - 0.57 + 0.49 In(K/L) - 1.85 DIn(K/L) - 0.03 t + 0.16Dt - 0.57 D5861 
(-4.88) (3.98) (-3.52) (-3.69) (2.18) (-1.95) 
Adj. R^ = 0.86 F-Statistic (5, 31)= 36.97 DW statistic = 2.08 
F-statistics (Ho: 5=^=0) = 1.01 (6.2.3) 
According to the estimation result, the structural differences between the two sub-
periods can be summarized as: 
(i) The t-ratios for the coefficients of disembodied technical progress, 7 and 5, are 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level under the two tail test. The test for 6=/?=0 is 
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rejected as the F-statistics (1.01) is not significant even at 1 per cent level. This test 
associated with the significant t statistics for 5 and b indicates that there have been a 
structural change over the reform period. Over the period 1952 to 1978, disembodied 
technical progress, indicated by the coefficient y, was negative (-0.03) and over the period 
1979 to 1988, disembodied technical progress, indicated by the coefficient 5 adjusted for 
Y, was positive (0.13)."^ This could mean that nonphysical factors, i.e. the reforms of the 
industrial economic system, had a positive impact on the growth of labour productivity. 
(ii) The coefficients of capital stock per unit of labour (i.e. capital intensity) for the 
two sub-periods are different in sign if one counts the coefficients of 5 and b joindy to 
represent the coefficient of capital stock per worker for the reform period. Consequently, 
the coefficient for the period 1952 to 1988 is 0.49, but the coefficient for the period 1979 
to 1988 is -1.36. The coefficient of capital stock is the elasticity of output per unit of 
labour with respect to capital per unit of labour. The negative value of this coefficient 
implies that the increase in capital-labour ratio following the introduction of economic 
reforms had a negative impact on the increase of labour productivity. 
This estimate is, however, in accord with the information presented in chapter 3 that 
there has been an inefficient investment boom in the iron and steel industry during the 
reform period. This investment boom was initially stimulated by ambitious plans to 
achieve high growth rates of steel production and then encouraged by the efforts of local 
governments to increase the amount of production under their control. In particular, the 
choice of electric furnace technology by many medium- and small-scale enterprises 
enabled an expansion of production capacity within regional financial constraints. But 
aggregated investment for the industry as a whole was considerable. Because of the 
4 
More accurately, the estimates of the coefficients, y and p, represents the long-term effect of technical 
progress, but they may also be an indication of the effect over the period 1952 to 1978. 
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special resources, scrap steel and electricity, were in short supply, the return from capital 
investment in electric furnace technology was low and low capital utilization was the 
result. 
Another reason for the negative impact of the increase in the capital/labour ratio on 
labour productivity may have been the high inflation in capital goods prices during the 
reform period (Jefferson 1990). Inflation resulted in substantial overestimation of the real 
quantities of productive capital within many enterprises. Large increases in capital goods 
prices after 1980 were not justified by improvements in the efficiency of recent vintages of 
Chinese capital equipment. 
Nevertheless, the negative value of the coefficient is abnormally high in magnirnde. 
Apart from the data problem mentioned above, caution should also be exercised in respect 
of mis-specification problems that may exist in the model. Due to mis-specification, the 
negative estimate of capital's output elasticity during 1979-88 may cause an overestimate 
of TFP growth during that period (i.e. the very high level of 13 per cent). This is because 
the weight on the faster growing input of capital is negative, in Solow's productivity 
accounting equation, the weighted input of capital is added, not deducted, from the growth 
of output. In order to identify this problem, the following analysis re-evaluates capital and 
labour force data within a vintage model and further explores the specification of the 
model. 
Disembodied and embodied technical progress: re-evaluation of capital and 
labour force data within a vintage model 
The data used to estimate disembodied technical progress in the above analysis implicidy 
ignore technical progress embodied in capital equipment and labour. Hence, the estimate 
of disembodied technical progress obtained above could be inflated, as it includes the 
positive impacts of embodied technical progress. These include increases in labour 
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productivity due to improvements in technology embodied in more recent vintages of 
capital stock and improvement in the qualifications and skills of workers. To remove the 
influence of embodied technical progress from the estimation of disembodied technical 
progress, it is necessary to use more refmed capital inputs and labour data which correct 
for quality improvements. This will enable more reliable estimates to be made of the 
output elasticity for capital, and disembodied technical progress. 
Bautista er a/ (1981) noticed that the direct measures of capital utilization differed 
remarkably depending on the method used to estimate the value of capital stock and capital 
utilization time. The problem is partly related to the estimated value of the capital stock. 
Almost all published statistics simply treat capital stock as historically cumulated value in 
the reported year. They usually include capital equipment of different vintages but define 
it as of homogeneous quality. The technical improvement from the introduction of new 
methods of production into different vintages of capital goods is not considered. New 
technologies are so completely intertwined with new capital investment that monumental 
estimation problems arise for those who wish to measure the influences of capital 
investment on productivity. The main problems are as follows: 
. Estimates of the price and quantity of new capital goods are used to measure 
additions to the capital stock. The estimates are not adjusted for changes in the 
output capability of new capital goods as capital goods change over time. Design 
engineers address the problem of improving the productive capability of capital 
equipment, and the specific improvements introduced may, or may not, be 
reflected in a proportional increase in equipment prices. As Denison noted, 
"Improvements in the design of capital goods that raise their net contribution to 
output are not regarded as representing an increase in capital input (except in so far 
as they change the cost of a capital good)" (1974:55). 
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. Modest improvements in the design of equipment can sometimes be adapted to suit 
existing equipment. For example, a manufacturer may refit an old machine tool 
with automatic controls, thereby increasing its productivity at a modest additional 
cost. 
The interest of economists is not in capital but in the service it provides. But it is 
not possible to separate the 'service' yielded by a machine or unit of capital equipment 
from its application. The services provided by a unit of capital are not homogeneous even 
for the same machine. In one case, capital equipment may be fully utilized in an 
application that greatly increases the productivity of the production process, while in 
another, it may also be fully utilized but in a way that provides only marginal 
improvements in productivity. The difference in skills and work effort of workers also 
contribute to differences in the quality of capital 'service'. Skilled labour may enable a 
higher quality of capital service to be achieved than can unskilled labour. 
The following analysis considers embodied technical progress in capital stock and 
the labour force to try to solve some of the problems oudined above. 
Homogeneous capital stock 
Quality differences in capital stock are evaluated so that capital stock can be measured as a 
homogeneous input. Solow (1962:76-86) called this homogenized capital stock J(t), the 
'equivalent stock of capital'. Applying a vintage model, J(t) can be described as: 
t 
J(t) = Z ( l + e ) ' ' B ( t - v ) I ( v ) (6.3) 
V = - 0 0 
where, 9 is the technical progress embodied in capital. By assuming that capital goods 
produced in any year are 100 * 0 per cent more productive than those produced the year 
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before, the term (1+0) takes account of the quality differences in capital stock of different 
vintages. I(v) is investment undertaken in year v, B(t-v) is the surviving rate of I(v) at 
year t. Hence, J(t) is homogenized capital stock at year t, a summation of the remaining 
quantities of capital goods for the different yeras involved, each of which embodies the 
technical progress which occurred in the year of its production. 
McCarthy (1965) showed that it is not possible to obtain a direct estimation of 0, 
embodied technical progress, in Solow's vintage formulation, from a Cobb-Douglas 
model. Direct estimadon of 0 from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model is 
possible, but additional information, such as the unit wage and capital rent are required. 
With these constraints, Solow (1962) and Intriligator (1965) used an indirect method to 
establish a suitable value for 0. First, a series of pre-determined values for 0 were used in 
calculation of J(t), the homogeneous capital stock. Second, the resulting series of J(t) was 
applied in the estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function. Finally, a judgement 
was made about which pre-determined level of 0 was most acceptable according to 
2 
statistical criterion, such as adjusted R and F-statistics. 
The following problem arises from this methodology. In so far as the estimate of 
embodied technical progress is based on several hypothetical values, the precision of the 
estimate from Solow's vintage model is limited. However, if a wide range of hypothetical 
degrees of embodied technical progress was considered in the estimation, the real degree 
of embodied technical progress would be likely to fall within this range. Moreover, 
interest is not in embodied technical progress itself but in the impact of its inclusion on the 
other estimates, Solow's methodology can be used to test the sensitivity of the estimation 
subject to a wide range of hypothetical degrees of embodied technical progress. Based on 
this approach, the following estimation will not focus on the identification of an acceptable 
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degree of embodied technical progress but the sensitivity of the estimation subject to a 
wide range of hypothetical degrees of embodied technical progress. 
To identify the proportion of the year v investment which is surviving at year t, a 
revised Jorgenson's vintage model (Jorgenson 1973:189-221, 1989:1-35) is used to 
decompose capital stock in a specific year into a summation of different vintages of capital 
goods. This vintage model can be written as: 
= + (6.4) 
i=l i=l i=l 
where is investment made at year t and B^ is surviving proportion of the year t's capital 
stock (Kj.) at year t+1 (see Appendix 6B for the derivation of this model). The data for K^ 
are reported by the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China as the original value of 
fixed capital assets at year end and for B^K^ as the net value of fixed capital assets at year 
end. By using these data, the newly reahzed fixed capital and the surviving rate B^ can 
be easily identified as: 
and 
B^ = the net value of fixed capital / the original value of fixed capital 
The capital stock at year t can then be expressed in terms of the derived and B^ according 
to equation (6.4). 
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By applying embodied technical progress to B I^^  as outlined in equation (6.4) and 
taking the technology of capital stock in the base year as given, homogeneous capital stock 
in year t can now be defined as: 
n n n 
J j = ( i+e )" i^ + z (1+9)^-^ ( n ) + ( n (6.5) 
i = l i= l i= l 
Given a hypothetical degree of embodied technical progress, 6, homogeneous capital 
stock J can be derived from the known data for K, I and B. 
Homogeneous labour force 
Not only a homogenized capital stock J but also a quality adjusted labour force WL 
are required to obtain accurate measures of productivity growth. 
The changing quality of the labour force over time will be mainly due to two 
factors: 
(i) the changing educational level of the labour force; and 
(ii) the changing average working age of the labour force. 
A higher education level usually corresponds with a higher quality labour force. 
The longer workers have been with the workforce, the more experienced they can be 
expected to be. Thus a greater average working life in the labour force would usually 
increase the quality of the labour force. 
The educational level of the labour force. Following Solow's vintage 
model, it is assumed that workers will be IOOTI more productive for each extra year of 
education they recieved. The homogeneous labour force, WL, can then be defined as at 
yeart: 
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n 
WL^= L(l+7i)^L^(e) (6.6) 
e=0 
where e is the education (in years) received by workers. 
However, it is very hard to obtain data on individual worker's levels of education 
for an industry. If the data were available, they could be aggregated to the data up to the 
industry level. The average educational level of the labour force is used instead of the 
levels of education of individual workers in calculating WL^. Equation (6.6) can then be 
re-written as: 
= (6.6.1) 
where AE^ is the average level of workforce education in year t and AEb is the level in the 
year when the average level was the lowest among all observation years. The year when 
the average level of education was the lowest is taken as the base year. If the average 
number of years spent in schooling and training are taken as the proxy for the education 
level of workforce, the methodology used to derive the embodied technical progress for 
capital stock can also be used to derive WL^, for different hypothetical values of n. Again, 
the purpose of doing this is not to choose an acceptable value for n but to test the 
sensitivity of the estimation to the different hypothetical values. 
The working age of the labour force. Assuming that workers with t years 
work experience were lOOd more productive than the workers with t-1 years experience, 
the homogeneous WL^ can also be defmed as: 
n 
WL^= I ( l + d ) ' ^ L ^ ( w ) (6.7) 
w=0 
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where w presents the years of work life. When only the average work life of the labour 
force is considered, equation (6.7) can be re-written as: 
WL^ = L^ (6.7.1) 
Where AW^ is the average work life of the labour force at year t and AW^^  is the average 
life in the year when the average work life was the lowest 
Considering both the average level of education and the average work life of the 
labour force, the homogeneous labour force can be defined as: 
WL^ = L^ (l+TT)^^-^^' ' (6.8) 
Equations 6.5 and 6.8 were used to revise the data for capital stock and labour force to 
correct for embodied technical progress. Embodied technical progress for capital stock is 
assumed to be in the range of 0.01 ^ 0 ^ 0.03. Embodied technical progress for a 
worker with one extra year of education is assumed to be in the range of 0.01 ^ n ^ 0.04 
and for a worker with one extra year of work experience, in the range of 0.01 ^ d ^ 0.04. 
The revised data are presented in Appendix 6.C. It can be observed that the revised data 
sets associated with different hypothetical degrees of embodied technical progress are 
substantially different from each other in magnitude. This suggests that the range of the 
above hypothetical degrees of embodied technical progress is quite wide. As the purpose 
of the above exercise was not to find accurate measures of embodied technical progress 
but to see how the estimates of parameters would be affected by considering embodied 
technical progress in factors used, the wide range of the data sets should be satisfactory 
for the purpose of sensitivity analysis. 
The impact of change of scale economies 
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The analysis of technical progress under the constrained Cobb-Douglas production 
function depends on a fundamental assumption that technical progress is Hicks neutral, 
that is, technical progress does not favour the use of one factor over others. This also 
implies an assumption of a constant retums-to-scale technology. 
Jefferson (1988) argued that the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant 
returns to scale is probably best understood as a long-run production function. In the 
short-run scale economies may exist. If scale economies are reflected by the total-factor-
productivity variable and denoted by Y such that Y = YQ the constant return to scale 
Cobb-Douglas production function with the form Y^ . = Y K^) can be written as ^ 
Y - (7 L K P) ) 
^ t ~ % n ^ t ^ y 
= A L^K^ (6.9) 
where, A 
a =(l-P)/(l-ay) 
b =[3/(l-ay) 
Equation (6.9) is simply an unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function. The scale 
parameter is l/l-oc^. If a^ = 0, the technology exhibits constant returns scale; if (l-a^) < 
1, the technology exhibits increasing returns to scale; and if (l-a^) > 1, the technology 
exhibits decreasing returns to scale. 
However, to estimate the scale parameter in a production function framework has 
never been an easy task. Difficulties arise because scale economies are not associated with 
a specific factor but rather with all factors used in production. Hence, the functional form 
has to be specified in such a way that the scale parameter is associated with all specific 
^The maLhematical notations used in Jefferson's functional specification (Jefferson 1988) have been 
changed to be equivalent to the notation used in this Chapter. 
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independent variables. It is possible that different specifications of the functional form 
may lead to considerably different estimates of the scale parameter. But different 
specifications may have different advantages or disadvantages in their rationale such that it 
is difficult to judge which specification would be the most appropriate. 
To compare the performance of different functional forms in estimating the scale 
parameter, two estimation functions are compared below. The first is the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. The second is a new functional form 
that is proposed to incorporate scale economies into the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
The CES production function. As far as economic restrictions are concerned, 
the CES production function with non-constant return to scale is the most general (least 
restricted) specification among the CES and Cobb-Douglas type production functions. 
This characteristic has widely been recognized as the advantage of the CES production 
function (Bairam 1988). 
This function is specified as: 
Y^ = A(t)[( l -p)^ ^ + ^K^-^yi^/^) (6.10) 
where, A is the substitution parameter. It can be shown that when A=0, equation (6.10) is 
equivalent to the Cobb-Douglas production function and when A= , equation (6.10) is 
equivalent to the fixed proportions production function. 
The scale parameter is denoted by co. When co = 1, constant returns to scale 
prevail, when co > 1, increasing returns to scale come into effect and when co < 1, 
decreasing returns to scale eventuate. 
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Since the equation is non-linear, a simple least squares procedure can not be 
applied. However, using a Taylor's series expansion around A=0 and disregarding the 
terms of third and higher order in the logarithmic transformation of equation (6.10), 
Kmenta (1967, 1971) developed the following function: 
2 
In Y^ = ttQ + yt + 6 Dt + ttj In L^ + ql^ In K^ + a^ (In L^ - In Kp + e^ (6.11) 
where, 
ttQ = constant: 
Y = the parameter of disembodied technical progress, 
ttj = (l-P)co, 
QL^ = P®' 
a 3 = 0.5 [P(l-P)Aco], 
e^  = normally distributed random variable. 
The parameters of equation (6.10) are related to the coefficients of equation (6.11) as 
follows: 
p = [a^l {o.^ + a^)] 
CO = (a^ + a ^ 
A = [ - l a ^ (a^ + a^) I io-^a^)] 
Linear estimation methods can now be applied to equation (6.11). The estimated 
coefficients can then be used to derive the parameters in equation (6.10). 
The specification of a scale parameter in an unconstrained Cobb-
Douglas production function. 
Another functional form proposed is: 
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= A ( . ) ( L / ' - P ' K P ) f (6.12) 
is equivalent to the productivity of joint inputs and (|) represents the 
scale parameter. The productivity of joint inputs is considered because scale economies 
will have an effect on output growth through the interaction between capital stock and the 
labour force. However, the left-hand side of this specification is nothing more than the 
conventional TFP measure which divides output by weighted inputs. The only difference 
in the specification of the TFP measure is that constant returns to scale are assumed in 
determining the weights. However, compared with the conventional TFP measure, the 
right hand side of the above function contains not only A(t) but also some specific 
variables and coefficients, namely, (L^^^'^^K^)^. As ([) represents the scale parameter, 
the productivity of joint inputs is now presented as a function of not only disembodied 
technical progress but also, the change in scale economies. 
The scale economies parameter, (|), is appHed to capital stock and the labour force as 
a whole. Scale economies that lead to cost savings can accrue from a better division of 
labour within the enterprise, the spreading of fixed costs and, especially, sunk costs and 
longer production runs (Norman 1979:45, Jacquemin 1990:540). If the resources of 
capital and labour in the iron and steel industry were optimally allocated across enterprises, 
a positive effect on joint input productivity would result from the optimal combination of 
capital and labour. Increasing returns to scale could be expected, i.e. (}) > 0, and the joint 
input productivity would increase. If existing capital and labour resources were not 
optimally allocated, the joint effect of capital and labour would have been negative, i.e. ( J ) 
< 0, and the joint input productivity would have decreased given the other coefficients. 
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When (j) = 0, there is no gain or loss from the chosen production technology and the above 
specification is reduced to the conventional TFP specification. 
If disembodied technical progress A(t) is defined as in equation (6.1), A(t) = aQ 
exp(Yt + 6 Dt), where t denotes the time trend in the pre-reform period (1952-78) and Dt 
the time trend during the reform period (1979-88), equation (6.12) can be rearranged as: 
= L a -P)( 1 ^^^ exp(y t + 8 Dt + ep (6.13) 
If the following are specified: 
( l - p ) ( l - H ( } ) ) = a j 
(3( l+(l) ) = a2 
Equation (6.13) can be rewritten as: 
Its logarithmic form is 
InY^ = Q^ + a^InL^ + a^InK^ + y t + 5 Dt 4- e^  (6.14) 
This is simply an unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function. The relationship 
between the coefficients of equations (6.13) and (6.14) can be defined as: 
(3 = a^ / (aj + a^) 
(l-p) = a j / ( a j + a 2 ) 
(]) = a^  -H a^ - 1 or a^  + a^ - (j) = 1 
It should be clear that a^ -i- a2 = 1 when (j) = 0, that is to say, when there are no 
scale effects, the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function is reduced to a 
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constrained constant retum-to-scale function. When (j) is larger than 0, it captures the 
increasing returns to scale; when is less than 0, it captures the decreasing returns to 
scale. The above specification therefore provides a sound economic interpretation for an 
unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function. 
While the piecewise linear regression method is applied in the analysis of structural 
change over the reform period, the estimation functions of equations (6.11) and (6.14) can 
accordingly be written as: 
InYj = a^ + (a^^+a^^D) InL^ + (a^^+a^jD) InK^ 
+ (a3Q+a3^D)(InL^-InKp^ + (7+6D) t + D5861 + e^  
+ a^Q (InL^-InKp^ + D(InL^-InKp^+ yi + 6Dt 
and 
+ a^D5861 +e^ (6.11.1) 
+ y t + 5Dt + a3 D5861 + e^  
= a^ + a^^InL + a^^DInL^ + a^^InK^ + a^^DInK^ 
+ Yt + 5 D t + a3 D5861 (6.14.1) 
Equation (6.14.1) is a more general form of equation (6.2.2). The difference 
between the two equations is that constant return to scale is imposed on equation (6.2.2). 
The reasons for estimating the two equations are as following. The usual practice in the 
estimation of production function is to try firsdy the constrained Cobb-Douglas funcdon 
(equadon 6.2.2) because it requires one less explanatory variable and hence save one 
degree of freedom for the regression. Also, the constrained Cobb-Douglas function is the 
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simplest form in the family of production functions, its estimation can be easily conducted 
and could provide some prelimary clues to the estimated economy (see, for example, Kate 
1969). However, as pointed out before, the coefficient for capital in the reform period is a 
large negative number and the coefficient for time trend in the reform period is a large 
positive number in the estimation of a constrained Cobb-Douglas production function. 
These are against conventional behaviour of production function. Therefore, the un-
constrained Cobb-Douglas production function will now be used. More importantly, 
constant return to scale implies the assumption of perfect competition in the estimated 
economy. By estimating the two functional forms, one can judge whether the estimated 
economy is in accord with this assumption. 
D is the dummy variable and adopts values of unity in the period 1979 to 1988 and 
zero in the period 1952 to 1978, and D5861 is defined as above. It should be clear that the 
scale parameters for the different sub-periods are different when the dummy variable is 
considered. Specifically, during the period 1952 to 1978, (more precisely, in the 
longterm), the scale parameter is (a^^ + a^^) for the CES production function and (a^Q -i-
a2Q - 1) for the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function. During the period 1979 
to 1988, the scale parameters are determined by both the long-term scale parameters and 
the structural change effects represented by the coefficients of the specified dummy 
variables. Therefore, the scale parameter for the period 1979 to 1988 is (a^^ + ^ n "20 
+ a^^) for the CES production function and (a^^ + ^ n ^20 ^21 ' ^^  
unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The revised data for capital stock and the labour force are used in the estimation. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 6.1. It can be seen that all the estimates have 
high adjusted R^ values of 95 per cent. Moreover, the DW-statistics in all these estimates 
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Table 6.1. Disembodied and embodied technical progress and the effect of 
scale economies in the iron and steel industry 
Different hypothesized rates of embodied technical progress rates 
9: embodied technical progress in capital stock 
6=0.01 6=0.01 6=0.03 6=0.03 
71: embodied technical progress in education level of the labour force 
n=0.01 it=0.04 jc=0.01 Jt=0.04 
d: embodied technical progress in work experience of the labour force 
Coefficients Variables d=0.01 d=0.04 d=0.01 d=0.04 
CES production function 
a 
10 
11 
20 
21 
a . 
30 
"31 
Y 
5 
. a 4 
Constant 
InL 
DhL 
InK 
DInK 
(InL-InK)^ 
D(lnL-lnK)^ 
t 
Dt 
D5861 
(0 (long-term) scale parameter 
(0(1979-1988) scale parameter 
2 
Adjusted R 
DW-statistic 
F-(9, 26) statistic 
Unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production 
a 
0 
10 
11 
20 
21 
Consunt 
InL 
DInL 
InK 
DInK 
t 
Dt 
D5861 
0 (long-term) scale parameter 
0.113 -0.512 0.031 -0.376 
(0.122) (-0.571) (0.042) (-0.437) 
0.224 0.422 0.297 0.289 
(0.741) (1.074) (1.133) (1.095) 
0.058 -3.767 0.061 -4.187 
(2.207) (-0.417) (2.221) (-0.432) 
0.557 0.573 0.507 0.671 
(1.613) (1.395) (1.141) (1.763) 
-0.141 3.377 -0.173 3.571 
(-0.982) (0.387) (-1.052) (0.413) 
0.112 -0.174 0.012 -0.122 
(0.491) (-0.767) (0.074) (-0.583) 
-0 .363 -2.989 -0.151 -1 .607 
(-0.572) (-0.452) (-0.377) (-0.472) 
-0.021 -0.039 -0.031 -0.047 
(-0.497) (-1.146) (-0.647) (-1.143) 
0.141 0.152 0.141 0.151 
(2.646) (2.671) (2.202) (2.231) 
-0.312 -0.202 -0.285 -0.160 
(-0.937) (-1.021) (-0.873) (-0.882) 
0.782 0.989 0.809 0.960 
0.701 0.597 0.701 0.340 
0.944 0.942 0.937 0.944 
2.141 2.232 2.142 2.242 
66.973 59.371 65.596 58.963 
function 
0.031 -0.237 0.062 -0.287 
(0.042) (-0.288) (0.071) (-0.34)0 
0.323 0.142 0.331 0.141 
(1.357) (2.272) (1.369) (2.31)2 
0.061 0.641 0.062 0.672 
(2.352) (0.601) (2.332) (0.697 
0.482 0.767 0.467 0.800 
(1.545) (2.772) (1.441) (2.772) 
-0.162 -0.787 -0.177 -0.831 
(-1,187) (-0.781) (-1.197) (-0.84)1 
-0.022 -0.037 -0.021 -0.051 
(-0.495) (-1.082) (-0.634) (-1.363) 
0.132 0.138 0.123 0.142 
(3.388) (2.659) (3.132) (2.172) 
-0.287 -0.133 -0.298 -0.141 
(-0.948) (-0.762) (-0.962) (-0.81)3 
-0.197 -0.091 -0.201 -0.061 
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0(1979-1988) scale parameter -0.299 -0.243 -0.321 -0.223 
Adjusted R 0.952 0.943 0.947 0.942 
DW-siatislic 2.142 2.213 2.132 2.210 
F-(7, 28) stausuc 91.424 79.911 90.247 79.923 
Notes: Dependent variable = InY, number of observations = 37. 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. For 37 degrees of freedom, the critical values of the t-ratio at 10,5 and 
2.5 per cent levels are respectively 1.303,1.684 and 2.201 under the one tail test. 
The critical values for the F-Statistics (7,28) and (9,26) are 3.38 and 2.89 respectively. 
indicate the appropriate specification of the autocorrelation in the estimation method (see 
Appendix 6A). 
The different functional forms lead to different estimations. As estimates for the 
unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function have higher F-statistics than those for 
the CES production function in all the four cases presented, it suggestes that the 
unconstrained production function performs better overall in the estimation process. Of 
greater importance, more individual variables in the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas 
production function are statistically significant (judged by their t-ratios) than in the CES 
production function. Hence, the coefficients of variables in the unconstrained Cobb-
Douglas production function give a more reUable indication of the economic behaviour of 
variables. 
Within the four estimations made for the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the two estimations that use the labour force data re-evaluated by the embodied 
technical progress rates K = 0.01 and d = 0.01 perform better. This is verified by their 
higher F-statistics and the higher t-ratios for individual variables. Accordingly, compared 
with the higher ratios of embodied technical progress in education levels and work 
experience, the two lower rates should be closer to the real rates. The following 
discussion of the estimation results hence focuses on the coefficients from these two 
estimations. 
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The estimates of disembodied technical progress. For the pre-reform 
period 1952-78, the estimates of disembodied technical progress, indicated by y in Table 
6.1, in the two estimations under consideration, are negative in magnitude (both are -
0.02). None of the estimates were statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. While it 
might be concluded that disembodied technical progress in the pre-reform period followed 
a decreasing trend, caution has to be exercised with respect to the statistical significance of 
this trend. For the reform period, the estimates of disembodied technical progress (5 in 
Table 6.1) are statistically significant at the 2.5 per cent level and have positive values of 
0.13 and 0.12 respectively. The comparison of disembodied technical progress in the 
reform period with that achieved over the longterm indicates that disembodied technical 
progress dramatically improved during the reform period. 
The derived scale parameters. The longterm (1952-88) scale parameter ((j) in 
Table 6.1) and the scale parameter in the reform period are derived from the coefficients of 
capital and labour as defined above. The derived long-term scale parameters in the two 
estimations under consideration are all -0.20. According to the criteria of constant returns 
to scale in the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function (())=0), the technology of 
the iron and steel industry in the pre-reform period is revealed as exhibiting decreasing 
returns to scale. The scale parameters during the reform period, however, record higher 
negative magnitude, -0.30 and -0.32 respectively. This suggests that the situation of 
decreasing returns to scale was even worse during the reform period 1979-88. 
It should be noted that the other estimations in Table 6.1 also indicate the same 
trend of improvements in disembodied technical progress and a deterioration in returns to 
scale over the reform period 1979-88. It is also interesting to compare the estimations in 
Table 6.1 with those from equation (6.2.3). The abnormally high negative coefficient of 
the capital-labour ratio during the reform period in equation (6.2.3) might be partly due to 
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the mis-specification of constant returns to scale in that model. Nevertheless, a high 
positive coefficient for disembodied technical progress is also obtained in the estimation of 
equation (6.2.3). The suggestion can be made that the statistical significance of the 
estimated model could be further improved but the basic behaviour of the estimated 
coefficients would not change. 
Conclusion 
As indicated by the above estimations, the effect of disembodied technical progress on 
productivity was largely offset by the deterioration in returns to scale during the reform 
period. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that there might be a trade-off between 
technical efficiency gains due to the increasing efforts of enterprises to utilize their 
production factors more effectively and scale efficiency losses due to the excessive 
decentralization of production capacity as a result of the increase in market segmentation. 
This occurred because capital investment and production materials were not efficiently 
concentrated in those regions and/or enterprises which had a comparative advantage in iron 
and steel production. Therefore, the expansion pattern of the whole iron and steel industry 
was inefficient. On the other hand, individual enterprises did improve the efficiency with 
which they used their factors of production in order to achieve higher profits, but the effect 
of this was offset by the inefficient expansion pattern of the industry as a whole. 
Attention has to be paid to the limitations of the empirical results in this chapter. 
First, during the reform period, enterprises might have under-reported their net output and 
over-reported their costs in order to minimize apparent profits and hence maximize retained 
earnings. This data problem may have caused some estimation biases. Second, only 10 
observations were used to estimate economic trends during the reform period, therefore, 
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the lack of degrees of freedom for the estimates of parameters is a concern. Due to these 
defects, the reliability of the empirical results which are aggregate analysis in nature may 
need more support from more disaggregate analysis even if the estimations basically 
support the predicted hypothesis. 
Hence, in the following chapters, a cross-sectional analysis of productive efficency 
in iron and steel enterprises will be conducted. If findings from the cross sectional 
analysis are consistent with the findings in the time-series analysis, credibility of these 
time series results will be enhanced. 
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Appendix 6A 
Data description 
The following data are taken from The Yearbook of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry 
(Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, 1985-1989); other sources are indicated. 
Y is the net output of the Chinese iron and steel industry at 1952 constant prices. 
The net output data are only available for the period 1976 to 1988. The data for the 
remaining years were derived from the available data on taxes, profits and wages. Net 
output, in the Chinese statistical system, consists of taxes, profits, wages, enterprise-
controlled workers' welfare funds, interest payments and residuals. Before 1979, 
enterprises had very limited power in allocating welfare funds for workers from their net 
output. Even in 1985, percentage share of this fund in total net output was only 1 per 
cent. Before 1979, interest payments were also a small proportion of net output, 
especially for the state-owned industrial enterprises which received their investment 
directly from government planning allocations rather than bank loans. Even in 1985, 
interest payments made by the Chinese iron and steel industry equalled only 2 per cent of 
net output. Therefore, taxes, profits and wages should represent a very close proxy for 
net output, particularly prior to 1976. Chinese aggregated industrial level data for net 
output, taxes, profits and wages are reported for the period 1952 to 1975 (Chinese 
Statistics Bureau 1980-1990). The ratios of taxes, profits and wages to net output for 
Chinese industry as a whole for the period 1952 to 1975 were on average around 0.95. 
The net output of the iron and steel industry was constructed on the assumption that it had 
the same ratios of taxes, profits and wages to net output as did national industry as a 
whole. Despite its limitations, this method seems a reasonable way of estimating net 
output of the iron and steel industry for the period 1952 to 1975. 
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K is the fixed capital stock at 1952 constant prices. The data are taken from the 
original value of fixed assets at the year end. As Chen et al. (1988b) pointed out, Chinese 
statistics for fixed assets include not only capital formation but also residential construction 
and other 'nonproductive' investments. More problematically, the current year's capital 
stock is calculated as the sum of the previous year's total value and the value, in current 
prices, of the new fixed assets added in the current year. Consequently, the resultant total 
of fixed assets embodies a mix of buildings and machinery valued in different years' 
prices. This measure fails to reflect the trends in the real stock of fixed capital, unless the 
absolute and relative prices of investment goods remain stable. The methodology that 
Chen et al. (1988b) applied is used to correct these biases. As the data for the cost of 
residendal construction and other 'nonproductive' investment in the iron and steel industry 
are not available for the period 1952 to 1979, an approximadon method is used to derive 
the data for this period. The series of adjusted fixed assets in Chinese industry (1952-79) 
compiled by Chen et al. (1988b) is divided by the unadjusted series and the resultant ratio 
is then used as the weight to re-evaluate the fixed assets data for the Chinese iron and steel 
industry. The weights actually include a price deflator, deduction rates for residential 
construction and other 'nonproducdve' investment. The assumpdon behind the use of this 
weight is that the fixed assets of the iron and steel industry in the period 1952 to 1979 had 
the same composidon of residendal construcdon, other 'nonproducdve' investment and 
capital formation as did all Chinese state-owned industrial enterprises. This assumption is 
obviously arguable, but the adjusted fixed assets data are expected to be closer to the real 
capital formadon. As data for the remaining years (1980 to 1988) are available, Chen's 
methodology can then be used. The fixed capital data are first revalued by deducdng the 
non-producdve assets. The remaining part of the fixed capital for each year are then 
divided into two parts, the inherited fixed capital from the previous years and the newly 
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formed fixed capital from fixed capital investment in the current year. These different 
parts of capital are then deflated by the relevant price deflators used by Chen et al (1988b). 
L is labour and represents data on the labour force at year end. It can be argued that 
the most suitable data to use in measuring labour input in a production function should be 
working hours, the actual labour input in production. However, working hours in 
Chinese state-owned industry, especially in heavy industry such as the iron and steel 
industry, are strictly regulated to eight hours per day and five and a half days per week. 
Moreover, there are almost no part-time or over-time workers in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry. Thus the variation of labour input in production is mainly affected by the 
variation of the size of the labour force. Labour force data have also been adjusted to 
include production labour only following Chen et al (1988a). That is, labour in 
production of in-kind services is subtracted from total labour force. In Table 6A.1, total 
labour force and labour force in production (adjusted for labour force in production of in-
kind services) are presented. In the estimation of production function, only labour force in 
production is used. 
It should be pointed out that the data series in the reform period may contain 
measurement errors. In order to achieve higher self-controllable profit margins, 
enterprises may over report production cost but under report the real value of output. 
Under the two-tier price system, this might have been possible when enterprises could 
deliberately count more input at market prices and count more output at planned price. 
This data measurement error might create some biases in the estimation. 
The original and revised data are presented in Table 6A. 1. 
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Table 6A.L Gross output, fixed capital stock and the labour force, 1952-88 
(values for output and capital stock are in 1952 prices) 
Net output Fixed capital stock Total labour Labour force 
force in production 
(Renminbi (RMB) (RMB 
100 milHon) 100 mUlion) (10,000 people) (10,000 people) 
Original Revised 
1952 7.70 15.66 15.66 17.75 17.65 
1953 9.70 16.29 15.95 22.97 22.88 
1954 11.58 25.06 23.98 24.35 24.10 
1955 14.30 28.05 26.77 26.55 26.28 
1956 15.73 35.37 33.63 30.57 30.22 
1957 20.82 42.14 39.92 38.74 38.26 
1958 33.20 58.15 55.41 233.11 232.08 
1959 54.19 75.96 72.63 335.07 334.65 
1960 70.06 97.96 93.79 345.12 344.73 
1961 29.57 100.52 105.54 248.04 247.59 
1962 21.93 115.05 109.69 103.21 102.18 
1963 26.77 117.67 115.57 75.15 74.62 
1964 38.72 122.03 114.85 73.16 72.77 
1965 51.54 128.50 119.92 72.08 71.48 
1966 64.51 135.66 125.72 75.13 74.69 
1967 36.09 142.76 131.49 81.97 81.15 
1968 26.31 143.09 132.14 88.01 87.50 
1969 44.94 150.08 137.22 102.07 101.45 
1970 63.42 172.16 156.93 147.02 146.50 
1971 72.02 198.78 180.69 164.21 163.80 
1972 74.63 225.20 204.17 186.10 185.54 
1973 75.87 251.32 227.68 189.92 189.26 
1974 51.00 270.76 245.14 188.03 187.30 
1975 48.79 297.07 268.78 192.30 191.74 
1976 39.65 320.09 289.37 202.01 201.14 
1977 46.22 350.33 315.70 208.12 207.55 
1978 73.45 383.07 344.03 212.07 211.05 
1979 85.34 430.20 383.01 227.10 226.11 
1980 100.16 447.78 393.63 229.22 228.59 
1981 100.16 470.02 405.77 230.12 229.73 
1982 108.75 491.82 416.79 234.15 233.56 
1983 122.89 521.93 433.22 238.84 237.97 
1984 145.54 545.91 444.13 241.24 240.61 
1985 175.36 598.13 469.67 269.51 268.76 
1986 201.23 718.33 602.97 276.01 274.95 
1987 235.67 793.64 662.77 284.07 282.62 
1988 276.09 889.19 730.19 305.25 304.40 
Sources: Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongyie Nianjiang (The 
Yearbook of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry) 1985-1990, Zhongguo Yejing Gongyie Chubanshe (Chinese 
Metallurgy Industrial Press), Beijing. 
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Appendix 6B 
The derivation of homogenized capital stock 
The only available data in Chinese statistics for capital stock are fixed capital assets in each 
year. In order to derive homogenized capital stock, a composition of each year's fixed 
capital assets into previous years' capital stock has to be made. The theory of replacement 
and depreciation presented in Jorgenson's vintage model (Jorgenson 1973, 1989) has 
been revised to achieve this purpose. 
Capital stock at the end of each period, say K ,^ according to Jorgenson, is the sum 
of past annual investment, say ZA .^ p, weighted by its relative efficiency: 
oo 
p=:0 (6B.1) 
where 
d^ = the relative efficiency of capital goods at age p; 
A^ p = the quantity of capital goods acquired, or past investment, at year t-p. 
Taking the first difference of the expression for capital stock in terms of past investment, 
we obtain: 
oo 
p=l 
OO = A^-f L m A 
p=l (6B.2) 
or. 
oo 
p=l (6B.3) 
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where 
/Wp = mortality rate, that is, the proportion of an investment to be replaced during 
the pth period, which, after its acquisition, is equal to the decline in efficiency during that 
period. 
Replacement requirements may also be expressed in terms of present and past 
changes in capital stock, using the replacement distribution: 
oo oo 
p=l p=l (6B.4) 
where 
Op = the rate of replacement for the initial investment at time p. Thus: 
oo 
p=l (6B.5) 
Which is assumed to be differentiable. However, the replacement coefficient, Op, is quite 
different from the depreciation rate, (1-B), used by Solow. The replacement coefficient. 
Op' used in Jorgenson's vintage model is linked with the efficiency of different vintage 
capital goods (^ip), which is differendated and non-increasing (constant or decreasing) 
over time. Moreover, d^ can also be used to define the normal distribution rate as: 
oo oo 
p=l p=l (6B.6) 
That is to say, the current year's capital goods are 100 per cent efficient. Thus, no 
replacement is needed. It then follows that d^ should also be different and non-
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increasing over time. But the surviving coefficient in Solow's vintage model does not 
consider the differences in efficiency among different vintage capital goods and their real 
value, or the depreciation rate adopted by some enterprises, which may be a constant over 
a certain period of time. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient of embodied technical progress (6) in Solow's model 
performs the same function as that of the efficiency coefficient {d^ in Jorgenson's model. 
Both coefficients are used to capture the different and non-increasing efficiencies in 
technology from different vintage capital goods. However, Solow evaluates the embodied 
technical progress back from some year in the past (-«») and forward to period n in the 
future 
X a + e) 
as an increasing value as t increases. Jorgenson evaluates the embodied technical progress 
from the current year back to the initial year, hence 
oo 
p=i 
Furthermore, d^ as specified in Jorgenson's model includes the effects of both embodied 
technical progress and depreciation by converting the past investment into current year 
capital goods in terms of equal technical efficiency. 
Because embodied technical progress in Solow's model is considered in calculating 
homogeneous capital stock, the replacement rate of capital stock in Jorgenson's model is 
now considered at the actual depreciation rate of capital instead of at its differentiated 
efficiency rate over time. That is to say, it is not necessary to consider Op in Jorgenson's 
model as different over time but simply as a depreciation rate (1-B) which may be a 
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constant over a certain period of time. Accordingly, Jorgenson's model can be simplified 
as follows: 
= jK^ j + I ^ (6B.7) 
where replaces A^ ^ and is the newly realized fixed capital in year t. The reason for this 
change is that Chinese industrial statistics only count the newly realized fixed capital 
investment in year t, that is, the newly established production capacity in year t, and not 
the fixed capital investment in year t as part of total fixed capital stock. 
The composition of different vintage capital goods in year t can be calculated from: 
i=l i=l i=l 
(6B.8) 
The data for K^ are reported by the Chinese Metallurgical Industrial Ministry as the 
original value of fixed capital assets at year end and jK^ j are reported as the net value 
of fixed capital assets at year end. By using these data, the newly realized fixed capital 
and the surviving rate B^ can be easily derived. The above revised capital stock for each 
year can be then decomposed according to the specification of equation (6B.8). 
When all the variables in equation (6B.8) are known, the homogeneous capital 
stock in year t can be derived from the equation: 
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n n n 
= + E (1+ef ^  ( n ) + ( n 
i=l n=l i=l (6B.9) 
This is equation (6.5) in chapter 6. 
Two hypothetical values, 0.01 and 0.03, are chosen for 6. The derived data are 
presented in Table 6.A.2. 
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Table 6A.2 Derived homogeneous capital stock using different embodied technical progress coefficients, 1952-88 
Capital stock Capital stock Capital stock 
(0=0) (0=0.01) (0=0.03) 
1952 15.00 15.00 15.00 
1953 15.95 16.50 16.77 1954 23.99 24.29 24.92 
1955 26.77 27.09 28.15 
1956 33.63 33.53 35.54 
1957 39.92 40.63 43.76 
1958 55.41 57.52 63.22 
1959 72.63 76.39 85.47 
1960 93.79 99.46 113.53 
1961 105.54 112.99 130.46 
1962 109.69 118.15 138.20 
1963 111.57 121.11 143.59 
1964 114.85 125.72 151.61 
1965 119.92 132.42 162.93 
1966 125.72 140.37 175.10 
1967 131.49 148.45 189.24 
1968 132.14 150.61 195.85 
1969 137.22 158.28 210.28 
1970 156.93 183.44 250.25 
1971 180.69 213.83 298.73 
1972 204.17 244.22 348.36 
1973 227.68 275.69 400.41 
1974 245.14 299.30 443.45 
1975 268.78 331.10 500.44 
1976 289.37 360.60 555.32 
1977 315.70 397.58 624.75 
1978 344.03 437.60 701.62 
1979 383.01 492.50 806.15 
1980 393.63 510.30 849.25 
1981 405.77 530.91 896.14 
1982 416.78 553.29 947.47 
1983 433.23 577.55 1017.30 
1984 444.13 599.57 1072.80 
1985 469.67 640.25 1180.00 
1986 602.97 834.73 1581.60 
1987 662.77 927.42 1790.20 
1988 730.19 1031.70 2025.70 
Sources: Derived from data in Table 6A.1. 
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Appendix 6C 
The derivation of the homogenized labour force 
According to equation (6.8), three additional variables or coefficients, namely, AE, AW 
and 71, have to be known to derive the homogenized labour force (WL) from L. 
There are no statistics available for AE, the average educational level of the labour 
force employed by the Chinese iron and steel industry. The only relevant time-series 
statistics are the categories of labour force by category of employment, that is, workers, 
engineers, managers, trainees and service staff, for the whole metallurgy industry. These 
data are used to estimate the average educational level of labour force in the iron and steel 
industry. As the iron and steel industry is the major part of the metallurgy industry, use of 
data from the metallurgy industry as a proxy for the iron and steel industry hopefully will 
not produce significant statistical bias. 
In order to derive AE from these data, the following assumptions on the average 
educational level of different categories of employment in several periods have been made. 
The reasons for these assumptions will be discussed later. For the period 1952 to 1962, 
workers are assumed to have on average six years of education (primary school), 
engineers fourteen years (between high school and technical college), managers eight 
years (between primary school and middle school), trainees four years and service staff 
four years. For the period 1963 to 1972, workers are assumed to have on average eight 
years of education, engineers sixteen years (university), managers ten years (middle 
school), trainees and service staff six years. For the period 1973 to 1978, workers are 
assumed to have on average ten years of education, engineers sixteen years, managers 
twelve years (high school), trainees eight years and service staff seven years. For the 
period 1979 to 1988, workers are assumed to have on average ten years of education, 
engineers sixteen years, managers fourteen years, trainees and service staff eight years. 
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These values are used with weights for different categories of employment in the total 
labour force to derive AE (see Table 6A.5 for the weights and 6A.6 for AE). 
The considerations behind these assumptions are: 
Workers. Workers are assumed to have at least six years of education. This is 
generally true for the urban population in China. Table 6A.3 presents the distribution of 
education level for different age groups in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province in 1978. The table 
shows that all school-age (7-20) people received at least primary school education and a 
considerable number of these received middle school education. This is also true for 
working-age (18-54) people. However, Table 6A.4 presents data on the number of 
students in various levels of schooling as percentage of the national population. This 
proportion has been around 18 per cent since 1965. This means that the distribution of 
students over different levels of education for different age groups in Table 6A.4 has not 
changed very much over the period 1965 to 1988. The information from Tables 6A.3 and 
6A.4 can then be used to predicate that the educational level for workers has increased 
over time. This is the rationale behind the duration of workers' education increasing to 10 
years in the later periods. 
Engineers. The national statistics for the educational level of engineers reveal that 
about 86 per cent of engineers received university or technical college education in 1985 
and 1988 (State Statistics Bureau of China 1980-90). The iron and steel industry, as the 
key industry in China, should have employed higher proportion university or technical 
college educated engineers. 
Managers. In the early 1950s, managers in any Chinese industry were mainly 
Ganbu (cadre). They came from the military forces to the newly established or 
reconstructed industrial enterprises, with little educational background. Their educational 
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level is thus assumed to be relatively low. However, the educational level of managers 
has been improving since the 1970s as the old Ganbu retire and more highly educated 
people becOme managers. 
Trainees and service staff. These workers comprise only a small part of the 
labour force. It can be assumed that trainees have a lower education level than workers. 
Service staff in any Chinese industry provide services such as supplying food and 
maintaining residential accommodation for workers and other staff. Some of these 
workers are usually employed as casual workers in enterprises, and accordingly their 
employment does not rely upon their educational background. 
The average working age of the Chinese industrial labour force (Table 6A.7) is 
used as the proxy of AW, the average working age, for the iron and steel industry. The 
Chinese iron and steel industry has always been a leading sector in China's industrial 
development. The quota of the labour force employed by every enterprise in the iron and 
steel industry has been rather stable over time. Thus, the average labour force working 
age in the iron and steel industry should not be so different from the national average. 
n and d are the coefficients for the quality improvement of labour force with more 
education and work experience respectively. Two sets of hypothetical values are assigned 
to these coefficients, namely, 7i=0.01 and d=0.01; 71=0.04 and d=0.04. These values 
defme a wide range of change in embodied technical progress resulting from education and 
work experience and hence provide a wide range of homogeneous labour forces evalued 
by the different values for a sensitivity analysis. 
Given AE, AW, x and d, the data series for the homogeneous labour force (WL) 
can be derived by using equation (6.9). Table 6A.8 presents the derived data. 
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Table 6A.3 Educational attainment in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, 1979 
Age Population University High Middle Primary 
school school school 
10 12308 18 12290 
11 13013 178 12835 
12 12119 8 3125 8986 
13 9847 9 7300 2583 
14 12511 120 10957 1434 
15 13493 1398 11285 810 
16 19583 75 8863 9881 764 
17 19876 240 11540 7429 667 
18 11123 310 7528 2969 316 
19-20 16601 461 11614 3761 765 
21-24 16126 570 2960 11184 1412 
25-29 87538 2168 5968 64026 15376 
30-34 65297 2115 11742 30860 20580 
35-39 44807 3336 11229 17684 12558 
40-44 37503 4119 7333 12110 13941 
45-49 31620 2269 4214 10507 14630 
50-54 24222 1094 2637 7984 12507 
55-59 16914 722 1599 4992 9610 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China, Statistics Yearbook of China, 1981. 
Table 6A.4. Students in various level of schooling as proportion of the 
national population 1952-87(per cent) 
Year Ratio Year Ratio Year Ratio 
1952 11.11 1965 18.09 1983 17.91 
1957 11.65 1978 22.28 1985 17.81 
1962 11.65 1981 19.55 1987 17.72 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China, Statistics Year-book of China, 1980-1989. 
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Table 6A.5. The composition of the total labour force employed in the metallurgy industry 
1952-88 (per cent) 
Year Workers Engineers Managers Trainees Service 
staff 
1952 66.3 3.5 14.5 3.5 12.2 
1957 59.5 6.0 12.4 5.8 16.3 
1960 65.8 1.8 5.7 8.1 17.6 
1962 67.4 5.8 9.7 1.3 15.8 
1965 64.9 7.5 8.6 0.5 18.8 
1971 71.6 4.0 7.4 5.3 11.7 
1972 68.8 3.7 8.4 7.0 12.1 
1973 71.9 4.3 8.3 4.9 12.4 
1974 70.0 4.8 8.4 3.2 13.6 
1975 69.2 5.0 8.4 3.1 14.2 
1976 69.8 4.2 8.6 3.9 13.5 
1977 69.5 4.3 8.5 3.8 13.9 
1978 67.8 4.4 10.1 3.0 14.7 
1979 68.2 4.7 10.7 2.3 12.0 
1980 67.1 4.7 9.8 3.0 12.2 
1981 65.9 4.8 10.1 2.6 12.6 
1982 65.3 5.3 10.3 1.9 13.3 
1983 65.5 5.3 10.2 1.7 13.0 
1984 65.6 5.4 10.0 1.5 13.1 
1985 65.4 5.5 10.2 1.7 13.0 
1986 65.3 5.6 10.2 1.8 13.0 
1987 65.3 5.6 10.3 1.7 12.9 
1988 65.3 5.6 10.3 1.7 13.0 
Note: There are some other workers in the total labour force which are not categorized into any standard 
categories and are not added into this table. Thus each year's figures do not add up to 100 per cent. 
Source: Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongyie Nianjiang (The 
Yearbook of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry) 1985-1990, Zhongguo Yejing Gongyie Chubanshe (Chinese 
Metallurgy Industrial Press), Beijing. 
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Table 6A.6 The derived average education level (AE) of the labour force 
employed by the Chinese iron and steel industry 1952-88 (years) 
Year AE Year AE 
1952 6.3 1971 9.9 
1953 6.3 1972 9.9 
1954 6.4 1973 9.9 
1955 6.4 1974 9.9 
1956 6.4 1975 9.9 
1957 6.4 1976 9.8 
1958 6.0 1977 9.8 
1959 6.2 1978 9.9 
1960 5.9 1979 10.4 
1961 6.2 1980 10.4 
1962 6.5 1981 10.4 
1963 7.4 1982 10.4 
1964 7.9 1983 10.5 
1965 8.4 1984 10.5 
1966 8.8 1985 10.5 
1967 8.9 1986 10.5 
1968 9.2 1987 10.5 
1969 9.5 1988 10.5 
1970 9.7 
Source: Data before 1982 are taken from Economic and Social Development Study Centre, Chinese State 
Council, Zhonggu Jingji de Fazhanyu Moxin (Development and Model of Chinese Economy), China's 
Finance and Economy Press, Beijing, 1990. Data after 1982 are estimated from the trend before 1982. 
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Table 6A.7 The average number of years of work experience of the Chinese 
industrial labour force 1952-88 
Year Years of work Year Years of work 
experience experience 
1952 16.6 1971 12.1 
1953 15.6 1972 11.9 
1954 14.8 1973 11.9 
1955 16.3 1974 12.0 
1956 17.0 1975 11.7 
1957 17.2 1976 11.4 
1958 6.3 1977 11.9 
1959 9.8 1978 12.1 
1960 10.2 1979 12.1 
1961 13.4 1980 12.3 
1962 16.8 1981 12.7 
1963 17.9 1982 13.2 
1964 17.7 1983 13.2 
1965 16.9 1984 13.2 
1966 16.1 1985 13.2 
1967 16.2 1986 13.2 
1968 16.2 1987 13.2 
1969 14.9 1988 13.1 
1970 13.2 
Source: Data before 1982 are taken from Economic and Social Development Study Centre, Chinese State 
Council, Zhonggu Jingji de Fazhanyu Moxin (Development and Model of Chinese Economy), China's 
Finance and Economy Press, Beijing, 1990. Data after 1982 are estimated from the trend before 1982. 
154 
Table 6A.8 Labour force and homogeneous labour force 1952-88 evaluated at different rates of embodied technical progress (10,000 people) 
Year Labour force Labour force Labour force 
71 = 0 . 0 1 7 1 = 0 . 0 4 
d=0.01 d=0.04 
1952 17.65 18.73 22.32 
1953 22.88 24.16 28.40 1954 24.10 25.35 29.46 
1955 26.28 27.85 33.12 
1956 30.22 32.15 38.64 
1957 38.26 40.75 49.13 
1958 232.08 233.23 236.63 
1959 334.65 342.23 367.49 
1960 344.73 352.81 377.85 
1961 247.59 258.18 292.33 
1962 102.18 108.68 130.47 
1963 74.62 80.57 101.14 
1964 72.72 78.82 100.06 
1965 71.48 77.54 98.66 
1966 74.69 81.05 102.98 
1967 81.15 88.22 112.93 
1968 87.50 95.31 122.68 
1969 101.45 110.19 140.68 
1970 146.50 158.08 197.89 
1971 163.80 176.11 218.09 
1972 185.54 199.29 246.09 
1973 189.26 203.33 251.25 
1974 187.30 201.29 248.98 
1975 191.74 205.71 253.16 
1976 201.14 215.46 263.93 
1977 207.55 222.86 274.92 
1978 211.05 226.85 280.73 
1979 226.11 244.48 307.83 
1980 228.59 247.31 311.95 
1981 229.73 249.06 316.13 
1982 233.56 253.91 324.90 
1983 237.97 258.71 331.06 
1984 240.61 261.57 334.68 
1985 268.76 292.21 374.07 
1986 274.95 298.96 382.78 
1987 282.62 307.32 393.54 
1988 304.40 330.87 423.20 
Sources: Ministry of Metallurgical Industr>' of China, Zhongguo Gangtie Gongyie Nianjiang (The 
Yearbook of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry) 1985-1990, Zhongguo Yejing Gongyie Chubanshe (Chinese 
Metallurgy Industrial Press), Beijing. 
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Chapter 7 
Enterprise-specific technical, allocative and scale efficiency 
In this chapter, the methodology of decomposition of productive efficiency is applied to 
enterprise-specific data for the Chinese iron and steel industry during the reform period. 
Using this methodology, the technical, allocative and scale efficiencies of enterprises in 
different-scale enterprise groups will be empirically estimated. The estimated results 
enable testing of the h>^theses developed in chapter 5. 
The decomposition of productive efficiency into technical, allocative and 
scale efficiencies 
Farrell (1957) is considered the pioneer of the use of the production frontier to decompose 
productive efficiency into two sub-categories: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. 
Forsund et al. (1980) decomposed productive efficiency into three components by adding 
scale efficiency to technical and allocative efficiencies. 
Assuming the following standard formulations of production, cost and profit 
functions respectively: 
Y = f ( X ) 
C ( Y , X ) = Min^ { WX I f ( X ) I Y , X I 0 } 
n ( P , W ) = Max^,^ { P Y - \ V X I f ( X ) 1 Y, Y I 0, X | 0} (7.1) 
1 
where, Y is the vector of outputs, X is the vector of inputs, W is tiie vector of input 
prices, P is the vector of output prices and C and n are the cost and profit functions 
respectively. If a production unit is observed at ( Y°, X°), then for: 
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Technical efficiency: = f ( ) 
Technical inefficiency: Y° < f (X^ ) 
Technical inefficiency is due to excessive input usage for a given output, and if this is the 
case costs are then (Forsund et al 1980) 
WX® > C ( Y^, W ) 
Since cost is not minimized, profit is not maximized: 
If cost is minimized, we can accordingly defme: 
AUocative efficiency: f ( X ° ) / f ( X ® ) = W / W 1 j 1 J 
AUocative inefficiency: f ( X " ) / f ( X ^ ) ^ W / W 1 J 1 J 
where f ( X*^ ) and f. ( ) are the marginal products of inputs i and j, and W. and Wj are 
the prices of factors i and j respectively. AUocative inefficiency results from employing 
inputs in the wrong proportions relative to their prices, which is costly and hence: 
WX° > C ( W ). 
As cost is not minimized, profit is not maximized: 
( PY^ - WX° ) < n ( P, W ) 
Obviously, if and only if WX*^  = C ( Y^, W ) and ( PY^ - WX°) = n ( P, W ), can the 
production unit ensure its overall efficiency. As neither the arguments of technical nor 
allocative efficiency involve the vector of output prices, they are not sufficient to ensure 
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( p y - WX°) = n (P , W). At this point we have to introduce scale efficiency to achieve 
overall efficiency: 
Scale efficiency: P = C^ ( Y^, W ) 
Scale inefficiency: P C^ ( W ) 
where C^ ( W ) is the marginal cost of production from increasing the scale of output. 
A production unit will be scale inefficient if it produces above or below the optimum 
output level and hence fails to equalize its marginal cost to output price. 
Unlike the so-called 'residual' estimations of productivity, such as the estimation of 
total factor productivity, the decomposition of efficiency isolates the different aspects of 
the performance of an enterprise by relating them to their respective causes. Therefore, 
estimates of decomposed efficiency can reveal more specific economic information on why 
enterprises' productive efficiency has or has not improved. For example, many 
enterprises might be found to be technically inefficient. This may be due to insufficient 
incentives, such as lack of ownership or other profit-related incentives. Alternatively, 
enterprises may be found to be technically efficient but allocatively inefficient. This 
suggests that factor markets are distoned and that, to improve the productive efficiency of 
enterprises, relevant economic policies should be adopted to minimize distortions in factor 
markets. Funhermore, a considerable number of enterprises might be found to be 
technically and allocatively efficient but not scale efficient. This suggests that the 
industrial market structure is distorted and that enterprises with potential scale economies 
can not fully exploit their potential lower production cost to increase their share of total 
industrial production. On the other hand, scale-inefficient enterprises may be able to 
expnd even though they have a cost disadvantage. Therefore, industrial and liberalization 
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policies that are neutral regarding the development of enterprises with economies of scale 
are a means of improving industrial performance. 
The theory of decomposed productive efficiency has recently been widely applied to 
enterprises in market economies (Kalirajan and Shand 1985, Van den Broeck 1988, 
Kumbhakar et al. 1989). In most of these studies, differences in productive efficiency 
among enterprises were found from the estimates of the three decomposed efficiencies. 
Because all these efficiency measures corresponded to the behaviour of enterprises in 
seeking to maximize profit under given market conditions, the resultant differences in 
enterprise-specific efficiencies were interpreted as an indication of market imperfection. 
As far as Chinese enterprises are concerned, estimates of decomposed efficiency allow one 
to judge not only the performance of individual enterprises but also the constraints market 
distortions placed on enterprises' performance. 
The econometric models for analysis of efficiency 
The stochastic frontier model is used to estimate decomposed productive efficiencies (see 
Forsund et al. 1980 for a survey of different estimation methods). 
In the case of the estimation of technical efficiency, the principal advantage of this 
stochastic method is that the impact of factors under enterprises' control on technical 
efficiency can be distinguished from the impact of various external uncertainties. As 
discussed in chapter 4, enterprises in the iron and steel industry faced different production 
conditions according to their production location, their status in the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
their privileged access to supplies of production inputs and bank credit, and even their 
bargaining power with government in deciding on their shares from profit distribution. 
All these uncertainties external to enterprises are actually a reflection of market 
imperfections. As enterprises' performance could be affected by these external 
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uncertainties, the impact of these influences should be netted out from enterprise-specific 
estimation of technical efficiency. As a result, estimated enterprise-specific technical 
efficiency will be a better indication of a enterprise's performance. The estimation of 
technical efficiency arrived at using the stochastic method, which distinguishes factors 
under enterprises' control (technical efficiency) from the random external effects (statistical 
random variables), thus ensures a proper estimation of technical efficiency. The resultant 
estimates of technical efficiency can be related to enterprises' efforts in utilizing production 
factors effectively. The effects of tiiose uncertainties external to enterprises, such as 
market imperfections, on enterprises' productive efficiency can, however, be captured by 
the estimates of allocative and scale efficiencies. 
Technical efficiency 
The following presentation of the econometric model which incorporates the existence of 
technical inefficiency is based on the work of Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977), Forsund et al. (1980), Jondrow et al. (1982) and Kalirajan and Flinn 
(1983). As the detailed specification of the stochastic frontier model for estimating 
enterprise-specific technical inefficiency is well presented in these references, I will simply 
summarize the main structure of the model. It will be pointed out that plan-specific 
allocative and scale inefficiency can be directly calculated by using the parameters 
estimated from the stochastic frontier model and the observed variables. 
Let the production function be represented by, 
y* = f ( x . . . . , x,..., X ) (7.2) 
^ 1 J m 
where y* is the maximum possible output a enterprise can produce using the inputs ( x.'s ) 
in a technically efficient way. It is reasonable to assume that not all enterprises will be 
technically efficient and, consequentiy, not all enterprises will be operating on the 
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industry's production frontier. The stochastic production frontier could then be 
represented by an unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function: 
m 
Iny. = a „ + l a i n x + u + v (7.3) 1 0 j ij i i 
j = l 
where, 
y. = actual output for the enterprise i and y,< y*; 
u. = a random variable which defines the characteristics of inefficiency of 
2 
production, u < 0 by taking a half normal distribution and then is iid N(0, o^ ). That is, 
if u. = 0, enterprise i operates with technical efficiency and, if u- < 0, with technical 
inefficiency; and 
V. = a random variable which captures the effect of the external uncertainties on a 
2 enterprise's production. The variable is subjected to a normal distribution N(0, a^ ). 
In the above specification, enterprise-specific technical efficiency can be 
distinguished from the effects on efficiency of the external uncertainties that are beyond the 
enterprises' control (Forsund et al. 1980). The distinctive characteristic of the stochastic 
production frontier model is that it provides estimates of technical inefficiency, which is 
not observable, for each enterprise according to the conditional mean of u- given (u.+vj. 
The density functions of u and v. respectively can be written as: 
1 l ' ' u,^ 
1 
f(u.)= exp( ) u. < 0 (7.4) 
a 2G ^ 
u 
1 1 
f(v.) = e x p ( - ) - o o < v . < o o (7.5) 
^ ^ a 2a ^ 
V 
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The joint probability density function (pdf) of (u.+vj, obtained using the 
convolution formula, can be written as: 
1 (u +v o 
i i u 
= exp [ ] {1- [F(u.+v.) ( )] } 1 1 
o a 
U V ' V 
(7.6) 
where, FC) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random variable. 
Specifying: 
2 2 2 o = o + a 
U V 
a 
u 
?l = 
a 
V 
e = u + V. 
i i 1 
The density function of y. is 
1 e^ e 
i 1 
f (y j = exp ( - 1/2 ) [1 - F( X)] (7.7) 
a V ^ a ^ a 
The likelihood function of the sample can now be written as: 
n 1 1 e^ e. 1 1 
L ( y , h ) = n [ exp(- ) ( 1 - F ( X ))] (7.8) 
i=l a ^ J n / 2 2 a^ a 
162 
where h is the parameter to be estimated from the maximum likelihood (ML) method and is 
equal to (a., c , X). The enterprise-specific technical efficiency for each enterprise ,TE, can 
then be estimated from the expected value of ui: 
a o fC) e 
u V i 
E(uJ(u+v.)) = [ ] (7.9) 
a 1 - FC) o 
TE = exp(ui) 
where fC) is the standard normal density function and both fC) and FC) are evaluated at 
(e.VcT). The estimate of ui is obtained from replacing e, in equation (7.9) by the residual 
which is the difference between the estimated and the actual frontiers. Since ui is defmed 
as a non-positive random variable in the econometric model of equation (7.3), the domain 
of the technical inefficiency parameter, TEi = exp(up, will be within the range of 0 to 1. 
Accordingly, TE. = 1 indicates the achievement of 100 per cent of potential production and 
hence, technical efficiency, and TE. < 1 indicates the failure to achieve potential production 
and hence, technical inefficiency. 
Allocative efficiency 
AUocative efficiency can also be specified as: 
MP / M P =\V. AV, e x p ( a j . ji li J 1 ji 1 
taking logs and rearranging, 
(a.J) . = ln(MP.p - ln(MP^.) - In W. + In W^ 
or, using the estimated production parameters from the estimated production function, 
(a^j) . = In (a^ap + In x^. - In x^. - In W^ + In W^ (7.10) 
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where, 
MP.. = the marginal product of input x. (j = 2,...,m); 
W. = the price of input x.; 
(tt j^) . = the allocative efficiency parameter between input 1 and j for the 
observation of i and a is iid N( p., Z ) . If a^^ = 0, enterprise i is allocatively efficient; if a 
< or > 0, then it is allocatively inefficient; 
a^  and a. = the production parameters estimated from the above ML method 
Since all variables in the right-hand side of equation (7.10) are actual economic 
variables and a^  and a^ are available from the estimated stochastic frontier production 
function, allocative efficiency parameter (^jj) j can then be directly calculated. 
Appendix 7A presents the derivation of the above estimation form of allocative 
efficiency and the relationship between production parameters and marginal product of 
input. 
Scale eff iciency 
Scale inefficiency can be defined as: 
d C / d y ^ = p e x p ( ^ J 
where, 
dC. / dy. = the marginal cost of production in enterprise i; 
P = the price of y.; 
= the scale inefficiency parameter for enterprise i and is iid N( 0, c ^ ) . If = 0, 
enterprise i is scale efficient; if ^^  < 0, scale inefficient in the sense that production is less 
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than the optimal output level; and if > 0, the enterprise is also scale inefficient but in the 
sense that production is greater than the optimal output level. 
By using the parameters estimated from the production function and the parameters 
of technical efficiency (in the domain 0 u- ^ 1) and allocative efficiency, scale efficiency 
can be calculated as, 
= - l n a , + l n W , + In x, - In Y - In P - Z. a. (a. J ./2:ai + (u. + v.)/2:ai (7.11) 1 1 1 J J ^ j r 1 ' ^ 1 r 
i= 1,... n 
j= 2,... n 
The above specification of scale efficiency is based on technically efficient output 
and allocatively efficient input (see Kumbhakar et al 1989 for details of the derivation). 
Hence, it actually defines scale efficiency as being conditional on technical and allocative 
efficiency. Since only the technically efficient output and allocatively efficient input levels 
are considered in the estimation of scale efficiency, the estimates of scale efficiency will 
have distinctive economic meaning alongside those for technical and allocative efficiencies. 
Equations (7.9), (7.10) and (7.11) form the system of equations employed for 
incorporating technical, allocative and scale inefficiencies into a profit-maximizing 
stochastic frontier framework. 
The variables used in the estimation and an explanation of the data used 
Enterprise-level data for the Chinese iron and steel industry for the years 1980, 1985 and 
1988 were used in the empirical analyses as these years were the most crucial in the past 
decade of reforms (see chapter 3). The data are taken from Quanguo Gongye Pucha Zilao 
(Nation-wide Industrial Investigation Documents) (Nation-Wide Industrial Investigation 
Office, State Economic Commission of China 1987), Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The 
Year-book of Chinese Iron and Steel Industry) (The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of 
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China 1986 and 1989). The estimation from data for 1980 was used to represent the 
situation in the early stage of the economic reforms. As few reform measures were 
implemented by 1980, it could be expected that the behaviour of enterprises and 
performance were stni mainly influenced by the traditional planned system. 
The year 1985 was chosen because, in 1984, China's State Council issued 
provisional regulations expanding the autonomy of enterprises. The regulations 
authorized decision making of enterprises on pricing, production levels and sales, 
investment planning, internal organization, personnel management and the disposition of 
wages and loans. It could be expected that these regulations had an impact on enterprises' 
performance one year later, that is, by the end of 1985. The year 1988 was chosen 
because substantial reform measures have not been implemented since then. The 
estimations from the data in 1985 and 1988 are compared with those from 1980s. Hence, 
it is possible to investigate whether there was any systematic change in enterprises' 
efficiency during the reform period. 
Ninety-nine different scale enterprises were chosen as the sample population. 
Statistics from 1980, 1985 and 1988 for these enterprises are presented in Appendix 7B. 
The total annual gross output value of the 99 enterprises amounted to 81, 79 and 78 per 
cent of the total gross output value for the whole industry for 1980, 1985 and 1988 
respectively. This sample is used as a proxy to represent the situation in the whole 
industry. 
In the following analysis, the observations are separated by size, based on the 
magnitude of their gross output value. Enterprises which had annual gross output values 
above 300 million yuan were taken to be the sub-group of large-scale enterprises. 
Enterprises which had annual gross output values between 50 to 300 million yuan were 
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medium-scale enterprises. The remaining enterprises comprised small-scale enterprises. 
This division is equivalent to the enterprise size division by steel output levels in Table 4.3 
(p.68). 
The variables used in the estimated production function are gross output, fixed 
capital, labour force, working capital and enterprise-size dummies. Gross output is the 
dependent variable and the remaining variables are independent 
The independent variables cover almost all production factors directly used in 
production. Fixed capital stock and labour force are the standard production factors in 
most production function analyses. Working capital is a proxy for the cost of purchased 
industrial materials in enterprises' accounting frameworks. 
The enterprise-size dummy needs more explanation. In the last chapter, a scale 
parameter was specified in the final estimation equation of the time series analysis. The 
scale parameter was expected to capture the effect of scale economies in the whole 
industry. The negative values of the estimates obtained for the scale parameter suggested 
that the iron and steel industry suffered further loss of scale economies during the reform 
period. This finding supported the hypothesis that the relatively higher growth rate of the 
local medium- and small-scale enterprises which had a cost disadvantage compared with 
the large-scale enterprises, had led to a further loss of scale economies. As far as cross 
sectional analysis is concerned, the difference in enterprise size can sometimes have a 
substantial effect on a enterprise's productivity (van den Broeck 1988). The effect of 
enterprises' scale is captured directly by the enterprise-size dummies. Specifically, the 
following estimation model makes medium- scale enterprises the benchmark and contains 
dummy variables for large- and small-scale enterprises. It is then expected that the cost 
advantage of the large-scale enterprises due to economies of scale will be captured by a 
positive coefficient for their size dummy variable, and, conversely, the cost disadvantage 
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of the small-scale enterprises due to the lack of economies of scale will be captured by a 
negative coefficient of their size dummy variable. If this is the case, the finding from the 
time series estimation of a loss of scale economies will be supported by the cross sectional 
analysis. 
It should be noted that the estimate of scale effects from the enterprise-size dummy 
is somewhat different from the estimate of enterprise-specific scale efficiency defined by 
equation (7.11). Enterprise-specific scale efficiency as defined by equation (7.11) was 
derived from comparison of output price and marginal cost. By equating marginal cost to 
output price, every enterprise has a specific optimal production scale. Hence, a enterprise 
in an industry might be relatively more efficient in scale than other enterprises but might 
still not be able to achieve its full scale economy potential. The enterprise-size dummy 
captures enterprises' relative efficiency in scale but the estimate of scale efficiency from 
equation (7.11) indicates whether a enterprise has achieved its optimal scale. 
In the derivation of allocative efficiency, the cost of working capital and fixed 
capital are compared with the cost of labour. As stated in chapter 5, since reforms in 
industrial finance in 1984, most working capital has been in the form of bank loans, which 
are subject to repayment and carry a cost in the form of interest. Thus, there is an 
opportunity cost to enterprises for use of their working capital. As enterprises retained 
part of their profit under the contract system, and continuously added new investment to 
their fixed capital stock from retained profits, the fixed capital stock might gradually have 
come more or less under the control of enterprises. This is because enterprises' total 
capital formation would have been adjusted towards the realization of profit maximization. 
Fixed capital stock might have become more or less sensitive to enterprises' output as an 
increasing part of fixed capital stock came to have an opportunity cost for enterprises. The 
estimates of allocative efficiency allow empirical investigation of the above situation. 
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The estimates for allocative and scale efficiencies are sensitive to the input and 
output prices used in the estimation. Considering that factor and goods markets were 
seriously distorted in China, actual input and output prices and hypothesized market 
clearing prices were used in the estimation of allocative and scale efficiencies. 
Comparative analysis can therefore be conducted using the different price-based estimates. 
The hypothesized market clearing prices for the average allocative efficiency of all sample 
enterprises were estimated by an iteration process: different prices were tried and the set 
finally chosen was that under which the average allocative efficiency of the 99 enterprises 
became zero, that is, on average allocatively efficient. As small-scale enterprises are 
hypothesized to be the most scale inefficient in the iron and steel industry, the hypothetical 
market clearing price for scale efficiency is simulated for small-scale enterprises. Under 
the simulated output prices small-scale enterprises on average, are scale efficient, that is, 
their marginal cost equals the hypothetical prices. Although this method is more or less an 
arbitrary means of identifying a correct set of the potential market clearing prices, it can, 
nevertheless, correctly indicate whether the actual input and output prices were lower or 
higher than the potential market clearing prices. Hence, the policy implications of the 
estimates of allocative and scale efficiency are easily verified. 
The actual price for working and fixed capital is taken from loan rates set by the 
China's Industrial and Commercial Bank and were 4.8 per cent for 1980, 7.3 per cent for 
1985 and 7.8 per cent for 1988 (see Appendix 3A). The average annual income of 
workers was calculated from workers' average wage. Average welfare expenditure in the 
industry was used as a proxy for the cost of employing labour. Considering that 'bonus 
spiral' activity among enterprises led to a more or less equivalent income level among 
workers within a enterprise as well as across enterprises, this industrial average income is 
a reasonable proxy for the cost of additional labour for each enterprise. These annual 
labour costs were 1,200 yuan, 1,550 yuan and 2,200 yuan for 1980, 1985 and 1988 
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respectively. The actual output price used in the estimation is the weighted unit value of 
pig iron, crude steel and finished steel from the large-scale enterprises. This unit value is 
taken as a base price that every enterprise should have been able to charge for its output. It 
is used because the large-scale enterprises were subject to greater government planing and 
proportionately more of their output was sold at lower, planned, prices. Thus, the 
weighted unit value of gross output from large-scale enterprises was the lowest in the 
industry. 
The analysis of empirical results 
The stochastic production frontier, equation (7.3), was estimated using the maximum 
likelihood (ML) method from the program Trontier 2.0' (Battese and Coelli, 1991, Coelli 
1991). The program was specially designed for the estimation of frontier production 
function by the ML method and for testing whether technical efficiency is varying over 
time for the observations. The estimation procedure involves three steps: first, calculation 
of ordinary least-square estimates (OLS); second, a grid search involving the value of 
gamma ( gamma = o^ /( a^ + o^)) and aQ (intercept term) along with adjustment of the 
estimate of a^;^ and third, the estimates from grid search are used as starting values for an 
iteration procedure to approximate the maximum Ukelihood estimates. The coefficient rj is 
also provided by the program as the reference for testing the significance of time-varying 
technical inefficiencies for the observations. If r| is statistically significant, it indicates that 
technical inefficiencies of the observations are changing over time. The statistic model 
used in the programe is in Battese and Coelli (1991) and will not be presented here for 
simplicity. 
^ / This is the case when the restricted mode with mu set to zero is estimated. When this resuiciion is 
relaxed, the grid search involving values of gamma and mu along with adjustment of estimates for a^ and 
2 a . 
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There are two reasons for using ML estimation. First, OLS of the production 
function (equation 7.3) provides an unbiased estimate of the k x 1 vector of production 
elasticities, a., but not of the intercept, a^, due to the non-zero expectation of (v. + up. 
The ML method oudined above can provide an unbiased estimate for a^. Second, the OLS 
2 estimate of the variance, denoted by a is often an underestimate of the sum of the 
9 
variances of V. and U-, o . Thus, when the grid search is carried out (over 0 < gamma < 
1 and -2 C J Q ^ ^ < m u < 2 S Q J ^ ^ ) the values of the intercept and variance parameters are 
adjusted accordingly. 
The Trontier' program was chosen because the iterative method used for 
approximating the ML estimates, the Davidon-Fletcher-Power method, is one of the more 
successful Quasi-Newton methods (Himmelblau 1972). The estimation used panel data of 
1980, 1985 and 1988 and the estimation results are reported in Table 7.1. 
From Table 7.1, it can be seen that the coefficients of all observable variables, fixed 
capital, working capital and labour force, have reasonable positive magnitudes and are 
statistically significant. The parameters for enterprise-scale dummy variables in particular 
are statistically significant and have the expected signs, that is, the large-scale enterprise 
dummy has a positive sign and the small-scale enterprise dummy has a negative sign. 
This supports the finding in chapter 4 that, due to their economies of scale, the large-scale 
enterprises had greater total factor productivity. On the other hand, the lack of economies 
of scale in the small-scale enterprises had a negative impact on their total factor 
productivity. Accordingly, it can be argued that a loss of scale economies would be most 
likely when the small-scale enterprise group expanded faster than the large-scale enterprise 
group under the constraint of scarce resources in the iron and steel industry. Based on this 
argument, the estimates of relative scale efficiency across enterprises are in accord with the 
estimates of scale effect obtained from time series analysis. 
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Table 7.1. Maximum likelihood estimation results (dependent variable = gross 
output and observation numbers = 99 x 3) 
Coefficients Independent variables Estimates 
Constant 2.24 
(20.66)^ 
Fixed capital 0.32 
(6.13) 
Working capital 0.33 
(6.40) 
Labour 0.11 
D (2.70) % Dummy 0.38 (Large-scale enterprises) (5.99) 
Dummy -0.20 
(Small-scale enterprises) ( -3.68) 
b gamma 0.94 (122.97) 
2b a 0.57 (7.24) 
0.15 
(7.78) 
Log-likelihood -60.73 
Notes: ^ Figures in brackets are t-ratios and all are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, h 2 2 2 a and 0 in equations 6.3 and 6.4 can be calculated using the formula a =a + o and gamma = u y u V 
(p- / (o^^ + o^^ (Jondrow et al. 1982, Battese and Coelli 1991). 
It should also be pointed out that the parameters of gamma and G^ of the ML 
estimation are statistically significant and the log-likelihood value is high enough to 
surpass the critical value. ri is statistically significant from zero and indicates a time-
varying technical inefficiencies of the observations. Hence, the ML estimation is vary 
reliable. Emphasis will now be placed on the explanation of the estimates of technical, 
allocative and scale efficiencies. 
Technical efficiency 
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As stated above, a enterprise is said to be technically efficient if the estimated technical 
efficiency coefficient is 100 per cent and technically inefficient if the coefficient is less than 
100 per cent This means that, if an inefficient enterprise can utilize its production factors 
as effectively as an efficient enterprise, it should be able to increase its current output to the 
output level that an efficient enterprise could achieve using the same factor inputs without 
increasing its current factor inputs. Esumates of technical efficiency for the 99 enterprises 
over the three years studied are reported in Appendix IB.2. The average technical 
efficiencies of different scale enterprises as calculated from the estimates are presented in 
Table 7.2. Some enterprises which were on a margin between the three defined scales 
moved into other enterprise-scale groups over the three years. To obtain a consistent 
result for average technical efficiency according to the estimates of individual enterprise's 
technical efficiency, the enterprise's scale in 1985 is chosen as the base for the calculation. 
Comparing the average technical efficiency of the all sample enterprises and with 
the three enterprise groups over the three years, there was an obvious improvement in 
technical efficiency in all enterprises over the reform period. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that, to maximize profits, enterprises utilized their production factors more 
effectively and improved their technical efficiency. However, the average technical 
efficiency of all enterprises in 1988 was only 0.53 and thus low. This indicates that the 
improvement in enterprises' technical efficiency over the reform period was not sufficient 
to move enterprises' output close to their potential output level. 
The obvious differences between the technical efficiency of different-scale 
enterprises should be noted. In the three years studied, while medium-scale enterprises' 
technical efficiency levels were at the average level of all enterprises, the large-scale 
enterprises' levels were above the average and the small-scale enterprises' levels were well 
below. This is a clear indication of economies of scale in iron and steel, that is, large-scale 
173 
enterprises could achieve their potential efficient output more easily by utilizing their 
production facilities more effectively than could small-scale enterprises. 
Table 7.2. Average technical efficiency among different sized enterprises, 
1980, 1985, 1988 
1980 1985 1988 
All sample enterprises 0.46 0.49 0.53 
In which 
Large-scale enterprises 0.55 0.59 0.62 
Medium-scale enterprises 0.47 0.51 0.55 
Small-scale enterprises 0.25 0.29 0.33 
The technical efficiency gap between different-scale enterprises is still a serious 
concern for the development of the Chinese iron and steel industry although the 
improvement in technical efficiency of all enterprise groups during the reform period was 
impressive. As discussed in chapter 4, under the protection of local governments and 
especially with the advantage of being able to sell a larger portion of their products at 
higher market prices, some of the local medium- and small-scale enterprises were still able 
to increase their profit margin even though they had an obvious technical, and hence cost, 
disadvantage in production expansion. Table 7.3 compares the more technically efficient 
enterprises, enterprises within the category 0.80 < technical efficiency < 1.00, with the 
least technically efficient enterprises, those within the category 0.20 < technical efficiency 
< 0.40, in terms of their growth rates and ratio of profit to gross output. The most 
technically inefficient enterprises had a higher output growth rate, and more importantly, 
that they had a slightly higher ratio of profit over gross output. This suggests that the 
technically inefficient enterprises had an advantage in charging higher prices for their 
product or through obtaining more inputs at controlled prices, or both. Otherwise, their 
profit margin would have been lower. Therefore, it can be concluded that the distorted 
price system, and possibly local authority protection for inefficient small-scale enterprises. 
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was one of the driving forces for the distorted expansion pattern experienced in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry in the reform period. 
Table 7.3. Growth rate and ratio of profit to output for enterprises with 
different levels of technical efficiency^ 
Enterprises with Enterprises with 
technical technical 
0.80 < efficiency < 1.00 0.20 < efficiency < 0.40 
Number of enterprises 12 34 
Growth rate (per cent) 0.19 0.25 
Profit/gross output (per cent) 0.23 0.25 
Note: Enterprises' average rate of gross output growth between 1985 and 1988. 
Source: The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China, Gangtie Gongye Nianjian (The Year-book of 
Chinese Iron and Steel Industry), 1986 and 1989. 
Allocative efficiency 
Equation (7.10) was used to calculate allocative efficiency. According to this equation, a 
enterprise is said to be allocatively efficient if the estimate of a.^ for the relevant inputs i 
and j is 0 and allocatively inefficient if the estimate is not equal to 0. This means that 
enterprises which are allocatively efficient have chosen an input combination such that the 
ratio of the marginal productivities of inputs is equal to the ratio of the prices of these 
inputs. In other words, costs of enterprises which are allocatively efficient cannot be 
further reduced by substitution between production factors. 
The economic implications of negative or positive values of estimated allocative 
efficiency can be explained by reference to the inputs which are compared. Using a 
comparison between labour and fixed capital as an example, equation (7.10) becomes: 
MP^/MP, = r /wexp(a ) K. L 
175 
where MPj^ and MPj^ are the respective marginal products of fixed capital and labour, r is 
the interest rate for fixed capital, w is the wage rate, and a is the estimate of allocative 
inefficiency. 
The economic implication of a negative a can be explained as follows. Given r and 
w, a enterprise can only change MP„ and MP. to correct the inequality between marginal K. L 
product of input and input price and achieve allocative efficiency. Hence, MPj^, the 
marginal product of labour, must be higher than MPj^, the marginal productivity of capital. 
In other words, capital is being over-utilized and labour under-utilized (Kumbhakar 1989: 
597). The rational adjustment of factor combinations would then use proportionately less 
capital relative to labour so that a enterprise could take advantage of the higher marginal 
product of labour. Costs can accordingly be reduced. The opposite conclusion can be 
drawn regarding a positive value of the estimates for the allocative inefficiency parameter 
within the above framework. However, the distorted prices of inputs should also be 
considered as one of the causes for the allocative inefficiency. If MP^^ and MPj^ are given, 
allocative efficiency can be achieved either by increasing the interest rate, r, or decreasing 
wage level, w. Hence, the allocative inefficiency of enterprises, as described above, may 
be due to distortions in factor market prices, encouraging over-utilization of one factor 
relative to another. Therefore, implications of the estimates derived for allocative 
inefficiency must be carefully considered depending on the likely causes. 
In the estimations of allocative efficiency presented below, labour and wages were 
chosen as the numerators of equation (7.10) to enable comparison with the other inputs: 
fixed capital and working capital respectively. The average allocative efficiency of 
different-scale enterprise groups is calculated from the estimates of individual enterprises' 
allocative efficiency parameters (Appendix 7B.3) and reported in Table 7.4. 
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The consistent negative signs for the estimates of the allocative efficiency parameters 
clearly indicate a general pattern of distortion in Chinese factor markets: workers were 
over-paid and capital costs were under-valued. 
Table 7.4 Average allocative efficiency between labour and fixed and 
working capital for different-scale enterprise groups, 1980, 1985, 1988 
1980 1985 1988 
Allocative efficiency between labour and fixed capital 
All sample enterprises -0.77 -0.60 -0.65 
In which 
Large-scale enterprises -0.60 -0.44 -0.44 
Medium-scale enterprises -0.80 -0.62 -0.67 
Small-scale enterprises -0.83 -0.64 -0.72 
Allocative efficiency between labour and working capital 
All sample enterprises -1.18 -1.07 -1.09 
In which 
Large-scale enterprises -1.19 -1.08 -1.07 
Medium-scale enterprises -1.19 -1.07 -1.08 
Small-scale enterprises -1.16 -1.05 -1.17 
However, an improvement in allocative efficiency can be observed between 1980 
and 1985. The average allocative efficiency of all sample enterprises changed from -0.77 
to -0.60 for the labour/fixed capital comparison and from -1.18 to -1.07 for the 
labour/working capital comparison over this period. This indicates that the enterprises had 
become more sensidve in economizing the use of fixed and working capital in production. 
The key to understanding this trend is the changing nature of the sources of 
investment for upgrading and innovation. These contributed to the newly established 
fixed capital and working capital. Reforms in industrial financing had barely begun in 
1980. Finance for investment for upgrading and innovation was channelled mainly 
through government planning. It would have been rational for enterprises to try to obtain 
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more investment funds from government authorities as the cost of investment to 
enterprises was actually negligible. However, following 1984, enterprises had to provide 
a considerable part of investment funds from their own accumulated revenue. Enterprises' 
behaviour towards the use of this investment could be expected to change. Clearly, 
enterprises should have considered the opportunity cost of this investment as the same 
source of investment could be used for other purposes, providing returns at full market 
value. Therefore, enterprises should have tried to maintain the marginal product of this 
investment at the same level as its opportunity cost. The improvement in allocative 
efficiency of fixed capital was reflected by the changed nature of this investment during the 
reform period. 
As far as working capital is concerned, interest rate charges on enterprises' working 
capital began in 1984 and provided enterprises with an incentive to use working capital 
more effectively compared with the situation in 1980, when working capital was mainly 
provided freely through government planning sources. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that allocative efficiency between labour and capital 
was still poor in 1985 and, more importandy, the improvement in average allocative 
efficiency for all sample enterprises over the period 1980-85 was replaced by a 
deterioration of allocative efficiency between 1985 and 1988 (although, for the large-scale 
enterprise group, the level of average allocative efficiency of fixed capital over labour 
remained the same in 1988 as in 1985 and its level of average allocative efficiency of 
working capital over labour improved slightly). As indicated in Table 7.4, parameters for 
average allocative efficiency of labour/fixed capital and labour/working capital of all 
sample enterprises changed from -0.60 to -0.65 and from -1.07 to -1.09 respectively 
between 1985 and 1988. This finding supports the hypothesis proposed in chapter 5 that 
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enterprises' ability to improve allocative efficiency was largely restricted by the distortions 
existing in factor markets. 
A considerable part of enterprises' fixed capital was inherited from the pre-reform 
period and enterprises paid no financial cost for its use. This contributed to the capital-
biased allocative inefficiency. More importandy, the virtually zero cost plan-allocated 
fixed capital investment was still provided during the reform period. Even if interest rates 
were charged for these investment funds, they were low or even negative in real terms, 
making this investment a 'free gift' to enterprises. 
Biased capital investment in the iron and steel industry was encouraged by self-
reliant regional development. As stated in chapter 3, regional segmentation of the industry 
increased during the reform period and the lack o f reforms regarding ownership o f 
industrial assets continued to restrict capital mobility between regions, sectors and 
enterprises. Every region attempted to ensure its own iron and steel production capacity. 
Because the basic capital investment for an iron and steel enterprise is usually larger than 
that for other enterprises, huge amounts of capital had to be invested by each region into 
these enterprises. Moreover, other industrial resources, such as coal and iron ore, are not 
equally distributed across regions and, more importantly, are scarce relative to the number 
of enterprises. Therefore, there were always enterprises which could not maintain normal 
production because of the shortage of industrial materials. On the one hand, working 
capital had to be over-used to store the industrial materials that were in short supply and, 
on the other hand, the working capital o f these enterprises had a low marginal 
productivity. 
Although the reforms provided banks with the right to charge interest rates for 
working capital, banks failed to set interest rates according to economic rationale and thus 
stimulate enterprises to operate efficiently. The interest rate that banks charged remained 
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subject to mandatory administration from either the central government or local 
governments. The interest rate on working capital was thus also low and did not reflect 
the shortage of its supply. According to Chinese statistics (State Statistics Bureau of 
China 1990), the annual inflation rate for industrial material in 1988 was 12 per cent. 
Compared with the nominal interest rate for working capital, of 9.6 per cent, banks 
incurred a net cost by providing enterprises with working capital. Enterprises benefited by 
borrowing as much working capital as they could from banks. As the cost enterprises 
faced for working capital was essentially negligible, it was rational for enterprises to use 
working capital even if its marginal product was low. This factor, and the shortage of 
industrial materials outlined above, contributed to poor utilization of working capital and 
hence substantially higher negative magnitudes for the estimated parameters of allocative 
efficiency from working capital. These can also explain why the simulated market interest 
rates for working capital are very high (Table 7.5). 
The economic reforms failed to create a labour market in the industrial economy. 
Workers retained their job tenure. Because of the lack of a well functioning labour 
market, managers could not easily decide individual workers' bonus levels through 
reference to a market determined rate. Instead, workers put great pressure on managers to 
increase the level of bonuses up to the highest level observable in other enterprises so that 
'competitive bonus spiral' took effect. During the period 1985 to 1988, the share of the 
wage bill in total net value of output increased from 18.7 per cent to 23.6 per cent in 1988 
(Nation-wide Industrial Investigation Office, State Economic Commission 1987 and The 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of China 1988, 1989). This indicates that the real cost 
of labour increased over the late reform period due to the increase in the real wage level of 
workers. Hence, the higher wage rates of 1988 were one of the key factors in the 
deterioration of allocative efficiency. 
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To shed more light on the extent of distortions in Chinese industrial factor markets, 
the market clearing prices of capital and labour have been simulated according to the 
structure of enterprises' marginal factor productivity. The simulation results are compared 
with the actual factor prices in Table 7.5. It is clear that a much higher interest rate and a 
lower wage level would have been necessary to achieve the average allocative efficiency of 
enterprises in the industry. Also, the inflation rates in the three years are also provided in 
Table 7.5. From the inflation rates, the real interest rate and the simulated market clearing 
interest rate can be calculated as the differences between nominal interest rates and inflation 
rates and simulated interest rates and inflation rates respectively. It can be seen that the 
real interest rates are almost zero in 1980, and negative in 1985 and 1988. This indicates 
that there was no real cost at all for enterprises to obtain loans from banks. As mentioned 
above, the simulated interest rates for working capital are very high. Compared to the 
rates for fixed capital, the higher rates for working capital could be attributed to their short-
term nature. 
Table 7.5. Comparison between actual factor prices and simulated market-
clearing factor prices, 1980, 1985, 1988 
1980 1985 1988 
Wage rate (Yuan) 
Actual 1200 1500 2200 
Simulated 600 700 920 
Interest rate for fixed capital (per cent) 
Nominal interest rate 4.3 7.3 7.8 
Simulated interest rate 14.0 14.5 23.0 
Inflation rate 6.0 8.8 18.5 
Real interest rate 0.6 -0.5 -3.3 
Simulated market clearing real interest rate 8.0 7.9 4.5 
Interest rate for working capital (per cent) 
7.8 Nominal 4.3 7.3 
Simulated 36.0 39.5 40.0 
Inflation rate 6.0 8.8 18.5 
Real interest rate 0.6 -0.5 -3.3 
Simulated market clearing real interet rate 30.0 30.7 21.5 
Source: Actual wage is taken from The Ministry of Metallurgy Industry of China, Zhongguo Gangtie 
Gongye Nianjian (The Year-book of Iron and Steel Industry), 1985-1989; Nation-Wide Industrial 
Investigation Office, State Economic Commission of China, 1987, Quanguo Gongyie Pucia Ziliao (The 
Document of National Industrial Investigation), Neibu Zhiliao (Internal resources). Simulated wage rate is 
from the estimation. Nominal interest rate is from China People's Bank, 1987, 1989 and 1990, Zhongguo 
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Jinrong (China's Finance), 1987/10:9, 1989/4:10, 1990/1:22, China's Finance and Economy Press, 
Beijing. Inflation rate is from World Bank, China - Financial Sector Review: Financial Policies and 
Institutional Development, Washingdon, D.C. 1991. The real interest rate and simulated market clearing 
real interest rates are calculated as the differences between nominal interest rate and inflation rate and 
simulated interest rate and inflation rate respectively. 
Scale Efficiency 
Equation (7.11) was used to calculate the parameters of scale efficiency. According to the 
formulation, a negative value of the scale efficiency parameter for a enterprise indicates an 
excess of output price over marginal cost. This implies that such enterprises are operating 
below their optimum production scale. On the other hand, a positive estimate of the scale 
efficiency parameter indicates a enterprise producing marginal cost above output price and 
operating above its optimal production scale. 
Since the analysis involved a period of almost ten years (1980-88), the estimated 
scale inefficiencies are treated as long-term inefficiencies of enterprises. Marginal cost 
curves of enterprises are hence long-term as presented in chapter 5. In the long term, the 
marginal cost curve is an upward sloping curve which intercepts the price line only once. 
This means that there is a unique optimal scale of production for the enterprise at which the 
marginal cost of the enterprise equals to the prevailing market price (McCloskey 1982, 
Call and Holahan 1983). Following the criterion of scale efficiency, enterprises producing 
over their optimal scales (their marginal costs are larger than the prevailing price) should 
reduce their production and enterprises producing under their optimal scales (their 
marginal costs are less than the prevailing price) should increase their production. It 
should be pointed out that the analysis of scale economies or optimal scale is usually based 
on the long-term situation of enterprises. However, if the short-term situation of 
enterprises are considered, one may observe an U shape marginal cost curve of enterprise. 
Change of enterprise's production in regard to the relationship of its short-term marginal 
cost curve and prevailing price should be the same as that in the long-term situation if only 
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the section of upward sloping curve of the short-term marginal cost curve is considered. 
But if the section of downward sloping curve is considered, enterprises should always 
expand their output no matter what is the prevailing market price. In other words, whether 
marginal cost is less or larger than prevailing price is irrelevant in deciding the change of 
scale of enterprise's production if the section of downward sloping curve is considered. 
This is why the analysis of scale efficiency which compares marginal cost with price 
usually considers the long-term marginal cost curve only simply because the comparison 
between short-term marginal cost curve (the section of downward sloping curve) and price 
does not make any sense. Therefore, the estimated scale inefficiencies should be 
explained in terms of long-term marginal cost rather than short-term marginal cost of 
enterprises. The limitation of analysis of scale efficiency should then be noted because the 
estimated long-term scale inefficiencies of enterprises will not reflect the adjustment of 
short-term marginal cost of enterprises. 
Price discrimination between different-scale enterprises under the two-tier price 
system and its impact on enterprises' scale efficiency is captured by estimates based on 
two different kinds of output prices. The weighted unit value of iron and steel products 
from large-scale enterprises, as mentioned before, will be used as the base price, i.e. that 
which every enterprise should be able to charge. A hypothetical market clearing price will 
be decided for the small-scale enterprises. More specifically, if small-scale enterprises 
charge this hypothetical price, their marginal cost on average will equal the hypothetical 
price and hence on average scale efficiency would be achieved. Since most small-scale 
enterprises were profitable over the period studied, this hypothetical price would be the 
bench-mark price which the small enterprises would have to charge. It is then possible to 
compare this bench-mark price with the base price and obtain an indication of the extent of 
price distortion. The estimates are reported in Table 7.6 (also see Appendix 7B.4). 
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Table 7.6 Average scale efficiency of different sized enterprise groups, 1980, 1985, 1988 
1980 1985 1988 
pa MP^ P MP P MP 
Large-scale enterprises -0.17 -0.42 -0.21 -0.41 -0.10 -0.63 
Medium-scale enterprises 0.22 -0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.27 -0.26 Small-scale enterprises 0.26 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.49 0.00 
Estimates from weighted unit value of iron and steel products from large-scale enterprises. 
^ Estimates from the hypothetical market clearing price at which small scale enterprises would on average 
achieve scale efficiency. 
Considering the average scale efficiency of each enterprise group over the studied 
period, the estimates based on the base price for iron and steel in Table 7.6 indicate that, 
on average, the large-scale enterprises were operating under their optimal scale. That is, 
their marginal cost was lower than the output price. Hence, if they had increased their 
output level, they could have increased their profits. On the other hand, the medium- and 
small-scale enterprises on average were operating above their optimal scale. That is, their 
average marginal cost was higher than the output price, and profitability could have been 
improved through a reduction in output. Overall, the scale efficiency in the iron and steel 
industry would have been improved if the large-scale enterprises, on average, had 
increased their production and medium- and small-scale enterprises, on average, had 
reduced their production. Hence, this finding supports the hypothesis advanced in chapter 
5 that the production of the iron and steel industry was not scale efficient because 
production was not optimally allocated between different-cost enterprises. 
Which factors enabled medium- and small-scale enterprises to operate at levels 
above their optimal scale and produce at marginal cost that is greater than the output price? 
One stems from the ownership of public assets. Under the prevailing system of public 
asset ownership, enterprises did not need to pay any form of interest on their fixed capital 
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which had been allocated through the government planning process. This meant that part 
of enterprises' net output, which should have been counted as a financial cost for the use 
of government allocated fixed capital, was instead counted as enterprises' profit. 
Therefore, despite the poor scale economies achieved by these enterprises, they often did 
not incur the economic losses which they should have because they paid no charges for the 
use of allocated assets. 
However, the estimates based on the hypothetical market clearing prices necessary 
for the small-scale enterprises on average to achieve scale efficiency, provide further 
insight into this problem. The hypothetical prices were 580, 510 and 1100 yuan for 1980, 
1985 and 1988 respectively and the base prices were 321, 324 and 326 yuan in 1980, 
1985 and 1988 respectively. The divergence between the two different types of prices 
was very great, especially in 1988. The implication of these estimates is clear. If small-
scale enterprises had charged higher market prices, they would have avoided economic 
losses. If medium-scale enterprises had charged such prices, they could even have earned 
economic profits. 
The absolute difference between the scale efficiency of large-scale enterprises and 
that of small-scale enterprises may be understood as an indication of the distortion in 
production share distribution across different-cost enterprises. This difference is about 40 
per cent in 1980 and 1985 but about 60 per cent in 1988. This reflects the increasing 
distortion in production share distribution due to production segmentation in the iron and 
steel industry in the late reform period. 
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Conclusion 
Technical efficiency for most enterprises was found to have improved over the economic 
reform period. This basically supports the hypothesis that, as various incentives, such as 
profit retention and bonus policies, were provided to enterprises and workers, they utilized 
production factors more effectively and achieved higher productivity. The large-scale 
enterprises are found to be relatively more technically efficient than medium- and small-
scale enterprises. 
The estimates of allocative inefficiency indicate that factor markets were distorted 
with labour being over-paid and capital under-paid. Nevertheless, allocative efficiencies 
between all studied inputs were also found to have improved slightly over the reform 
period. While this fmding seems to support the hypothesis that enterprises should seek to 
economize on their production factors and thereby improve their allocative efficiency, 
caution should be paid to the absolute level of allocative inefficiency in the estimated 
reform years and the trend of deterioration of allocative efficiency in the late reform years 
(1985-88). A more realistic explanation of the estimated result is that the ability of 
enterprises to improve their allocative efficiency was restricted by distortions in factor 
markets. Moreover, increasing distortion in factor markets would lead to the failure of 
enterprises to rationalize their use of production factors. The simulation for the 
hypothetical situation of average allocative efficiency of all sample enterprises indicates 
that capital should have been valued much higher, and labour, on the other hand, should 
have been valued much lower. Particularly, interest rate for working capital should be 
much higher than the prevailing rate. Hence, the policy implication of these results is that 
giving enterprises the right to maximize profits is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for optimal resource allocation. The sufficient condition is to create functioning factor 
markets which will give correct market signals to enterprises. 
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From the estimates of scale inefficiency based on the base prices, large-scale 
enterprises were found to operate below their optimal scale and medium- and small-scale 
enterprises were found to operate above their optimal production scale. From the 
estimates based on the hypothetical market clearing prices for small-scale enterprises, it is 
revealed that medium and small enterprises should have charged much higher prices for 
their output to make profits. The substantial difference of scale inefficiency between 
different enterprise groups supports the hypothesis that, under the price discrimination and 
the local government protection, the production share was not optimally allocated among 
different-cost enterprises. The current industrial expansion pattern would be cosdy in 
economies of scale. 
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Appendix 7A 
The derivation of the estimation functions of allocative efficiency 
(i) The estimation equation of allocative efficiency 
Given the definition of allocative efficiency: 
^ x i ^ ^ x j = • (^A. 1) 
where, MP^^j and MP^j are the marginal productivities of inputs x. and Xj respectively, W. 
and Wj are the prices of x. and Xj respectively and a - j are the pair-wise allocative 
efficiencies for x. and Xj. Also given a Cobb-Douglas production function 
n 
Y = a n x " 0 i 
i=l (7A.2) 
The marginal productivities of x. and Xj can be derived from eq. (7A.2) as 
n 
M P . = a Y / a x . = a a x ^ " - ' ^ U x ' ' XI 1 0 i i j 
and 
n 
MP . = a Y / a x . = a ax^'J'^^ Hx"* XJ J 0 J J i 
i'^j a A3) 
Substituting eq.(7A.3) into eq.(7A.l) and re-arranging: 
a.Xj / ajx. = W. / W j . exp(a.j) 
taking logarithms of both sides and re-arranging: 
a.j = In(a./aj) + Inx^ + InW^ -Inx. - InW. {7A.4) 
equation (7A.4) is the estimation equation (7.9) in the text. 
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Appendix 7B. Selected statistics, estimated technical, allocative and scale efficiency 
of 99 plants in the Chinese iron and steel industry, 1980,1985,1988 
Table 7B.1. Selected statistics of 99 plants in the Chinese iron and steel industry, 1980,1985,1988 
Gross 
output 
1980 
Fixed 
capital 
Working 
capital 
Labour 
force 
Gross 
output 
1985 
Fixed 
capital 
Working 
capital 
Labour 
force 
Gross 
output 
1988 
Fixed 
capital 
Working 
capital 
Labour 
force 
Firm (million yuan) (million yuan) (million yuan) (100 people) (million yuan) (million yuan) (million yuan) (100 people) (million yuan) (million yuan) (million yuan) (100 people) 
1 1431 1808 440 1111 1860 2208 483 1233 2771 3312 729 1319 
2 1352 512 423 631 1916 670 390 675 2383 959 608 772 
3 446 258 110 235 582 357 157 263 739 562 209 469 
4 133 258 85 273 185 318 104 297 230 440 115 307 
5 813 1260 350 558 1056 1525 358 593 1776 1896 546 621 
6 553 1829 361 624 837 2162 387 684 1129 2521 560 745 
7 2898 5087 792 2101 4152 6221 841 2199 4932 8287 1184 2170 
8 837 1753 242 918 1145 2190 252 1002 1526 3117 429 983 
9 243 265 166 146 388 330 168 147 587 408 194 161 
10 262 226 189 130 359 280 183 137 421 335 201 150 
11 211 321 111 145 280 389 124 156 388 450 166 165 
12 4425 1840 1244 1355 5581 1817 1176 1161 4202 2294 1689 1390 
13 93 939 101 240 422 2060 296 300 1673 9530 1407 324 
14 246 378 119 200 333 456 121 212 381 534 146 222 
15 638 1129 214 601 885 1407 236 664 1039 1938 361 721 
16 74 219 48 617 93 263 61 89 165 494 173 100 
17 1895 4068 922 1143 2809 4926 942 1208 3832 5090 1055 1363 
18 267 288 140 222 360 362 172 244 501 462 239 226 
19 234 381 98 218 337 455 113 237 363 589 172 250 
20 626 1114 218 455 839 1416 228 506 875 1650 265 520 
21 426 547 197 468 554 651 219 494 739 894 265 498 
22 257 188 125 158 375 233 149 168 435 307 256 176 
23 319 421 175 228 496 496 192 241 681 556 279 257 
24 232 345 127 151 343 424 137 162 432 535 147 158 
25 81 71 30 83 116 91 34 85 135 122 68 92 
26 50 71 21 48 80 85 20 50 75 92 30 52 
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27 119 333 69 153 154 466 91 168 173 496 168 231 
28 63 77 44 63 77 89 47 69 109 133 63 81 
29 21 30 18 24 38 37 18 5 57 45 25 26 
30 101 600 110 275 161 717 117 319 213 1092 178 325 
31 108 222 90 118 142 253 96 125 222 316 146 126 
32 43 80 20 42 66 96 20 44 75 94 35 47 
33 111 61 48 54 161 99 49 58 200 159 80 75 
34 37 19 14 26 55 34 14 28 93 68 26 38 
35 192 80 58 63 285 136 59 68 333 236 99 77 
36 47 37 25 30 69 58 26 33 78 76 37 38 
37 72 45 40 37 105 73 39 40 126 94 43 44 
38 66 88 35 80 95 136 35 87 102 175 49 92 
39 34 80 25 48 48 124 25 52 53 227 32 47 
40 281 355 91 200 392 442 109 217 447 616 130 262 
41 83 78 25 62 107 91 36 68 120 106 47 78 
42 54 131 41 124 99 151 41 134 132 251 102 187 
43 46 32 41 46 66 44 26 50 114 113 33 57 
44 9 35 25 23 13 47 13 25 24 55 14 29 
45 71 113 41 115 96 168 53 123 110 236 93 138 
46 78 170 37 129 102 202 48 138 130 237 78 149 
47 49 63 20 43 74 73 30 46 74 84 42 57 
48 81 114 41 82 125 136 50 88 182 160 63 120 
49 48 121 20 81 65 140 25 86 105 374 32 103 
50 60 70 38 71 86 98 39 76 139 173 63 132 
51 61 16 17 19 87 23 18 20 102 36 29 28 
52 31 110 30 41 45 55 31 45 59 63 40 49 
53 94 13 17 14 132 17 17 14.6 103 28 24 25 
54 41 14 14 15 60 18 14 16 78 23 14 19 
55 52 13 20 19 76 17 21 20 90 26 22 23 
56 47 16 9 21 68 21 9 22 65 26 19 23 
57 75 45 37 15 108 62 38 17 142 80 52 18 
58 93 160 42 234 142 352 68 248 213 460 114 262 
59 43 120 30 69 63 150 32 73.6 85 169 50 91 
60 83 23 21 29 121 28 22 30.4 143 48 55 45 
61 94 215 60 146 145 246 75 155 219 369 156 183 
62 61 47 26 24 91 60 27 25 117 71 34 26 
190 
63 117 74 42 72 175 88 59 75.6 206 107 83 87 
64 50 51 27 55 75 63 28 59.6 80 78 40 61 
65 61 44 29 63 90 56 28 67 116 108 44 73 
66 203 154 69 144 295 191 92 154 286 315 108 162 
67 94 160 59 168 130 192 69 177 166 275 92 119 
68 15 25 10 32 31 32 11 34 31 51 12 45 
69 91 153 50 117 133 182 51 124 170 249 99 131 
70 170 205 41 218 263 306 60 232 380 427 152 265 
71 197 146 76 137 296 191 87 146 420 274 169 68 
72 80 66 27 83 122 80 39 89 125 113 78 100 
73 41 64 26 76 64 79 27 80 82 154 63 107 
74 143 229 58 171 238 274 64 180 382 503 122 209 
75 180 297 57 235 196 369 70 249 291 440 104 273 
76 151 63 33 72 197 98 40 75.9 239 140 69 88 
77 44 41 10 36 66 53 11 38 87 66 19 40 
78 27 24 8 26 44 32 8 26.9 53 66 12 40 
79 211 288 110 275 332 367 149 291 509 497 197 302 
80 44 36 15 46 68 45 16 49 76 49 48 56 
81 150 164 53 167 217 196 74 176 237 386 77 210 
82 57 60 26 66 86 74 35 70 60 45 24 30 
83 52 57 43 9 87 72 44 10 92 83 61 103 
84 150 240 48 158 241 293 57 167 252 424 132 187 
85 23 53 46 42 35 67 47 44 47 81 55 45 
86 15 26 12 30 24 35 11 32 147 75 20 44 
87 101 195 63 156 173 221 77 167 256 294 89 184 
88 107 127 66 110 160 164 86 116 216 265 116 123 
89 45 13 9 19 66 17 8 21 80 20 10 21 
90 90 232 65 143 145 294 80 151 212 329 110 180 
91 30 37 27 41 44 45 28 43.8 65 84 53 59 
92 85 42 48 60 125 57 49 64 150 123 97 72 
93 20 22 16 36 33 27 17 37.7 62 52 34 61 
94 230 409 89 353 306 512 96 373 335 617 169 349 
95 21 81 21 65 33 106 22 69 55 130 28 77 
96 22 50 25 42 33 61 26 44 46 74 35 45 
97 3 10 9 16 4.5 13 10 17 6 18 15 18 
98 71 93 31 77 105 114 37 82 155 197 75 106 
99 65 148 46 120 98 176 58 127 140 307 90 157 
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Table 7B.2. Estimated technical efficiency, 1980,1985,1988 
Firm 1980 1985 1988 
1 0.659 0.692 0.724 
2 0.936 0.944 0.951 
3 0.623 0.660 0.694 
4 0.312 0.359 0.406 
5 0.511 0.554 0.595 
6 0.296 0.343 0.391 
7 0.765 0.790 0.812 
8 0.471 0.516 0.558 
9 0.553 0.594 0.632 
10 0.518 0.561 0.601 
11 0.482 0.526 0.568 
12 0.967 0.971 0.974 
13 0.173 0.214 0.258 
14 0.499 0.542 0.584 
15 0.433 0.479 0.524 
16 0.205 0.248 0.294 
17 0.597 0.635 0.671 
18 0.488 0.532 0.574 
19 0.480 0.525 0.567 
20 0.435 0.481 0.525 
21 0.394 0.441 0.487 
22 0.577 0.616 0.653 
23 0.478 0.523 0.565 
24 0.468 0.512 0.555 
25 0.456 0.502 0.545 
26 0.365 0.413 0.459 
27 0.247 0.292 0.339 
28 0.306 0.353 0.401 
29 0.336 0.384 0.431 
30 0.172 0.213 0.257 
31 0.302 0.348 0.395 
32 0.338 0.385 0.432 
33 0.601 0.639 0.674 
34 0.534 0.576 0.615 
35 0.870 0.884 0.897 
36 0.419 0.465 0.510 
37 0.498 0.542 0.584 
38 0.322 0.369 0.416 
39 0.223 0.267 0.314 
40 0.551 0.591 0.630 
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41 0.471 0.515 0.558 
42 0.246 0.291 0.338 
43 0.419 0.466 0.511 
44 0.119 0.154 0.193 
45 0.259 0.305 0.352 
46 0.279 0.325 0.373 
47 0.369 0.417 0.463 
48 0.411 0.457 0.502 
49 0.279 0.326 0.373 
50 0.335 0.382 0.429 
51 0.809 0.830 0.848 
52 0.240 0.285 0.332 
53 0.965 0.969 0.973 
54 0.778 0.802 0.823 
55 0.763 0.788 0.811 
56 0.810 0.830 0.849 
57 0.608 0.646 0.681 
58 0.296 0.343 0.391 
59 0.236 0.281 0.328 
60 0.862 0.878 0.891 
61 0.296 0.343 0.391 
62 0.543 0.585 0.624 
63 0.634 0.670 0.703 
64 0.354 0.401 0.448 
65 0.446 0.492 0.536 
66 0.632 0.668 0.701 
67 0.309 0.356 0.404 
68 0.274 0.321 0.368 
69 0.343 0.390 0.437 
70 0.565 0.606 0.643 
71 0.627 0.663 0.697 
72 0.456 0.502 0.545 
73 0.273 0.319 0.366 
74 0.497 0.540 0.582 
75 0.429 0.476 0.521 
76 0.828 0.847 0.864 
77 0.561 0.601 0.639 
78 0.453 0.498 0.542 
79 0.448 0.493 0.537 
80 0.459 0.504 0.547 
81 0.491 0.535 0.577 
82 0.380 0.427 0.473 
83 0.371 0.417 0.464 
84 0.466 0.511 0.554 
85 0.174 0.215 0.259 
86 0.340 0.387 0.434 
87 0.376 0.423 0.470 
88 0.391 0.438 0.484 
89 0.918 0.928 0.936 
90 0.289 0.335 0.383 
91 0.276 0.322 0.370 
92 0.500 0.543 0.585 
93 0.299 0.346 0.393 
94 0.430 0.476 0.521 
95 0.177 0.218 0.262 
96 0.210 0.254 0.300 
97 0.059 0.084 0.114 
98 0.380 0.427 0.473 
99 0.246 0.292 0.339 
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Table B.3. Selected allocative efficiency, 1980,1985,1988 
Actual 
1980 
estimates Simulatecl estimates Actual 
1985 
estimates Simulated estimates Actual 
1988 
estimates Simulated estimates 
ns F ixed capi ta l Work i ng capi ta l F ixed cpai ta l Work i ng capi ta l Fixed capi ta l Work i ng capi ta l Fixed capi ta l Work ing capi ta l F ixed capi ta l W o r k i n g capi ta l F ixed capi ta l W o r k i n g capi ta l 
1 -0.711 -1.345 0.103 -0.121 -0.537 -1.217 0.092 -0.153 -0.527 -1.205 0.135 -0.117 
2 -1.013 -1.117 -0.200 0.107 -0.793 -1.048 -0.164 0.016 -0.833 -1.051 -0.170 0.037 
3 -0.882 -1.273 -0.068 -0.049 -0.657 -1.034 -0.028 0.030 -0.849 -1.299 -0.186 -0.210 
4 -0.947 -1.450 -0.133 -0.226 -0.760 -1.266 -0.131 -0.202 -0.771 -1.374 -0.108 -0.286 
5 -0.569 -1.146 0.245 0.078 -0.379 -1.029 0.250 0.035 -0.442 -1.004 0.220 0.085 
6 -0.456 -1.181 0.358 0.043 -0.290 -1.057 0.339 0.007 -0.398 -1.072 0.265 0.017 
7 -0.539 -1.367 0.275 -0.143 -0.338 -1.228 0.291 -0.163 -0.345 -1.211 0.317 -0.122 
8 -0.642 -1.522 0.172 -0.298 -0.450 -1.410 0.179 -0.345 -0.426 -1.308 0.237 -0.219 
9 -0.664 -0.887 0.150 0.337 -0.438 -0.752 0.191 0.312 -0.523 -0.867 0.139 0.222 
10 -0.682 -0.781 0.131 0.443 -0.479 -0.684 0.150 0.380 -0.578 -0.821 0.084 0.268 
11 -0.577 -1.059 0.236 0.165 -0.393 -0.910 0,236 0.154 -0.491 -0.945 0.171 0.144 
12 -0.790 -0.980 0.024 0.244 -0.595 -0.805 0.034 0.260 -0.710 -0.863 -0.047 0.226 
13 -0.330 -1.319 0.484 -0.095 0.047 -0.816 0.676 0.248 0.541 -0.310 1.204 0.779 
14 -0.646 -1.169 0.168 0.055 -0.457 -1.054 0.172 0.011 -0.546 -1.130 0.117 -0.041 
15 -0.649 -1.392 0.165 -0.168 -0.463 -1.259 0.166 -0.195 -0.498 -1.248 0.165 -0.160 
16 -1.372 -2.052 -0.559 -0 828 -0.319 -0.974 0.310 0.090 -0.233 -0.710 0.429 0.379 
17 -0.371 -1.036 0.442 0.187 -0.179 -0.918 0.450 0.146 -0.355 -1.059 0.308 0.030 
18 -0.810 -1.143 0.004 0.081 -0.618 -0.962 0.011 0.102 -0.617 -0.923 0.046 0.165 
19 -0.680 -1.290 0.134 -0 066 -0.506 -1.132 0.123 -0.068 -0.555 -1.110 0.108 -0.022 
20 -0.534 -1.263 0.280 -0.039 -0.343 -1.156 0.286 -0.092 -0.426 -1.240 0.237 -0.152 
21 -0.855 -1.319 -0.041 -0.095 -0.670 -1.163 -0.041 -0.099 -0.673 -1.222 -0.010 -0.133 
22 -0.847 -1.045 -0.033 0.179 -0.648 -0.862 -0.019 0.202 -0.686 -0.785 -0.023 0.304 
23 -0.656 -1.058 0.157 0.166 -0.476 -0.909 0.153 0.155 -0.592 -0.912 0.071 0.177 
24 -0.564 -1.018 0.250 0.206 -0.372 -0.883 0.257 0.181 -0.397 -0.979 0.265 0.110 
25 -0.990 -1.385 -0.177 -0.161 -0.760 -1.208 -0.131 -0.144 -0.805 -1.079 -0.142 0.010 
26 -0.753 -1.302 0.061 -0.078 -0.559 -1.208 0.070 -0.144 -0.679 -1.187 -0.017 -0.098 
27 -0.585 -1.289 0.229 -0.065 -0.347 -1.076 0.282 -0.012 -0.595 -1.086 0.067 0.003 
28 -0.835 -1.099 -0.022 0.125 -0.679 -0.977 -0.050 0.087 -0.712 -1.057 -0.049 0.032 
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29 -0.826 -1.068 -0.012 0.156 0.080 -0.254 0.709 0.810 -0.689 -0.965 •0.026 0.124 
30 -0.S84 -1.341 0.230 -0.117 -0.438 -1.246 0.191 -0.181 -0.401 -1.209 0.262 -0.121 
31 -0.648 -1.061 0.166 0.163 -0.483 -0.925 0.146 0.139 -0.528 -0.884 0,135 0.205 
32 -0.643 -1.265 0.171 -0.041 -0.451 -1.153 0.178 -0.088 -0.626 -1.076 0.036 0.013 
33 -0.870 -0.994 -0.056 0.230 -0.557 -0.883 0.072 0.181 -0.601 •0.920 0.062 0.169 
34 -1.059 -1,212 -0.245 0.012 -0.705 -1.111 -0.076 -0.047 -0.674 -1.113 -0.012 -0,024 
35 -0.819 -0.979 -0.005 0.245 -0.489 -0.872 0.140 0.192 -0.441 -0.839 0.222 0,250 
36 -0.831 -1.022 -0.018 0.202 -0.545 -0.914 0.084 0.151 -0.626 -0.959 0.036 0,129 
37 -0.838 -0.909 -0.024 0.315 -0.528 -0.821 0.101 0.243 -0.598 -0.958 0.065 0,131 
38 -0.881 -1.302 -0.067 -0.078 -0.596 -1.206 0.033 -0.141 -0.648 -1.221 0.015 -0.133 
39 -0.701 -1.226 0.113 -0.003 -0.412 -1.128 0.217 -0.064 -0.243 -1.115 0.419 •0,026 
40 -0.673 -1.285 0.140 -0.061 -0.481 -1.109 0.148 -0.045 -0.556 -1.252 0.107 -0,163 
41 -0.823 -1.338 -0.009 -0.114 -0.663 -1.086 -0.034 -0.022 -0.794 -1.168 -0.131 •0,079 
42 -0.899 -1.424 -0.085 -0.200 -0.738 -1.324 -0.109 -0.260 -0.799 •1,211 -0.137 •0,122 
43 -1.080 -0.993 -0.266 0.231 -0.845 -1.094 -0.216 -0.030 -0.630 •1.185 0,033 •0,096 
44 •0.740 -0.907 0.073 0.317 -0.515 -1.094 0.114 -0.030 -0.649 -1.264 0,013 •0,175 
45 -0.930 -1.391 -0.116 -0.167 -0.654 -1.176 -0.025 -0.111 -0.694 •1.119 -0,032 •0,030 
46 -0.803 -1.485 0.011 -0.262 -0.624 -1.269 0.005 -0.205 -0.726 •1.229 •0,063 •0,140 
47 -0.757 -1.276 0.057 -0.052 -0.589 -0.996 0.040 0.069 -0.759 -1.080 -0.096 0,008 
48 -0.779 -1.244 0.034 -0.020 -0.601 -1.056 0.028 0.009 -0.802 •1.228 •0.140 •0,139 
49 -0.748 -1.551 0.065 -0.327 -0.578 -1.347 0.051 -0.282 -0.367 •1.455 0.295 -0,367 
50 -0.929 -1.215 -0.115 0.009 -0.679 -1.100 -0.050 -0.036 -0.810 •1.269 -0,147 -0,180 
51 -0.997 -0.991 -0.184 0.232 -0.729 -0.856 -0.100 0.208 -0.818 •0.932 •0.155 0,156 
52 -0.494 -1.079 0.320 0.145 -0.702 -0.972 -0.073 0.092 -0.818 •1.036 •0,155 0,053 
53 -0.955 -0.859 -0.141 0.365 -0.724 -0.744 -0.094 0.320 -0.878 -0.965 •0.215 0,123 
54 -0.953 -0.973 -0.139 0.251 -0.738 -0.868 -0.109 0.196 -0.844 -1.080 •0,182 0,008 
55 -1.087 -0.921 -0.274 0.303 -0.860 -0.789 -0.231 0.275 -0.874 -0.967 •0,211 0,122 
56 -1.041 -1.311 -0.227 -0.087 -0.810 -1.198 -0.181 -0.134 •0.874 •1.031 •0,211 0,058 
57 -0.445 -0.551 0.368 0.673 -0.228 -0.461 0.401 0.603 -0.279 •0.487 0,383 0,602 
58 -1.088 -1.689 -0.274 -0.465 -0.638 -1.372 -0.008 -0.308 •0.683 -1.309 •0,020 •0,220 
59 -0.682 -1.305 0.131 -0.081 -0.480 -1.172 0.149 -0.108 •0.658 •1.208 0,004 •0.119 
60 -1.023 -1.083 -0.210 0.141 -0.825 -0.951 -0.196 0.114 •0.899 •0.861 •0,237 0,228 
61 -0.754 -1.329 0.059 -0.105 -0.589 -1.125 0.040 -0.061 •0.623 •1.017 0.040 0,072 
62 -0.631 -0.908 0.183 0.316 -0.409 -0.777 0.220 0.288 -0.491 •0.831 0,172 0.257 
63 -0.911 -1.177 -0.097 0.047 -0.724 -0.918 -0.095 0.146 -0.837 •0.968 •0,175 0.120 
64 -0.955 -1.252 -0.142 -0.028 -0.766 -1.138 -0.136 •0.074 -0.820 •1.131 -0.158 •0.042 
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65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
•1.078 
-0.893 
-0.944 
-1.030 
-0.806 
•0.949 
-0.895 
•1.022 
•0.997 
•0.796 
•0.821 
-0.981 
•0.866 
-0.957 
-0.903 
•1.029 
•0.930 
-0.964 
-0.121 
-0.741 
-0.822 
-0.985 
-0.826 
-0.860 
•1.087 
-0.712 
-0.967 
•1.077 
•1.136 
•0.859 
-0.827 
•0.847 
•1.127 
•0.S41 
•0.831 
•1.280 
-1.263 
•1.398 
-1.448 
•1.312 
-1.669 
-1.199 
•1.431 
•1.409 
-1.413 
-1.558 
•1.282 
-1.499 
•1.455 
-1.341 
•1.430 
•1.442 
-1.348 
•0.264 
•1.460 
-0.904 
•1.341 
•1.337 
•1.165 
•1.268 
•1.285 
-1.124 
-1.040 
-1.295 
•1.541 
-1.434 
-1.168 
-1.193 
-1.338 
-1.359 
-0.265 
-0.080 
-0.130 
-0.216 
0.008 
-0.136 
•0.081 
-0.208 
•0.184 
0.018 
•0,007 
-0.167 
-0.052 
-0.144 
-0.089 
•0.215 
•0.117 
-0.150 
0.693 
0.073 
-0.008 
-0.171 
-0.012 
-0.046 
•0.274 
0.101 
•0.153 
•0.264 
•0.323 
•0.045 
•0.013 
•0.033 
•0.313 
•0.027 
-0.018 
-0.056 
-0.039 
-0.174 
-0.224 
-0.088 
-0.445 
0.025 
-0.207 
•0.185 
•0.189 
•0.334 
•0.058 
•0.276 
-0.231 
-0.117 
-0.206 
-0.218 
-0.124 
0.960 
-0.237 
0.320 
•0.117 
-0.113 
0.059 
•0.044 
•0.062 
0.099 
0.184 
•0.071 
•0.318 
•0.210 
0.055 
0.031 
•0.114 
•0.136 
-0.868 
-0.696 
-0.754 
•0.816 
•0.623 
•0.669 
•0.673 
•0.836 
-0.795 
•0.607 
•0.619 
•0.679 
•0.645 
-0.714 
-0.689 
-0.827 
-0.743 
-0.765 
0.068 
•0.545 
-0.607 
-0.751 
•0.668 
-0.639 
-0.881 
•0.500 
•0.778 
-0.840 
-0.935 
•0.652 
•0.603 
•0.648 
•0.906 
•0.647 
•0.648 
•1.189 
•1.034 
•1.219 
•1.300 
•1.196 
•1.397 
-1.035 
-1.168 
-1.282 
-1.259 
-1.361 
-1.088 
-1.349 
-1.337 
•1.101 
•1.296 
•1.186 
•1.111 
•0.167 
•1.277 
•0.781 
•1.274 
•1.146 
•0.940 
•1.229 
•1.086 
•1.004 
•0.926 
•1.156 
•1.400 
-1.307 
-1.039 
-1.041 
-1.156 
-1.151 
-0.238 
-0.067 
•0.125 
•0.187 
0.006 
•0.040 
•0.044 
-0.207 
•0.166 
0.022 
0.010 
-0.050 
-0.016 
-0,085 
-0.060 
-0.198 
-0.114 
-0.136 
0.697 
0.084 
0.022 
-0.122 
-0.039 
•0.010 
•0.252 
0.129 
•0.149 
•0.211 
•0.306 
•0.023 
0.026 
•0.019 
•0.277 
-0.017 
•0.019 
•0.125 
0.030 
-0.155 
•0.236 
•0.132 
•0.333 
0.029 
•0.104 
-0.218 
-0.195 
-0.297 
-0.024 
-0.284 
-0.273 
-0.037 
-0.232 
-0.122 
-0.047 
0.898 
-0.213 
0.283 
-0.210 
-0.082 
0.124 
-0.165 
-0.022 
0.060 
0.138 
-0.092 
-0.335 
•0.242 
0.026 
0.024 
•0.091 
•0.086 
•0.757 
•0.638 
•0.563 
•0.873 
•0.648 
-0.720 
•0.322 
-0.874 
•0.769 
•0.546 
•0.720 
•0.726 
•0.710 
•0.710 
•0.711 
-0.985 
•0.663 
-0.751 
-1.021 
•0.572 
•0.672 
•0.696 
-0.724 
-0.594 
-0.948 
-0.665 
•0.774 
•0.695 
•0.997 
•0.680 
-0.700 
•0.711 
•0.927 
•0.658 
•0.636 
•1.168 
-1.124 
-1.059 
-1.522 
-1.069 
•1.189 
•0.552 
•1.056 
•1.178 
•1.181 
•1.367 
•1.053 
•1.271 
•1.471 
•1.133 
•1.015 
-1.383 
•1.045 
-1.175 
•1.099 
-0.861 
-1.290 
-1.263 
•0.973 
•1.270 
•1.162 
-0.994 
•0.818 
•1.202 
•1.263 
•1.387 
•1.057 
•1.027 
•1.098 
-1.189 
•0.094 
0.024 
0.099 
•0,210 
0.014 
•0.057 
0.341 
•0.211 
•0.106 
0.117 
•0.057 
•0.063 
•0.047 
•0.047 
•0.048 
•0.323 
0.000 
•0.088 
-0.358 
0.091 
-0.009 
-0.033 
-0.061 
0.069 
-0.286 
-0.003 
-0.111 
-0.032 
-0.334 
-0.017 
•0.037 
•0.049 
•0.265 
0.005 
0.027 
•0.079 
•0.035 
0.029 
•0.433 
0.019 
•0.100 
0.536 
0.033 
•0.089 
•0.093 
•0.278 
0.035 
•0.182 
•0.382 
•0.045 
0.074 
•0.295 
0.044 
•0.087 
-0.010 
0.228 
•0.202 
-0.175 
0.115 
•0.181 
•0.073 
0.094 
0.270 
•0.113 
•0.174 
-0.298 
0.032 
0.062 
•0.009 
•0.101 
-1.291 -p.ooe -0X107 Wimm -1,066 P 0 3 3 - o w e 1 c w 0 002 a o o 2 
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Table 7B.4. Estimated scale efficiency, 1980,1985,1988 
1980 1985 1988 
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated 
Firms estimates estimates estimates estimates estimates estimates 
1 0.081 -0.176 0.061 -0.136 0.144 -0.384 
2 0.125 -0.132 0.132 -0.065 0.244 -0.284 
3 -0.002 -0.259 -0.160 -0.357 0.312 -0.216 
4 0.542 0.285 0.473 0.276 0.653 0.125 
5 -0.293 -0.550 -0.315 -0.512 -0.167 -0.695 
6 -0.411 -0.668 -0.397 -0.594 -0.207 -0.735 
7 0.053 -0.204 0.015 -0.182 0.076 -0.452 
8 0.103 -0.153 0.091 -0.106 0.066 -0.462 
9 -0.108 -0.365 -0.147 -0.344 0.128 -0.400 
10 -0.176 -0.433 -0.183 -0.380 0.088 -0.441 
11 -0.049 -0.305 -0.091 -0.288 0.113 -0.415 
12 -0.018 -0.275 -0.101 -0.298 0.053 -0.475 
13 -0.642 -0.899 -0.988 -1.185 -1.612 -2.140 
14 0.127 -0.130 0.113 -0.084 0.319 -0.209 
15 -0.043 -0.300 -0.066 -0.263 0.021 -0.507 
16 1.348 1.091 -0.249 -0.446 -0.429 -0.958 
17 -0.437 -0.694 -0.445 -0.642 -0.085 -0.613 
18 0.253 -0.004 0.179 -0.018 0.234 -0.294 
19 0.256 -0.001 0.225 0.028 0.303 -0.226 
20 -0.256 -0.513 -0.265 -0.462 -0.070 -0.599 
21 0.009 -0.247 -0.042 -0.239 0.097 -0.431 
22 0.192 -0.064 0.121 -0.076 0.151 -0.377 
23 -0.427 -0.684 -0.444 -0.641 -0.255 -0.783 
24 -0.083 -0.340 -0.105 -0.302 0.079 -0.449 
25 0.452 0.195 0.357 0.160 0.347 -0.181 
26 0.112 -0.145 0.137 -0.060 0.256 -0.272 
27 0.080 -0.176 -0.066 -0.263 0.212 -0.316 
28 0.035 -0.222 0.029 -0.168 0.220 -0.308 
29 0.110 -0.146 -1.079 -1.276 0.294 -0.234 
30 0.103 -0.154 0.166 -0.031 0.187 -0.342 
31 -0.081 -0.338 -0.096 -0.293 0.012 -0.516 
32 -0.034 -0.291 -0.029 -0.226 0.113 -0.415 
33 0.050 -0.207 -0.053 -0.250 0.091 -0.438 
34 0.247 -0.010 0.123 -0.074 0.216 -0.312 
35 0.070 -0.187 -0.042 -0.239 -0.045 -0.573 
36 -0.077 -0.334 -0.155 -0.352 0.016 -0.512 
37 -0.112 -0.369 -0.192 -0.389 0.057 -0.471 
38 0.259 0.002 0.190 -0.007 0.303 -0.226 
39 0.212 -0.045 0.137 -0.060 0.042 -0.486 
40 0.271 0.014 0.205 0.008 0.457 -0.071 
41 0.272 0.016 0.158 -0.039 0.400 -0.128 
42 0.353 0.096 0.419 0.222 0.456 -0.072 
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43 0.103 -0.154 0.250 0.053 0.271 -0.257 
44 -0.221 -0.477 0.012 -0.185 0.404 -0.124 
45 0.388 0.131 0.214 0.017 0.262 -0.266 
46 0.378 0.121 0.279 0.082 0.408 -0.120 
47 0.089 -0.168 -0.035 -0.232 0.227 -0.301 
48 0.151 -0.106 0.100 -0.097 0.518 -0.010 
49 0.322 0.065 0.247 0.050 0.277 -0.251 
50 0.208 -0.049 0.153 -0.044 0.523 -0.005 
51 0.071 -0.186 -0.019 -0.216 0.191 -0.337 
52 -0.104 -0.361 0.234 0.037 0.470 -0.058 
53 -0.022 -0.279 -0.064 -0.261 0.271 -0.257 
54 -0.038 -0.295 -0.052 -0.249 0.306 -0.222 
55 0.062 -0.195 0.014 -0.183 0.251 -0.277 
56 0.352 0.096 0.317 0.120 0.262 -0.266 
57 -0.751 -1.008 -0.758 -0.955 -0.608 -1.136 
58 0.821 0.564 0.427 0.230 0.511 -0.017 
59 0.035 -0.222 0.006 -0.191 0.274 -0.254 
60 0.216 -0.040 0.191 -0.006 0.242 -0.286 
61 0.226 -0.031 0.172 -0.025 0.207 -0.321 
62 -0.310 -0.567 -0.351 -0.548 -0.154 -0.682 
63 0.253 -0.004 0.128 -0.069 0.336 -0.192 
64 0.238 -0.019 0.240 0.043 0.334 -0.194 
65 0.394 0.137 0.396 0.199 0.365 -0.164 
66 0.390 0.133 0.280 0.083 0.352 -0.177 
67 0.445 0.188 0.378 0.181 0.157 -0.372 
68 0.570 0.313 0.566 0.369 0.855 0.327 
69 0.249 -0.008 0.251 0.054 0.240 -0.288 
70 0.770 0.513 0.562 0.365 0.517 -0.011 
71 0.331 0.074 0.262 0.065 -0.364 -0.892 
72 0.517 0.260 0.393 0.196 0.375 -0.154 
73 0.384 0.127 0.369 0.172 0.336 -0.193 
74 0.392 0.135 0.374 0.177 0.365 -0.163 
75 0.573 0.316 0.447 0.250 0.637 0.108 
76 0.439 0.182 0.257 0.060 0.338 -0.190 
77 0.363 0.106 0.307 0.110 0.376 -0.152 
78 0.596 0.339 0.562 0.365 0.747 0.219 
79 0.473 0.216 0.349 0.152 0.501 -0.028 
80 0.438 0.182 0.417 0.220 0.363 -0.166 
81 0.537 0.280 0.411 0.214 0.575 0.047 
82 0.348 0.091 0.235 0.038 0.160 -0.368 
83 -1.327 -1.584 -1.295 -1.492 0.561 0.032 
84 0.395 0.138 0.340 0.143 0.256 -0.272 
85 -0.025 -0.282 -0.049 -0.246 0.161 -0.367 
86 0.438 0.181 0.453 0.256 0.718 0.190 
87 0.302 0.045 0.281 0.084 0.531 0.002 
88 0.187 -0.069 0.065 -0.132 0.143 -0.386 
89 0.347 0.090 0.400 0.203 0.564 0.036 
90 0.146 -0.111 0.063 -0.134 0.366 -0.162 
91 0.329 0.072 0.322 0.125 0.409 -0.119 
92 0.228 -0.029 0.186 -0.011 0.040 -0.488 
93 0.565 0.308 0.548 0.351 0.772 0.244 
94 0.624 0.367 0.570 0.373 0.531 0.002 
95 0.434 0.177 0.402 0.205 0.670 0.142 
96 0.223 -0.034 0.203 0.006 0.364 -0.164 
97 0.188 -0.069 0.146 -0.051 0.237 -0.292 
98 0.266 0.009 0.202 0.005 0.260 -0.268 
99 0.266 0.009 0.189 -0.008 0.308 -0.220 
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Chapter 8 
Summary of fmdings and policy implications of this study 
The market structure of the Chinese industrial sector has been influenced by the changing 
relationship between government agencies and enterprises and the changing relationship 
between the central and provincial and local governments. Reforms represent two 
distinctive movements: movement towards more reliance on the market mechanism at the 
enterprise level and decentralization of power from the hierarchical centralized bureaucracy 
to the provincial and local level. While the former has resulted in the decline of the 
traditional centrally planned economy and an increased reliance on the market, the latter 
has encouraged market segmentation. Protected local markets have become prevalent in 
the provinces. 
A confusion of fiscal and fmancial reforms 
Reforms in the planning and fiscal systems were the driving force behind the 
decentralization of the bureaucracy. 
Guidance planning was the key element of reforms in planning. Provincial and 
local governments played an important role in implementing guidance plans, because local 
rather than central governments had to negotiate with individual enterprises to set the 
targets of a guidance plan and, more importantly, had to allocate scarce inputs to die 
enterprises involved at prices below the market level. By so doing, they could control 
most products produced for regional purposes under the guidance plan. Essentially, 
guidance planning represented the transfer of part of the planning process previously 
controlled at the central level to provinces. Local governments' intervention in the new 
market arenas then used familiar instruments of material supply. 
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Reforms to the fiscal system were characterized by the new system of fiscal 
revenue-sharing between the central and local governments. The purpose of this reform 
was to encourage local governments to take responsibility for maintaining their financial 
balances by linking their spending to their own revenue collection. However, because 
market interest rates were not applied to state-owned assets, a enterprise-specific tax was 
introduced instead. This confusion between fiscal measures (taxes) and financial 
measures (financing enterprises) led to distortion of taxation at the enterprise level. Local 
governments had to negotiate taxes with the enterprises they owned on a case-by-case 
basis. Consequendy, enterprises were encouraged to seek rents through bargaining with 
local governments. On the other hand, local governments were able to keep more fiscal 
and financial resources within their territories, and they were also able to control 
enterprises' revenue distribution through direct or indirect bureaucratic intervention. 
Increased reliance on the market at the enterprise level was dependent on the 
effectiveness of ownership reforms. The extent to which the Chinese state-owned 
enterprises could effectively respond to market signals depended on their freedom from 
bureaucratic control by government agencies, which had in the past both owned and 
regulated them. Reform of state ownership focused on the separation of ownership and 
control of state-owned assets between government agencies and enterprises. More 
precisely, the reforms involved weakening ownership and regulatory functions of 
government agencies and devolution to enterprises of the right to control the assets 
employed and accumulated through their activities, and retain some of the benefits from 
doing so. 
The Contract Responsibility System developed by the Capital Iron and Steel 
Corporation was employed by the Chinese government as a model in the reform of state 
ownership. The basic elements of the Contract Responsibihty System were the temporary 
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contract between the government agent and enteqjrise (which had to follow former 
allocation of enterprise profits between the government and the enterprise), the regulation 
of enterprises' retained profit into different types of funds, and the ratio of planned output 
to marketed output. Although the Contract Responsibility System enhanced enterprises' 
autonomy in decision-making and led enterprises to maximize profits, it did not separate 
government control over government-owned assets from the enterprises' rights to control 
the use of those assets. One of the main constraints of the approach was its lack of clear 
definition of property rights for enterprises' assets. This led to the confusion between 
taxes and industrial financing. The Contract Responsibility System was also not flexible. 
Once it was implemented nationally, most enterprises were required to expand their 
production capacity. Expansion was mandatory irrespective of whether they were 
economically viable or not before the contracts were introduced. Resource mobility 
between industries and enterprises was restricted. 
The goal of ownership reform was to replace the bureaucratic administrative system 
by the market. The failure to separate ownership rights and control rights between 
government agencies and enterprises prevented the achievement of this goal. Although 
markets were used more during the reform period than previously, the bureaucracy 
remained pervasive. 
Reforms in industrial finance and labour allocation were key to the development of 
factor markets. Reforms in industrial finance moved away from the previous practice of 
supplying all of the fixed and much of the working capital of enterprises as interest-free 
budgetary allocations. Under the new system, the bulk of capital advances were in the 
form of bank loans, subject to repayment and carrying a cost in the form of interest. 
Instead of transferring all of their surplus funds to the state, enterprises only paid taxes to 
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government agencies out of their profits and kept the surplus as their own accumulation. 
These reforms were too limited, however, to provide a functioning capital market. 
Interest rates on bank loans were still subject to government regulations and were 
typically lower than the inflation rate. Therefore, enterprises' demand for bank loans 
largely exceeded supply. To be able to protect the interest of local enterprises, local 
governments put great pressure on local bank branches to extend credit to meet the 
demand of local enterprises. At the same time they restricted cross-regional mobility of 
credit from their local bank branches. 
The key problem in reforms in industrial finance was confusion between tax and 
industrial financing. Enterprises had not paid interest rates for the state-owned assets. 
Local governments negotiated the payment of taxes with enterprises on a case-by-case 
basis. Consequently, what should properly have been part of a enterprise's financial cost 
for the use of state-owned assets were recorded as enterprises' profits. Negotiations of 
contracts between enterprises and government authorities was based on miscalculated 
profits. It is most likely that even relatively inefficient enterprises, which would have 
made losses under a free market situation, had considerable profit margins because no 
account was taken of the costs of state-owned assets. Enterprises also had bargaining 
power in negotiations with government authorities to claim retention of these apparent 
profits. Hence, the ability of enterprises to self-finance was dependent on their bargaining 
power or connections with government authorities. As local governments had the power 
to set tax levels for the enterprises in their territories, bureaucratic intervention in 
enterprises' capital accumulation, and thus enterprises' financial resources, remained 
pervasive. Furthermore, there was no specific tax directly linked to the capital assets 
allocated to a enterprise under previous government plans. 
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This error in calculating profits undermined the effectiveness of economic reform in 
enterprises which inherited large capital assets under previous government plans. An 
important goal of the economic reform was to make enterprises self-fmancing to instil in 
them financial discipline and reduce the soft budget constraint. Profitability was to 
become the key criterion by which enterprises were judged, and accordingly, management 
was expected to seek efficiency and improve product quality. The banking system and the 
budget authorities were to judge enterprises according to their profitability, ending the 
automatic accommodation of demands for subsidies, tax relief, and credits. Enterprises 
judged not to be viable were to face bankruptcy. So long as part of the financial cost of 
enterprises for the use of inherited capital was incorrectly included in enterprises' profits, 
profitability became a false criterion on which to judge the performance of enterprises. 
The reform measures based on the allocation of resources according to the apparent 
profitability of enterprises did not result in increased efficiency. This problem was found 
to be particularly serious in the iron and steel industry. The inherited capital assets of an 
ordinary small-scale iron and steel enterprise corresponded to the amount of fixed capital 
in a medium-scale enterprise in other industries. This meant that enterprises in the iron 
and steel industry had a greater relative advantage in terms of the inherited capital assets 
over which they had control. 
Reforms in labour allocation were very rare. Even though managers were allowed 
to appoint senior officers within their enterprises, they did not have the right to adjust the 
employment level. Attempts were made to decentralize the wage-setting process and 
thereby increase efficiency in the use of labour by permitting managers to determine 
workers' income from bonuses. Managers faced enormous pressure from workers to 
increase workers' incomes through bonuses. Due to the lack of a competitive labour 
market, the wage level in a enterprise did not converge to workers' marginal productivity. 
Workers cared not only about how many yuan per month they were paid, but also about 
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how many yuan per month workers in other enterprises received. A 'competitive bonuses 
spiral' across enterprises occurred. The increasing share of wage bills in the value of 
enterprises' net output in the iron and steel industry suggests that managers bowed to 
pressure from workers to increase wage levels beyond improvements in the enterprise's 
productivity. 
Goods markets have been established as a result of reforms in the commodity 
distribution and price systems. Under the new commodity distribution system, 
enterprises have been allowed to sell part of their output on the open market. The power 
of local governments in the allocation of iron and steel products increased. The effect of 
local market development was that a much higher proportion of the products of large-sized 
than medium- and small-scale enterprises were controlled by government plans. Hence, 
the access of enterprises to the goods market was distorted as well as restricted on a 
regional basis. Local governments had an incentive to restrict competition in local markets 
supplied by enterprises owned by them. 
Although the term 'two-tier price system' has been widely used to describe the 
price system implemented during the reform period, prices of industrial goods were not 
simply planned or market prices, but ranged from planned, negotiated and floadng to free 
market prices. As far as iron and steel goods are concerned, output sold by enterprises on 
the market was subject to a price ceiling regulated by the central government. The ceiling 
prices were too low to clear the market. Products were hence sold through various under-
table trade arrangements to final consumers at higher market prices. Further distortion of 
the goods market was introduced because higher market prices encouraged enterprises to 
break the government price ceiling through various malpractices. Therefore, distortions in 
the goods market led to unequal profit opportunities between enterprises: the more output 
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enterprises could sell in the market, the less they were bound by government regulated 
price ceilings. 
In brief, elements of markets have developed since the process of economic reform 
started in 1978, but local governments have continued to enforce controls over 
enterprises. With the development of markets, enterprises altered their behaviour towards 
pursuit of profits. True measures of the profitability of enterprises are impossible to 
obtain because of the existence of distorted factor and goods markets. Without 
functioning factor and goods markets, decentralization merely stimulated bureaucratic 
bargaining. Enterprises bargained for credits, subsidies and tax relief with local 
governments. Direct central controls previously in force were replaced by a plethora of 
indirect policy instruments which were exercised by local authorities with increasing 
arbitrariness. Due to the pervasive bureaucratic intervention of local governments, the 
development of industrial markets tended to become locally segmented. Consequendy, 
competition among enterprises and across regions was limited due to the lack of capital 
and labour mobility across enterprises, local governments introduced shelter from 
competition from other regions, and the absence of capital market disciphne on investment 
decisions. 
Partial introduct ion of a market mechanism, market distort ion and 
economic eff ic iency 
The Chinese iron and steel industry, like iron and steel industries everywhere, was subject 
to economies of scale. The large-scale enterprises on average had lower unit costs than 
smaller-scale enterprises. However, enterprises of all scales were able to improve their 
economic efficiency by reducing their unit costs during the reform period. 
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Concerns arise from industrial market segmentation in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry. The pattern of production expansion was biased to those local government 
owned medium- and small-scale enterprises which operated far below the minimum 
efficient scale levels. Medium- and small-scale enterprises were able to increase their 
production share even though they had high marginal production costs. By using electric 
arc furnaces, the medium- and small-scale enterprises used scrap steel and electricity 
which were in short supply in China. The spatial distribution of iron and steel production 
became increasingly segmented across regions. The regions which exhibited low 
efficiency in iron and steel production had a rapid increase in investment. As every region 
and every enterprise had an incentive to increase output using resources under its control 
with little regard for nationally optimal resource allocation, economic efficiency in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry was adversely affected. 
The development of markets in the Chinese iron and steel industry affected 
economic efficiency in a number of different ways. This study has attempted to 
decompose economic efficiency into technical, allocative and scale efficiencies. The 
analysis in chapter 5 suggested the following trade-offs between the different aspects of 
productive efficiencies. 
' Market imperfections led the Chinese iron and steel industry to operate at less 
than an optimal scale of production. This occurred because enterprises with 
higher production costs expanded much faster than enterprises with low costs. 
' Scale inefficiency was encouraged by distortions in the capital market which led 
to capital resources being spread thinly across regions and enteiprises. 
• In response to the incentives offered, enterprises went some way towards 
maximizing profits. This led to an improvement in the technical efficiency of 
enterprises as they tried to utilize their production capacity effectively. A 
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limited improvement in technical efficiency might also have been due to 
increasing workers' efforts associated with 'bonus incentives'. 
' Improvement in the allocative efficiency of factors over which enterprises had 
control, such as enterprises' accumulated funds, could have been expected as 
enterprises economized on the use of these factors. However, an inefficient 
allocation of capital resources remained with respect to the capital resources that 
continued to be either provided by banks at negative real interest rates or by 
government plans. Allocative inefficiency was also caused by distortions in the 
labour market where rigidities regarding the hiring and firing of labour were not 
resolved during the reform period and where labour was over-valued due to the 
'competitive bonus spiral'. 
Estimation methodology and results of the empirical studies 
Empirical studies were conducted at both industrial and enterprise levels with time-series 
industry data and cross-sectional enterprise-specific data. 
The time-series industry level study aimed to distinguish improvements of 
economic efficiency resulting from economic reforms. Improvements were anticipated to 
arise from changes embodied in capital stock and changes in workers' qualifications or 
experiences. Hence, a distinction between disembodied technical progress and embodied 
technical progress, which includes productivity improvements due to improvements in the 
quality of productive factors, was made in the estimation. Disembodied technical progress 
was expected to reflect the effect of the economic reforms on improvements in the 
efficiency of resource allocation only. Change in scale economies has also been 
distinguished from technical progress. By so doing, the estimation function involved less 
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restrictions in its function form and, more imponantly, revealed more details of the 
efficiency structure of industrial performance. 
The finding from the industrial level study is that, compared with the pre-reform 
period, disembodied technical progress during the reform period was significantly higher, 
but economies of scale were even poorer than in the pre-reform period. This finding 
seems to support the hypothesis that there might be a trade-off between a gain in technical 
efficiency due to the enterprises' increased effort to utilize their production factors more 
effectively to maximize profits and the loss of scale efficiency due to the excessive 
segmentation of production capacity as a result of bureaucratic decentralization. Because 
production capacity was highly segmented across regions and enterprises, it could be 
expected that capital investment might have increased but that the resulting output might 
not have increased proportionately. This arose because it appears that capital investment 
as well as production materials have not been effectively concentrated in the regions and 
enterprises with a comparative advantage in iron and steel production. Therefore, the 
expansion pattern of the whole industry has been inefficient in scale. Despite the fact that 
every enterprise tried to utilize its individual production factors more effectively, this effort 
at the individual enterprise level was off-set by the loss of scale economies due to the 
inefficient industrial expansion pattern. 
Cross-sectional enterprise level study aimed to provide details of technical, 
allocative and scale efficiencies of different-sized enterprise groups during the reform 
period. 
The stochastic frontier estimation method was used to estimate these efficiencies. 
The advantage of this method was that it provided separate estimates for the respective 
208 
sources of productive efficiency. Thus, the estimates of scale efficiency do not include the 
effect of technical and allocative inefficiencies on output and marginal cost 
Technical efficiency in most enterprises was found to have improved during the 
economic reform period. This supports the hypothesis that, because various incentives 
such as profit retention were provided to enterprises and workers, the available production 
factors within enterprises were utilized more effectively in pursuit of higher productivity. 
Allocative efficiency in factors was found to have improved slightiy over the early 
reform period (1980-85). This seemed to support the expectation that enterprises should 
seek to economize on their production factors so that resources should be more optimally 
allocated across enterprises. However, the deterioration of allocative efficiency in the later 
reform years (1985-88) indicated that the ability of enterprises to improve their allocative 
efficiency was largely restricted by the increasing distortions in factor markets. The 
comparison between the prevailing factor prices and the simulated factor prices suggested 
that capital was under-valued and labour, on the other hand, was over-valued. The policy 
implication is that the creation of functioning factor markets is the key for optimal 
allocation of production factors across enterprises. 
On average, the three enterprise scale groups were found to produce inappropriate 
shares of total production, that is, failed to achieve scale efficiency. The large-scale 
enterprise group produced less than the share of total output it should have produced and 
the medium- and small-scale enterprise groups produced a higher share of total output than 
they should have produced. That is, the relatively more efficient enterprises produced too 
littie and the relatively less efficient enterprises produced too much. The enterprises which 
produced too great a share of total output made economic losses. This finding supports 
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the hypothesis that the inefficient enterprises that took advantage of distorted goods 
markets by selling proportionately more of their products at higher market prices than 
other enterprises, they could expand more rapidly than relatively more efficient 
enterprises. Consequently, resources would not have been allocated in favour of the more 
efficient enterprises but rather spread thinly across all enterprises, or even allocated 
disproportionately to inefficient enterprises. 
Policy implications 
Movement towards more reliance on the market mechanism at the enterprise level has been 
successful in China. The change of enterprises' behaviour towards profit maximization 
has led to a significant effort by enterprises to utilize resources under their control more 
effectively. This has been rewarded by the improvement of disembodied technical 
progress at the industrial level and an improvement of technical efficiency at the enterprise 
level. Hence, further reforms which encourage decentralization towards more reliance on 
market mechanisms at the enterprise level should be encouraged. 
Distinction between industrial financing and taxation 
The current method of collection of the adjustment tax was uncertain and arbitrary. 
When the tax was taken from enterprises' profits, what should have been defined as the 
enterprises' financial costs of capital were in fact represented as their profits and, hence, 
what should have been the enterprises' liability became their net contribution to 
government or the society. As a result, this confusion between industrial financing and 
taxation led to many relatively inefficient enterprises appearing to be profitable by under-
reporting their capital costs. As this misleading standard of enterprises' profitability was 
widely used as the criterion for enterprises' performance, economic resources were not 
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optimally allocated in favour of relatively more efficient enterprises. A distinctive financial 
market and well-defmed taxation system should, therefore, replace the current confusion 
between industrial financing and taxation. A uniform tax on state-owned productive 
assets should replace arbitrary taxes and negotiated profit shares. In the long run, the tax 
on state-owned assets should be replaced by market interest rates, state-owned assets 
should be fully mobile in a capital market, and taxes should be charged only on income 
that is properly assessed as such. 
Clear property rights definition 
The lack of effective ownership reform was a key feature of the 1980s. A striking 
weakness of the ownership reform was that there were no well-defined property rights for 
productive assets employed in the state-owned enterprises. Government ownership of the 
productive assets that enterprises inherited from government plans in the pre-reform 
period was confirmed only by the introduction of an arbitrary adjustment tax. 
Even the productive assets in which the enterprises invested their own capital were 
regarded as public assets. Government agents arbitrarily removed enterprises' benefits 
with either the adjustment tax or negotiated profit shares. This greatly discouraged 
enterprises from self-financing investment. 
Poorly defined property rights over productive assets in state-owned enterprises 
had a negative impact on measures aimed at increasing reliance on the market mechanism 
at the enterprise level. The contracts signed between enterprises and government agents 
did not follow any set rules. There was no guarantee of due process nor predictability and 
security of returns from investment. Profits earned legally could be arbitrarily taken away 
by either the adjustment tax or the increase in the government's share in enterprises' 
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profit. On the other hand, profits made illegally could be concealed by enterprises if they 
had good bureaucratic connections. The rewards of economic success did not necessarily 
go to the relatively efficient enterprises. 
Correcting market signals 
To use enterprises' profitability as a guide for resource allocation, the two-tier price 
system should be replaced by a uniform price system based on free market-clearing prices. 
This study has shown that the less efficient the enterprises and the poorer their 
performance, the less likely they are to be bound by plan constraints. The less efficient 
enterprises are often more capable of exploiting gaps and loopholes created by the two-tier 
price system in distoned goods markets. They could become as profitable in financial, 
though not economic, terms as more efficient enterprises. Consequendy, the less efficient 
enterprises were not disadvantaged in acquiring productive resources. 
Negative real interest rates, that is, distortions in the capital market, played a major 
role in the excess demand from enterprises for capital loans. The next step towards 
reform in the capital market should be the freeing of interest rates. The regulated, and 
usually negative, real interest rate for bank loans has failed to guide the allocation of 
capital towards the relatively efficient enterprises, even though local bank branches were 
able to allocate bank loans. In Poland, in contrast, high interest rates served to stabilize 
the national economy and create a real capital market (Lipton and Sachs 1990:117-8). 
They have not only sharply reduced the demand for credit on the part of enterprises but 
have also contributed to currency convertibility and the restoration of macroeconomic 
balance. The results presented in chapter 7 indicated that, to ensure allocative efficiency of 
capital, an appropriate interest rate on capital would have been much higher than the 
prevailing rates. 
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The wage level in the industrial sector was too high to allow enterprises to achieve 
an optimal allocation of resources. The government recognized the dangerous trend in the 
increase of workers' wages and tried to control wage increases by introducing penalty 
taxes on them. But the government was largely ignored as enterprises exploited gaps and 
loopholes in the regulations to meet the demands of their workers for wage increases. 
Hence, the experience of the past reforms is that reform in the wage system will not be 
effective if there is no effective reform in the labour allocation system. So long as 
workers are theoretically owners of state-owned productive assets and their lifetime 
employment is guaranteed, enterprise managers will have no power to dismiss or reassign 
workers according to economic efficiency. On the other hand, without a labour market, 
managers cannot determine workers' wage levels according to marginal labour 
productivity. Wages have to be set subject to arbitrary standards. When arbitrary 
standards apply, managers are in a very weak situation to resist pressures from workers 
for wage increases. 
Reform in the labour and wage system should aim to create a labour market. 
Workers could move across regions and enterprises so that efficient workers would be 
given preference in employment. Managers would be able to 'hire or fire'. Reforms of 
this type, however, would be most likely to change under-employment in the existing 
state-owned enterprises into unemployment. The under-employment in Chinese urban 
industries is estimated by an IMF study to be as many as 20 million people; this is 14.5 
per cent of the urban work force. (Blejer et al. 1991: 8) 
Reducing regional barriers through markets 
Decentralization towards local bureaucracies has encouraged local governments to 
use their power to restrict competition across regions. Therefore, local medium- and 
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small-scale enterprises have been able to obtain more protection than previously from their 
local authorities. The government has never stopped arguing against regional and sectoral 
isolation {tiao kuaifenge). Attempts in this regard have repeated cycles of decentralization 
and re-centralization throughout the history of the People's Republic of China (Zhao 
Suishen 1990). The current policy of the Chinese government is again to re-centralize 
economic power. Specifically, allocation of industrial materials by central plans has been 
increased, bank credits are being controlled through state-fixed quotas, more industrial 
goods are being subjected to state-fixed prices, central financial revenues have been 
increased by reducing local financial revenues and reforms leading to a greater reliance on 
markets have been terminated (Chen Kang 1990). 
This study highlights the need to reduce regional barriers in the Chinese economy 
to minimize the distortions in factor and goods markets. Only when markets are 
functioning smoothly can bureaucratic interventions in the economy, whether from the 
central government or local governments, be effectively reduced. More specifically: 
' if the real rate of interest charged on bank loans reflected demand and supply, credit 
would not need to be rationed by bureaucratic means. Profits and losses could be 
calculated properly. It would be unnecessary for the local governments to restrict the 
credit of local banks to theu- own regions; 
' if property rights for enterprises' productive assets were clarified, arbitrariness in the 
current enterprise-specific contracts would be limited. The Contract Responsibility 
System could then be replaced by a well defined taxation system. In this situation, 
the interests of the central government, local governments and enterprises would be 
cleariy separated and the incentives for local government protectionism would be 
greatly reduced; and 
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' if the current two-tier price system were replaced by a system in which prices could 
adjust to reflect scarcity, regions endowed with different resources would be 
encouraged to specialize in the industrial activities in which they have a comparative 
advantage. There would be no need for local governments to protect industry in their 
own regions. 
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